









Ecuador is a country that arouses interest in its current 
situation. Aer an economic boom, it is now going through 
a severe crisis. At the end of a decade of an authoritarian 
government identifying itself with “21st century socialism”, 
human rights and freedom of expression abuses are being 
exposed. As the facts are being laid bare, an entire system of 
abuse of power and corruption from the government is 
emerging.
e present work brings together various papers focusing 
on these realities. ey tackle several aspects of the coun-
try’s context today and in the immediate past: poverty, 
economic changes, political power and its relationship to 
social movements, extractivism and its impacts, art and 
literature.
Despite interest in this subject, the literature on Ecuador’s 
realities is quite scant. at is why we hope the present publi-
cation will contribute meaningfully to further knowledge 
about the country.
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For several reasons, Ecuador is a country that arouses interest in its 
current situation. Aer a boom, it is now going through a severe crisis. At 
the end of a decade of an authoritarian government identifying itself with 
“21st century socialism”, human rights and freedom of expression abuses 
are being exposed. As the facts are being laid bare, an entire system of 
abuse of power and corruption from the government is emerging.
e present work brings together various papers focusing on these 
realities. ey tackle several aspects of the country’s context today and in 
the immediate past: poverty, economic changes, political power and its 
relationship to social movements, extractivism and its impacts, art and 
literature.
is book’s various chapters have been presented at academic gather-
ings, such as the seminar “Ecuador in the 21th Century” (Oxford, Octo-
ber, 2017)  and others. ey are aimed at a wide range of readers. Most of 
them were originally written in English. Others were translated so they 
could be included in this publication. All have been written by professors 
teaching at the Ecuadorian campus of the Simón Bolívar Andean Univer-
sity.
Despite interest in this subject, the literature on Ecuador’s realities is 
quite scant. at is why we hope the present publication will contribute 
meaningfully to further knowledge about the country. 
Oxford, October 2017 – Quito, July 2018
Editorial Note

Social Capital, Economic Performance, 
and Poverty in Ecuador
Alex Remache Gallegos
Introduction
Certain studies aimed at understanding the economic processes and 
determinants of development in society stress the important role played 
by culture, natural diversity, organizational tradition, and participation, 
as well as the ties of trust and solidarity that bring members of a com-
munity together. In other words, they take into account hidden or in-
formal elements within society, on the assumption that these elements 
foster economic growth. Furthermore, these studies believe that groups 
of people who maintain strong cultural ties and organizational and com-
munity traditions are better positioned to tackle poverty and exclusion. 
ese ideas provide the framework for the present paper.
e paper will identify dimensions of social capital, natural capital, and 
economic performance in Ecuador’s parishes and examine the relation-
ships between them, taking into consideration the conditions of family 
poverty. e parish is the smallest territorial unit within the country’s po-
litical and administrative structure.
e discussion explores the following question: What is the relation-
ship between the cultural, organizational, and natural elements in Ecua-
dor’s parishes and the economic performance and conditions of poverty 
in these parishes?
Following the introduction, this paper will: dene concepts that are 
important for the analysis; articulate a theoretical perspective for linking 
social capital, economic growth, and development; present certain fea-
tures of Ecuador’s diversity; point out certain dimensions of social capi-
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tal; identify and reveal relationships between the variables that were used 
in the empirical work, conducted on a statistical sample; and nally, draw 
conclusions.
Concepts of Interest
Social inequality and poverty are pressing problems that Ecuador 
must continue to address in coming decades. is task requires a better 
understanding of the factors that are the driving forces behind economic 
growth and the distribution of wealth, as well as the potential of society 
and groups who maintain strong traditions and solidarity ties to promote 
this growth.
Let us examine a brief list of data highlighting the social and economic 
imbalances in Ecuador. Ospina (2011) indicates that, between 1996 and 
2005, “[...] although economic growth reached 14%, [...] poverty declined 
by only 5.7%. e low correspondence between economic growth and 
the reduction of poverty is due to the marked increase in social inequali-
ty; the Gini coe
cient for per capita consumption grew from 0.434 to 
0.466. e concentrative nature of the model reduced the advantages of 
the modest growth achieved” (p. 23).
According to data from ECLAC, average GDP growth between 2004 
and 2013 amounted to 4.5% and poverty declined from 52% to 33.6%. 
e historical evolution of unemployment and underemployment has re-
mained unchanged at about 45%. In other words, about half of the labor 
force is unemployed and underemployed (INEC, 2016). Over the past 10 
years, economic performance has been modest, despite political stability 
and the signicant nancial resources made available by earnings from 
high oil prices.
Economic growth benets certain sectors. It can even be asserted that 
the economy has always been structured in such a way as to secure the 
same results and benet the same groups. Growth does not exert iden-
tical impacts on all segments of the population, since it is structurally 
biased toward promoting the concentration of wealth, which in turn wi- 
dens inequality.
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ese imbalances in Ecuador have remained constant over time and 
are driven by a worldwide strategy to ensure the concentration of wealth. 
Regarding this, Bauman (2014) states that “in almost all parts of the world 
inequality is growing rapidly, which means that the rich, especially the 
very rich, are getting richer, while the poor, and especially the very poor, 
are getting poorer” (p. 22). In addition, Stiglitz (2015) states his concern 
over high levels of social inequality and the concentration of wealth in 
few people (pp. 139-143).
Economic and social processes, however, always take place within a 
given society marked by specicities, some of which, if viewed from an 
economic standpoint, may contribute to overcoming some of the problems 
noted above.
On the basis of this perspective, studies on the determinants of eco-
nomic growth increasingly emphasize elements such as diversity, culture, 
community and organizational tradition, and the ties based on trust and 
solidarity between people. ey also correlate the level of economic per-
formance with the maturity of political systems and the progress achieved 
by countries in developing their institutions. Moreover, they claim that 
these elements promote economic growth and social inclusion and help 
families to address conditions of inequality.
As a result, these elements in a society, which have not been su
cien- 
tly studied, become relevant to the economy and development. Because 
of this, the cultural and organizational traditions of a society are being 
reappraised and becoming the focus of research. In this context, the study 
of social capital, along with its forms, impacts, and the resources it a	ords 
economic processes, is also becoming increasingly important.
As noted, some of these elements have already been mainstreamed into 
studies on economic growth and development. Growth models have been 
ne-tuned and their determining factors have been identied, including 
physical capital, labor, technology, and international trade. ere is not 
enough empirical evidence, however, to unequivocally establish the rele- 
vance of social and natural capital to economic growth or development.
ere is very little knowledge about how the elements underlying 
the social, natural, and cultural fabric of society are related to economic 
growth, social inequality, and family poverty.
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is study contributes to understanding these relationships. e re-
sults can help to steer policymaking and provide social groups, organiza-
tions, and communities with knowledge useful for revitalizing their tra-
ditions and organizational and productive practices. e results can also 
contribute to improving governance of small territories by taking into ac-
count their specicities and even by devising new forms of management. 
In short, the study is of interest, not only because it addresses the social 
and economic situations of people and their territories, but also because 
it seeks to rea
rm ideas about the specicities and potential arising from 
the diversity of Ecuador’s social and natural capital.
Diversity Enriches        
a Theoretical Perspective
Dominant paradigms involve models that simplify reality and, as a 
result, they fail to adequately take into account the social, economic, cul-
tural, and natural diversity of countries. Hence, it is necessary to study a 
society on the basis of these specicities.
e potential of diversity is examined by Martucelli and Svampa (1993), 
who point out that “it is not the ‘schools’ that respond and analyze, [...] 
rather the social problems that set the guidelines” (p. 10). In other words, 
the specic traits of a society may well be the source from which inno-
vative thinking can arise, especially when a society has urgent problems 
to tackle, such as scarcity, low growth, poverty, exclusion, and inequality. 
erefore, the idea that the specicities of a society, when reappraised on 
the basis of their relationship to economic and political processes, can be 
used to enhance local development is of the utmost importance.
As a result, regardless of the extent to which development theories have 
been ne-tuned, they stand to be further enriched by these reections 
on a society’s diversity. is requires widening the scope of development 
theory beyond the economic elements that are traditionally examined.
is line of reection is enriched by scholars such as Sen (2000), who 
denes development as a process of expanding the real freedoms enjoyed 
by individuals. For example, by preventing deprivations such as starva-
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tion, malnutrition, preventable morbidity, and premature mortality or by 
promoting the exercise of political freedoms and freedom of expression 
(p. 55). In other words, Sen views development as people being able to 
exercise real freedom and self-fulllment, which depends on their access 
to health, education, opportunities, and participation.
Kliksberg (2002) also challenges the reductionist view of development 
and advocates a broader perspective, one that incorporates economics, ins- 
titutions, politics, human development, and the environment. He points 
out that it is ethically imperative to place equity, inclusion, and partici-
pation at the heart of the development agenda, emphasizing the need to 
reformulate the economy-centered vision of development. He calls for 
ethical responsibility in dealing with social challenges, for creating fairer 
rules of the game, and for reappraising the importance of solidarity and 
participation (pp. 172-173).
Development and economic growth are interrelated concepts that can 
be enriched by incorporating elements of diversity. In order to do this, 
certain specicities of a society can be added to the classical factors of 
growth: savings, capital, labor, technical progress, learning, knowledge, 
human capital, research, and international trade (Sala I Martin, 1994). In 
doing so, the notion of diversity challenges development policymakers 
and thinkers to remodel their theses. It also challenges them to identify, 
value, and include each country’s unique potential among its determi-
nants for economic growth.
Ideas about natural capital also highlight the role of local communities 
in preserving forests, mangroves, and water sources. is position is con-
sistent with that of Ostrom (1999), who states that governance models 
should focus on co-management practices, or practices that restore the 
organizational and management capacity of local groups or communi-
ties. In this sense, a strong relationship is established between the mana- 
gement of natural resources and social capital. is approach involves 
caring for the environment and natural resources, which is associated 
with the capacities of groups and communities. However, it cannot be 
taken for granted, as Pretty and Ward (2001) note, that the participation of 
social groups in environmental issues ensures the equitable or sustainable 
management of resources.
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It is now time to focus on social capital. e theoretical background to 
this concept is rooted in studies that examine trust relationships between 
individuals and groups, as well as civic and cooperative action taken by 
members of society who seek joint benets. Social capital has also been 
identied by studies in the eld of economics that concentrate on insti-
tutions and solidarity mechanisms. Although this background a	ords a 
broad understanding of the concept, it fails to identify social capital as 
an element that is related to the economic performance of a country or 
region.
e theoretical contributions of James Coleman and Robert Putnam 
consider the specicities of the regions and community associations they 
study as elements that enhance cooperation between individuals, and that 
frequently improve the functioning of political systems and economic de-
velopment. Coleman (1988) begins with a reection on social action that 
leads to the conceptualization of social capital as collective actions that 
can a	ect social development. Putnam (1933) builds upon this by analy- 
zing the civic traditions of Northern and Southern Italy and their impact 
on how regional governments function. He also studies social capital in 
North America, showing that, when the activity of organized groups de-
clines, so does the quality of democracy and the lives of citizens.
Bourdieu’s rst proposals (1980) attribute new dimensions to social 
capital, which he denes as “the aggregate of the actual or potential re-
sources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or 
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recogni-
tion.” Subsequently, Bourdieu (1985) presents three types of capital: eco-
nomic capital, which can immediately be converted into money; cultural 
capital, which in certain conditions can become money and which be-
comes institutionalized via educational qualications that give rise to hu-
man capital; and social capital, which is based on social obligations that, 
under certain conditions, can be converted into economic capital.
Later, Putnam (1995) establishes a correlation between social capi-
tal and the development of a region or country. is conclusion led to 
the concept’s acceptance by international development agencies, which 
mainsstreamed it into their recommendations and, as a result, opened up 
new lines of research.
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e possession of social capital, in other words, the social space where 
it develops, is yet another one of Putnam’s important contributions. Spe-
cically, Putnam locates social capital at the regional or country level, 
which is di	erent, in terms of methodology, from Coleman’s (1988) com-
munity or group analysis. is di	erence a	ects the units of analysis ex-
amined in the research and has a large impact on the empirical results. 
It should be noted that both Putnam and Coleman avoid the individual-
level analysis (in which people are the unit of analysis) that is common-
place in this eld of research. As can be seen, these contributions are 
signicant for recognizing the progress achieved in understanding social 
capital and how it relates to economic and development processes.
Based on these advances, Knack and Keefer (1997) investigate the re-
lationship between economic outcomes and social capital, using a sample 
of countries and cross-sectional empirical analysis. In their research, so-
cial capital variables are quantied through subjective indicators, making 
it possible to establish positive correlations.
Like any school of thought, social capital is a eld under construction 
and the subject of questioning. Kenneth Arrow (1999) and Robert Solow 
(1999) strongly criticize the notion that social networks and trust must 
be come under the category of social capital. ey painstakingly iden-
tify the di	erences between social and physical capital. From their point 
of view, cooperative action and social organization cannot be viewed as 
elements that inuence economic growth. Moreover, they point out that 
social interaction can produce unwanted e	ects or obstacles to reaching 
collective goals, since interest groups can appropriate government o
-
cials and policymakers for themselves, resulting in the malfunctioning of 
governance systems.
Criticism of the idea that relationships based on cooperation, solidari- 
ty, and trust are a type of capital can be summarized as follows: social 
capital is a useful but extremely complex concept to which various perspec-
tives and disciplines have much to contribute; there is also reason to believe 
that the forms, quality, and quantity of social capital in a society are not 
necessarily optimal; and social capital develops because of public sector 
intervention (Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999).
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In addition, it should be noted that theories of social capital show the 
many ways in which the concept borders on institutionalism, a eld that 
also examines the institutional structure of a society. Booth (1990) and 
Brett (1994) analyze the role that institutions play in African and Asian 
countries in setting long-term economic patterns. ese studies contri- 
bute to a greater understanding of the economic importance of certain 
characteristics of a society. ey go beyond market-based economic rea-
soning, which risks misinterpreting or simply ignoring elements of di-
versity. According to Molteni (2006), this convergence makes it possible 
to obtain greater in-depth knowledge about the behavior of organiza-
tions, groups, businesses, associations, collegiate bodies, etc. He refers to 
examples provided by Khan (1995), which show how various institutio- 
nal frameworks can shape organizational behavior and, conversely, how 
di	erent organizational schemes can impact institutional forms and their 
future development.
ese perspectives also highlight how deeply economic agents are 
conditioned by prevailing cultural norms, possibly far from the optimal 
and maximizing behavior assigned to them by neoclassical theory, sig-
naling that organizations and individual initiatives play an important role 
as agents of change (Molteni, 2006, p. 12). is bolsters the school of 
thought known as New Institutional Economics, which examines eco-
nomic institutions and structures on the basis of the specicities of each 
society (Menard and Shirley, 2005).
Based on the above discussion, and without neglecting the criticism 
noted above, the present study views social capital as a set of norms and 
traditions for participation and civic relationships that favor associative 
and community life. is includes practices of mutual aid and recipro- 
city that strengthen interpersonal trust networks and coordinated action 
for achieving mutually desired goals. ese conditions facilitate problem 
solving through cooperation and interaction, which provide greater op-
portunities for success than individual action. Carroll (2002) states that 
“[...] social capital has its roots in history, tradition and culture. Unlike 
human capital and physical capital, social capital is relational and embed-
ded in social structure” (p. 548).
17Social Capital, Economic Performance, and Poverty in Ecuador
Now that we’ve provided this overview, we will focus on some re- 
presentative studies. e contributions made by Piazza-Georgi (2002), 
who carefully analyzed the role of human and social capital in economic 
growth, are important. Her research led to broadening the theory, ma- 
king it possible to mainstream human capital into the study of institutions 
or organizations and to mainstream social capital into economic growth 
factors. Along this line, the contributions of Routledge and von Amsberg 
(2003) proposed a theoretical model in which social capital is seen as con-
ducive to reaching Pareto optimal outcomes in growth models.
Other relevant developments came from Woolcock (2001), who also 
focused on how economic growth models could pay more attention to 
social capital. He emphasized the importance of social capital to unders- 
tand economic and social outcomes, and proposed incorporating the 
spirit of social capital into political economy and public policy. Wool-
cock also examined the implications of social capital for development 
theory and policy formulation, and suggested improving social capital 
measurements by making them more comprehensive. In addition, Mol-
teni (2006), on the basis of several studies carried out by other authors 
in Kenya, Tanzania, South Korea, and Pakistan, pointed out that cultural 
and natural characteristics are closely tied to economic outcomes. He 
also demonstrated that economic institutions achieve di	erent outcomes 
depending on the context in which they act.
In recent years, social capital studies have been enriched by the con-
tributions of Elinor Ostrom (1999), who conducted research on socio-
ecological systems, focusing on natural resource management and the 
organizational capacity of local groups.
As noted, these important theoretical advances include elements that 
facilitate social capital’s inclusion among the factors or determinants of 
economic growth.
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Some of Ecuador’s Specificities
Ecuador’s diversity can be seen from many angles. e country has 
four natural regions, vast biological wealth, and unique ecological sys-
tems such as the Galapagos Islands and Yasuní National Park. It has va- 
rious micro-climates conned in small territorial spaces, as well as abun-
dant watersheds and arable land.
According to data from the 2010 census, out of a total of 13,465,323 
inhabitants, 71.9% are mestizos, 7.6% are indigenous, 7.4% are montubios 
(from the coastal mountains and lowlands), 7.2% are Afro-descendants, 
and 6.1% are white. e indigenous population is grouped into 14 na-
tions and 2 tribes, most of which retain their ancestral languages. Spanish 
is the o
cial language, whereas Kichwa and Shuar are also recognized as 
o
cial and intercultural languages.
Ecuador’s economic production systems encompass a wide range of 
resources and technologies, including oil, owers, bananas, palm oil, 
shrimp, artisanal shing, and subsistence agriculture.
Large business and nancial groups linked to international markets, 
as well as associations of workers, peasants, entrepreneurs, and, of course, 
indigenous communities, are clear evidence of the country’s organiza-
tional diversity. e peasant and indigenous organizational tradition is 
community-based. Groups of communities belong as well to higher-level 
regional and national organizations. is social framework gives rise to 
other organizational forms for productive processes, such as associations 
for irrigation management and mangrove species collection.
Ecuador has one constitution uniting the country, while simultaneously 
recognizing that it is a plurinational and intercultural country. ere is one 
national and many sub-national governments. Political representatives 
are elected by universal su	rage at all levels and exercise their powers 
within a complex legal framework. e country is organized politically 
and admi nistratively into 24 provinces, 224 municipalities, and 1,118 
parishes (846 rural and 272 urban).
Social and economic imbalances are most clearly observed at the level 
of the parish. According to Larrea et al. (2007), the greatest problems of 
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rural economic inequality are found in parishes comprised of predomi-
nantly indigenous and Afro-descendant populations (p. 42).
ese are some of the elements of diversity that warrant being studied 
in order to enhance knowledge about diversity itself, as well as to iden-
tify the potential that lies in diversity to positively inuence the country’s 
economy and development. 
Dimensions of Social Capital      
and Exploration of its Relationships
How social capital is measured depends on the theoretical perspective 
that is adopted. In other words, the theoretical perspective dictates the 
dimensions proposed for analysis and steers what and how measurement 
instruments or surveys are built. e following dimensions, among others 
are used most frequently in empirical studies: trust between people and 
institutions; civic participation; solidarity; political participation; social 
networks; social and community participation; involvement in associa-
tions; collective action and cooperation; and reciprocity. ese dimen-
sions can be grouped into elds based on the degree of subjectivity with 
which they are addressed. A rst eld may be comprised of the levels of 
trust and action or civic participation in a society. A second eld may fo-
cus on social and community participation, for example through involve-
ment in associations that use economic and productive means for impro- 
ving living conditions or addressing conditions of exclusion and poverty.
e dimensions considered in this study pertain to those of the second 
eld. Individual participation and community action in solving economic 
problems, as well as the role of social organizations, provide this eld with 
a wider range of dimensions, especially when they are incorporated into 
the organizational traditions and strong cultural ties that are found in a 
large part of Ecuador’s parishes. In other words, this eld is eshed out 
by incorporating dimensions such as organizations or associations for 
production purposes or to reach economic objectives in diverse cultural 
environments.
As already noted, social capital has been approached from di	erent 
angles, which has led to the identication of several units of research and 
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analysis. e units of analysis most frequently used in empirical research 
are: people, communities or groups, and regions or countries. ese va- 
rious units highlight how individuals are able to accumulate social capi-
tal; they also treat groups and communities as the owners of the social 
capital resource; and, based on an adequate aggregation methodology, 
they locate the social capital in a specic region or country.
An illustrative example of how an individual is the unit of analysis and 
how the aggregation of information makes it possible to study regions 
or countries can be found in the BVVA Foundation’s 2007 study, “So-
cial Capital in Spain and OECD Countries.” e study calculates social 
capital for each individual by using, among other variables: the degree of 
connection to social networks, as estimated using the credit/GDP ratio; 
survival rate of the stock of social capital, as measured by the unemploy-
ment rate; inequality index of income distribution, provided by the Gini 
index; and average life expectancy of the population. is example, in 
addition to showing how the unit of analysis is dened and setting forth 
the procedure whereby information is added, clearly demonstrates how 
mainstreaming economic variables into the calculation of social capital is 
used to correlate a country’s economic indicators to its levels of available 
social capital.
In the present study, the parish is adopted as the unit of analysis, be-
cause the objective is to understand the relationships between social capi-
tal, natural capital, economic performance, and poverty in these terri- 
tories. e initial methodological denition that has been adopted re-
quires precise criteria for aggregating information, as well as an adequate 
method for processing data gathered from household surveys on house-
hold living conditions.
To undertake the empirical research, a statistical sample of 697 parishes 
was used (143 urban and 554 rural). is sample is the same one that 
was used by Ecuador’s National Statistics and Census Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos del Ecuador–INEC) to carry out the 
Living Conditions Surveys (Encuestas de Condiciones de Vida–ECV) in 
2013 and 2014. 
It is necessary to reiterate that social capital and natural capital are 
viewed as expressions or manifestations of Ecuador’s diversity. ese 
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two types of capital are inherently important, all the more so because the 
theoretical sca	olding of the present study requires that they be treated 
as determinants of economic growth and assumes that they exert a posi-
tive impact on societal development. However, the scope of the present 
research focuses more on analyzing social capital and its dimensions than 
examining natural capital and its dimensions.
e dimensions comprising natural capital at the parish level are likely 
to be easily identied, and measuring them is simpler than measuring 
social capital. Information on these dimensions comes from various 
sources, including the ECVs. e dimensions include: surface vegetation 
cover, soil quality, rainfall, soil productivity, area covered by irrigation 
systems, protected area or forests, water sources, and micro-climates. e 
INEC’s Living Conditions Surveys also contain information on some di-
mensions of social capital, most of them of a qualitative nature (dummy 
variables), such as belonging to a community, production cooperative, 
neighborhood committee, women’s organization, or political group. Sur-
veys also provide qualitative information regarding cooperative actions 
with other members of the community to solve a problem and whether 
or not individual community members trust the majority of the people 
in the community.
A smaller set of quantitative variables are used in this work, making it 
possible to calculate a preliminary estimate for social capital in Ecuador’s 
parishes. ese variables include: i) mingas or community work, mea-
sured in terms of the time (hours) spent sowing, harvesting, production, 
and cleaning communal areas; ii) unpaid activities, measured in terms 
of the time (hours) spent working for other households, the community, 
and voluntary work; and iii) community work or activities, measured in 
terms of the time (hours) spent building schools, roads, irrigation sys-
tems and channels. For natural capital, the variables include: i) partici-
pation in activities related to environmental problems; ii) detection of 
environmental problems, and iii) the overall condition of the environ-
ment. From the INEC surveys, information is obtained on average con-
sumption, a variable that is initially treated as a proxy for the economic 
performance of the parishes. Poverty line data drawn from the sample of 
urban and rural parishes in Ecuador were also obtained from INEC.
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e correlation coe
cients of the variables were calculated to mea-
sure the degree of association between them. e coe
cient’s sign in-
dicates whether an association is signicant. A positive sign is ascribed 
when two variables are moving in the same direction, whereas a negative 
sign is given when two variables are moving in di	erent directions. e 
value of the coe
cient falls between -1 and 1.
e coe
cients calculated for rural and urban parishes took into 
account the parishes’ relationship to the poverty line, as established by 
INEC. For urban parishes on the poverty line, the correlation between 
average consumption and social capital was 0.071, whereas between ave- 
rage consumption and natural capital it was 0.128. For rural parishes on 
the poverty line, the correlation between both economic growth and so-
cial capital, as well as between average consumption and natural capital, 
was 0.022.  Finally, for rural parishes below the poverty line, the corre- 
lation between average consumption and social capital was -0.036, 
whereas between average consumption and natural capital it was 0.104. 
All coe
cients are small, which reveals their high degree of association. 
Only one has a negative sign.
Conclusion
e social, natural, and cultural specicities of Ecuadorian society, 
which are evident in its diversity, are usually subsumed in growth models 
and approaches to development, although they are important sources for 
enriching the body of research on social and natural capital.
e organizational traditions, community participation, and natural 
wealth of Ecuador’s parishes, when grouped according to poverty status, 
are weakly correlated to their economic performance.
In urban and rural parishes on the poverty line, the correlation bet- 
ween natural capital and average consumption is more signicant than 
the correlation between social capital and average consumption.
In rural parishes below the poverty line, the correlation between avera- 
ge consumption and social capital is negative, whereas the correlation 
between average consumption and natural capital is positive.
23Social Capital, Economic Performance, and Poverty in Ecuador
e theoretical elements and empirical research discussed in this paper 
will enable forecasts to be made about the causal relationships between 
the variables studied. Regression analysis will make it possible to estimate 
the e	ects that social capital and natural wealth in Ecuador’s parishes have 
on economic growth, poverty, and inequality.
e initial treatment applied to the variable set will facilitate drawing 
up a social capital density index for parishes in the future, as well as an in-
dex for measuring the levels of organized participation engaged in tack-
ling economic problems and poverty.
e breadth and intensity of the theoretical discussions about social 
and natural capital call for the renewed application of measurement ins- 
truments, such as the surveys used in this study, but with the incorpora-
tion of new dimensions to better understand diversity. is will make it 
possible to better identify and assess the many elements comprising Ec-
uador’s diversity and to conduct more comprehensive studies.
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e so called third wave of democratization has not implied a world-
wide extension of democracy. Regular elections are one, but not the only 
condition for a democratic regime. In that sense, authors like Linz (2000, 
33-34), Schedler (2006, 1-2), Mainwaring et al. (2001, 37), Diamond 
(2002, 23), Levitsky and Way (2010, 23), and Morlino (2007, 20), among 
others, have pointed out the appearance of numerous non-democratic 
polities around the world holding regular, but not competitive elections, 
that present crucial authoritarian traits. Moreover, as has been conside- 
red by Schedler (2002, 2006), Diamond (2002) and Levitsky and Way 
(2010), elections can work out as manipulative instruments of autocratic 
elites, rather than as means of participation and accountability. Appropria- 
te levels of electoral competition and minimal conditions of electoral in-
tegrity, rather than the sole fullment of elections, need to be taken as the 
basic criteria of contemporary democracies. 
is consideration is important in Latin American and, particu-
larly, in Andean politics, where we nd a long autocratic tradition. In 
our region, authoritarianism has been associated with military rule, re-
pression, and violent golpe de estado against elected governments (the 
Curzio Malaparte theory of the coup d´état). For that matter, electoral 
events and civilian presidents were automatically identied with demo-
cratic regimes. Moreover, the reestablishment of elections and of some 
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civil and political rights were assumed by the international community as 
valid the credentials of democratic rule. Nevertheless, especially since the 
1990s, Latin America started to be populated by hybrid regimes exhibi- 
ting elected leaders with strong popular support, but lacking other impor-
tant democratic elements such as accountability, respect of basic rights, 
balance of power. In this decade, when neoliberal adjustment policies 
dominated throughout the region, Guillermo O´Donnell (1997) called 
the Menem, Salinas or Fujimori governments as delegative democracies, 
and this denition became the standard denomination for several Latin 
American hybrid regimes, although in the case of Fujimori, it was clear 
that we were in front not of a democracy, not even delegative, but of a 
straight authoritarianism regime.
ings turned out much even more complicated with the turn of the 
new century. e emergence of what Carlos de la Torre (2013) has inter-
preted as radical populism in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia challenged 
previous concept and denitions. e international commodities boom 
brought about an unprecedented ow of resources to oil and mineral orien- 
ted export economies, and suddenly those states were transformed into 
rich national and international actors, with anti-imperialist, anti-political 
and anti-oligarchic discourses, redistributive policies in favor of the poor 
and the excluded, and a refounding agenda around constituent processes. 
Chávez, Morales and Correa championed this trend in South America 
under the label of Socialismo del siglo XXI, 21th Century Socialism. De-
spite their idiosyncratic di	erences, the three enjoyed a majoritarian 
and enthusiastic support from their constituencies; the three questioned 
neoliberal economic policies, and liberal representative democracy; the 
three institutionalized highly personalized political regimes in which the 
concentration of power, the restriction of citizen rights, and an extensive 
government intervention in the economy put the state at the center of so-
ciety. Moreover, the three understood their respective political processes 
as revolutions from below geared toward a radical regime change: the 
Bolivarian revolution in the case of Venezuela; the proceso de cambio in 
Bolivia; the Citizen revolution in Ecuador.
One can argue that radical populist governments have largely achieved 
their political objectives. Not so much their ambitious economic and so-
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cial aims. ey might have failed in refounding the economic, and the so-
cial and cultural structure of their societies, but have succeeded in trans- 
forming their political scenario. e post Chávez, post Morales and post 
Correa politics in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, even their political 
elites, have experience a dramatic change, a real and profound regime 
transformation. In that way, it seems relevant to adopt a political regime 
perspective in order to analyze and interpret the character of contempo-
rary Andean politics;1 and ask if the three can be considered real attempts 
towards the democratization of their societies, through non-liberal paths. 
For that matter I it worth analyzing the so called Citizen Revolution in 
Ecuador. 
The Colapse of a Limited       
Democracy in 2007
Ecuador was the rst Latin American country returning to democra- 
cy in the late 1970s. Its democratic return was the result of a pact bet- 
ween the military in power and an emergent political elite, basically 
formed by middle class reformist intellectuals. e traditional political 
establishment and the oligarchic elites occupied a secondary position in 
the democratic restoration. e implicit program sustaining the tran-
sition aimed at, on the one hand, continuing a state led development 
model and, on the other, consolidating a multiparty democratic system. 
Economic development and pluralist democracy had to go hand by 
hand, but neither of both could fully materialize. Early on, neoliberalism 
supplanted develomentalism as the dominant economic doctrine; and 
pluralist democracy could not institutionalize in the midst of political 
conict, social mobilization, and instability. Finally, the political regime 
post 1979 transition collapsed when the Citizen Revolution came into 
power in 2007.
Jaime Roldós, a young reformist center le politician from CFP –a 
populist party– was the rst civilian elected president in 1979. In many 
1. I follow Lucio Levi (1983, 1362) in the denition of political regime as the set of institutions that 
regulate the struggle and the exercise of power, as well as the values that sustain those institutions. 
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ways, his personal prole represented the new political moment in Ecua- 
dor. However the reestablishment of democracy coincided with the end 
of the 1970s oil boom, the so called debt crisis, and the beginning of eco-
nomic adjustment policies, under the tutelage of multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank and the IMF. Democracy had to be built in the 
context of deep economic restrictions, low international oil prices, cons- 
tant intervention of multilateral banks, increased Costa-Sierra fragmen-
tation, and internal and political conict.
Nevertheless, during the 1980s a new political regime came into being. 
At the national level, the military assumed an arbitraring role within the 
political system, a strong populist right emerged under the leadership 
of León Febres Cordero (Partido Social Cristiano), and two middle class 
parties came to the scene, the social democratic Izquierda Democrática, 
and the Christian democratic Democracia Popular. A center le populist 
movement emerged in the Coast with Abdalá Bucaram (Partido Roldo-
sista), while the le divided in several small parties, occupied minority 
positions.
All administrations in the 1980s su	ered chronic economic and po-
litical problems. Considering the entire decade, the average GDP growth 
reached 2.35%, while ination increased in 33.7 % and the national cu-
rrency, the Sucre, devaluated in 42%. To an important extent, this was a 
result of the crisis of an oil dependent external sector where oil exports 
represented near 60% of all Ecuadorian exports, contributing in near 40 
of the national budget (Naranjo 2004, 229).2 All in all, the national debt, 
approximately 76% of the GDP along the decade (Naranjo 2004, 227), put 
Ecuadorian governments under the pressure of implementing adjustment 
policies that included scal discipline, currency devaluation, privatiza-
tion of public rms, imports restrictions. Industrialization and develop- 
mental policies were put aside, despite a strong opposition of worker 
unions, the political le, and even the business sectors. 
In such a context, the consolidation of a multiparty system, in the 
terms expected in the transition, was an impossible project. e political 
2. During the 1980s, the international price of petroleum uctuated around an average of US$ 23/
barrel. Some years were critical: in 1986=US$ 12.8, in 1987 = US$ 14.2, and in 1988 = US$ 12.7 
dollars/barrel (Naranjo 2004, 229).
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regime installed aer 1979 managed to survived, in the middle of enor-
mous economic and political di
culties, but never really consolidated. 
No economic, nor political conditions could make it feasible. Neverthe-
less, all elected presidents of the decade nished their terms.
But such a fragile situation could not endured. e 1990s brought 
about a slow but continuous political decline leading towards the deni-
tive collapse of the political regime and multiparty system originated in 
1979. at decline can be explained in terms of a general decit of repre- 
sentation of all political actors, and an increased political conict and 
instability, which expressed itself in three di	erent but related trends: 1) 
e emergence of social movements, specially, the indigenous, carrying a 
robust anti party and anti-neoliberal agenda; 2) e crisis of the political 
right, which in 1992 ran divided for the Presidency, and, nally, deserted 
from the national arena, becoming a regional force; and 3) e rise of 
populist movements winning presidential elections: Abdalá Bucaram in 
1996, and Lucio Gutiérrez in 2002. 
In the background, the economic turmoil persisted. In the 1990s, the 
GDP grew at an average of 1.8% (Banco Central del Ecuador 2010, 10). 
e international prices of oil remained at low levels, an average of 15.4 
dollars per barrel for the decade, in an economy in which oil exports still 
represented 36% of all exports and 41% of the national budget. e criti-
cal point reached at the end of the decade. In 1998, the international price 
of the Ecuadorian oil drop to 9.2 dollars coinciding with a collapse of 
the banking sector. In the period 1998-1999, the GDP plummeted from 
2.1% to -6.3% (Banco Central del Ecuador 2010, 10), while the Pichincha 
volcano started an eruptive process. In 2000, the falling Mahuad govern-
ment decreed a banking holiday, and the adopted dollarization. 
As a result, political conict and instability deepened. In the period 
1997-2007 Ecuador had 7 consecutive Presidents that lasted from three 
days (Rosalía Arteaga) to 2 years and three months (Lucio Gutiérrez). As 
a rule, every Ecuadorian head of state before 2007 confronted low levels 
of popularity. Strong legislative opposition, systemic economic problems, 
and country wide social mobilization created a political context marked 
by conict, blockade, and generalized discontent. Everything was ready 
for a regime change. Even the economic recuperation that started aer 
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dollarization was established, with an average of GDP growth of 4.4% be-
tween 2000-2009 (Banco Central del Ecuador 2010, 10), and the increase 
of oil international prices from 24.9 in 2000 to 83 dollars per barrel in 
2008 (Banco Central del Ecuador 2010, 7), contributed for the new politi-
cal moment Ecuador was about to begin.
The Rise of Correa´S Electoral      
Authoritarian Regime
In 2006, the promise of the so called Citizen Revolution was to re-
found Ecuador. President Correa understood his historical role as the 
conductor of a new political, economic and social era in Ecuadorian his-
tory, based upon 5 revolutions: Constitutional and democratic; Ethical; 
Economic; Social; and International (Senplades 2009, 5). Initially, the 
Constitutional revolution acquired a dominant position. e constituent 
process, which took place in the years 2007-2008, was the opportunity 
to establish new links between the state and society, and transform the 
power correlation of Ecuadorian politics. It concluded with the expedi-
tion of a new Constitution characterized by a generous chart of rights, 
which included rights for nature, and a hyper presidential political sys-
tem, where the Executive acquired a disproportioned power over all state 
institutions, erasing checks and balances, and superimposing the state 
apparatus over the economy and society. ere was no mistake or con-
tradiction between a rights based constitution and the statist and hyper 
presidential system. e idea was that for democratizing Ecuador, and 
closing down political instability, it was necessary to strengthen the state 
in the hands of an Executive with extraordinary powers.
President Correa largely t into that role. He had a strong will to power, 
and more than that, the new international moment aided him a lot. Correa 
can be dened as a strange mix of a technocratic leader and a traditional 
caudillo. He holds a PhD in Economics and promotes meritocracy, while 
cultivates clientelism and exhibits an aggressive and intolerant discourse 
against the opposition; he speaks in favor of a modern public service and 
on behalf of an anti-oligarchic politics, at the same time that he exercises 
a personalist and an autocratic rule. 
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Using the new constitutional framework, President Correa and his go-
vernment consolidated a tight control of all state institutions at the na-
tional level, put the state at the center of the economic process, demobi-
lized social movements, crushed all political parties and neutralized any 
important political opposition, and developed an overarching inuence 
over cultural institutions: the press, the university system, intellectuals. 
In short, Ecuador institutionalized a caudillo centered polity, a political 
regime marked by an extreme version of power concentration, sustained, 
nevertheless, on high levels of popularity of the President (55-60% in ave- 
rage), consecutive electoral ratications, and high citizen satisfaction 
with government policies.
Internationally, the installation of the new regime was favored by two 
decisive trends. On the one hand, the Correa government was part of 
the so called turn to the le in Latin American. ere was a clear a
nity 
with Chávez, Morales, Ortega, and close relations with the Kirchners, 
and the PT governments in Brazil. e Correa administration adopted a 
loud anti imperialistic stand, criticized the Interamerican human rights 
system, and refused any relation with multilateral banking institutions. 
At the same time, Correa claimed for the incorporation of Cuba to the 
OAS, and strongly supported alternative regional institutions like UNA- 
SUR, and CELAC. More than that, Correa has intended to project his 
image in the World as in the cases of Julian Assange´s asylum in the 
Ecuadorian embassy in London, and the diplomatic protection Ecuador 
provided to Edward Snowden in his scape trio from Hong Kong to Rus-
sia in June 2013.
But the most important international factor supporting the consolida-
tion of the Correa regime has been the high international prices of oil. 
One can even argue that the Citizen Revolution could not have been pos- 
sible without the commodities boom of the rst decade of this century. 
In 2007 Ecuadorian oil prices marked US$ 59.9/barrel, and in 2014 they 
reached US$ 97.5. In the period 2007-2015, that represented an income 
of US$ 72543, which meant 33% of the total government income (Flores 
2016, 11). No political regime could have been successful without such 
international conditions. 
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Considering all the above, one should question what have been the 
achievements and failures of correísmo. Has Ecuador, over this decade, 
experienced the structural change, the change of era, the revolutions an-
nounced by the Government and Correa himself? Doing justice to what 
really has occurred, the most important accomplishment of correísmo 
has been political stability. Correa, himself, not only was reelected in a 
single round in three consecutive elections, but achieved wide legisla-
tive majorities. Since García Moreno in the 19th Century, no Ecuado- 
rian president has enjoyed such positive governance conditions and has 
ruled the country for so long. However, such stability was achieved at 
the price of huge democratic decits in terms of the protection of basic 
political rights, government accountability and the normal functioning 
of a system of checks and balances. Without an independent judiciary, 
no transparency or political accountability, strict control of the media in 
terms of its capacity to air criticisms, the burden of corruption is evident 
and unprecedented. 
Another accomplishment frequently mentioned in the strengthening 
of the state apparatus. Aer two decades of neoliberal policies and the 
weakening of government regulatory and planning capacities, the state 
assumed a central role in all areas of the economy and social life. e 
idea of the government planners was to modify the structural dependence 
of Ecuadorian economy to oil exports and implement a selective indus-
trialization policy. Such a transformation required the construction of a 
new transportation and energy infrastructure, which has been one of the 
highlights of the government. According to a study carried out by the In-
teramerican Development Bank, which constructed an index for social 
service development, in the period 2004-2011 Ecuador improved its score 
in 6 points, passing from 15 to 21 in a scale of 100 (Cortázar et al. 2014, 
179).3 Regionally compared this score falls way below the Latin American 
average: 30 for 2004, and 38 for 2011 (Cortázar et al. 2014, 179).
3. Nonetheless, the report recognizes that it does not take into account important achievements 
which have occurred due to the approval of the Law for Public Service (LOSEP) of 2010 (Cor-
tázar et al. 2014, 180). e authors does not mention that the approval of this law generate the 
events of September 30, 2010; a police rebellion that jeopardized the country and is regarded by 
the government as a failed “so” coup d´état.
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Economic growth is regarded as other important achievement of the 
Correa period. roughout the decade, the Ecuadorian economy did bet-
ter than most Latin American economies. In the period 2006-2014, the 
average GDP growth was 4.6%. In overall, public spending grew in the 
Correa regime in 260%. In 2006, public spending represented 21.4% of 
the GDP, reaching in 2014 to 44.1%. Simply put, during the Citizen Revo-
lution the state doubled its size in terms of its presence in the economy. 
For Eduardo Valencia (Focus 2015), in the period 2007-2014, the govern- 
ment spending marked US$ 231.443 million; a sum similar to what all 
previous administrations, since the democratic return, spent over a 40 
year period. However, an important part of Correa´s spending was used 
to pay bureaucracy salaries, 24% of the total (being current spending 
68.4% of the total). e government payroll increased in 100%: from 
350.000 public servants in 2007 to more than 600.000 in 2014 (Focus 
2015a, 9, 12); and public spending in salaries tripled: increased from 
3162 million in 2006 to 9500 in 2014 (Focus 2016, 8). e counterpart of 
state strengthening has been a systematic weakening of the private sector. 
Private investments declined from 79.7% of total investments in 2007 to 
47.4% in 2013; while public investment jumped from 20.3% to 52.6% of 
the total in the same period (Andrade 2015, 5). Something similar oc-
curred with foreign direct investment, which in 2014 reached a total of 
US$ 600 million of dollars.4
An important progress in the reduction of income inequality and po-
verty are another achievements of correísmo. e increase of public spen-
ding in the social sector, from 3.4% of the GDP in 2006 to 8.5% in 2015 
(in absolute terms the growth is even more impressive: from US$ 1595 
million to US$ 8567 in the same period), and of direct transfers to the 
poor are reported as the main cause for such an outcome. According 
to the IMF (2015, 4), the Gini coe
cient declined from 0.54 in 2006 to 
0.47 in 2014. Likewise, poverty indicators show a reduction from 38% to 
22.5% in the same period. Real salaries have experimented an important 
rise, from US$ 350 to US$ 430 between 2018-2014 (Larrea 2016, 11); and 
4. In 2014, foreign direct investment to Colombia was US$ 12918 million, and to Perú US$ 6860 
million.
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the coverage of social security presented an important expansion: from 
26% in 2007 to 44% in 2014. According to Carlos Larrea (2016, 10) there 
has also been an important progress in the labor market: inadequate em-
ployment declined from near 50% to below 30% in the 2007-2014 period, 
while the appropriate employment increased from 11% to 28% in the 
same years. ese gures have started to deteriorate since the beginning 
of the crisis in 2014.
Nevertheless, no structural economic changes have occurred. All the 
talk over an economic revolution or a change in the productive matrix 
simply contradicts what economic gures show. Yet, we will have to 
wait several years to assess the real economic impact of the macro hy-
droelectricity projects under construction. But more than that, despite 
positive GDP growth rates, production in Ecuador has experienced a 
tremendous decline. In the period 2007-2015, the industrial and agri-
culture GDP remained stagnant, demonstrating that no diversication 
policy had taken place, but a continuation of the traditional extractivist 
model. Nonetheless, the GDP growth since 2007 had nothing to with an 
increase of production, but only with the high prices of oil (not even a 
rise of oil production which has remained since 2004 in around of 400 
thousand barrels/day). 
Ecuadorians do not produce more, but import and borrow more. Im-
ports increased dramatically from US$ 13.348 in 2006 to US$ 30.382 in 
2014. e same with public debt. In 2009, the public debt represented 
16.3% of the GDP; in 2015, 32.9%. Public debt increased in 218%, with- 
out considering advanced oil sales to China and ailand for approxi- 
mately 14.5 billion. For 2016, the IMF predicts that Ecuador´s public 
debt will reach 40% of the GDP. 
Apart from the social improvements mentioned above, Ecuador´s Hu-
man Development Index score does not show any substantive progress. 
In 2006, the country occupied the 83 position out of 117, with a score of 
0.765 (UNDP 2006, 289); in 2014, the position was 88 out of 188, with 
a score of 0.732 (UNDP 2015, 209). In 2006, unemployment and under 
employment represented 53% of the economically active labor force. In 
2014, this gure was 53.5%. According to these gures, the majority of 
working Ecuadorians still live under precarious work and salary condi-
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tions, as they did before the Correa period.5 Likewise, the country´s tax 
structure is still based on regressive and indirect taxes like the sales tax 
and others, 70% of the total, while the income tax represents 30%.6 e 
current tremendous growth of the state during the Correa administra-
tions relies on a regressive tax structure that has not been modied in the 
past decade, despite the 15 tax reforms implemented since 2007. Like-
wise, there are serious doubts on the sustainability of the social security 
system in the context of its impressive coverage expansion. e govern-
ment arbitrarily has used social security funds for other purposes, and 
has cut o	 some of its nancial obligations (Llanes 2016). 
e real success of correísmo has been mainly political. It is a political 
revolution in terms of a successful construction of a new political regime, 
not an economic revolution of the production matrix, and despite some 
achievements that we don’t know if they are sustainable, neither a social 
revolution which has improved human development, in general. 
In that sense, what really seems crucial is the character of the po-
litical regime successfully constructed since 2007. In a previous work, 
I argued that the political regime installed in Ecuador by the Citizen 
Revolution is not a democracy (Montúfar 2016, 114). It is neither a hy-
brid democracy nor a limited democracy since correísmo lacks some 
critical attributes of democratic regimes such as real multiparty plu-
ralism (Morlino y Diamond 2004), electoral integrity (Schedler 2004), 
or alternability (Przeworski et al. 2000). at does not mean that it is 
a traditional dictatorship, similar to those military ones that ruled in 
Latin America in the 1970s or that it could be dened as a totalitarian 
regime. On the contrary, the Citizen Revolution exhibits elections as 
its main instrument of legitimation, and therefore, it is a regime that 
combines democratic attributes, with critical non democratic traits. 
5. is judgement could be ratied by the data presented above by Carlos Larrea (2016). Accor- 
ding to his assessment, despite appropriate employment grew in the 2007-2015 period form 12% 
to 25% approximately, if one adds the categories of under employed (33%) and workers with ade-
quate but not appropriate employment (37%), both categories sum up to 70%, even without adding 
5% of the unemployed.
6. According to Valencia, Ecuadorians pay today three times more taxes than in 2007 (Focus 2015b, 
23). Today the average of taxation in Ecuador marks 19.2%, which is higher than the Latin Ameri- 
can average of 15.4% (Flores 2016, 6).
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Neither it is a delegative democracy, in Guillermo O´Donnell´s terms, 
given that in Ecuador post 2007 there is no space whatsoever for hori-
zontal (institutional) nor vertical (social) accountability, due to the ex-
treme concentration of power in hands of the Executive, the criminali- 
zation of social protest, and the limitations imposed over freedom of as-
sociation, and freedom of expression.
Over all these considerations, I argue that the post 2007 regime can be 
dened as a competitive authoritarian (Levitsky y Way 2010) or electoral 
authoritarian regime (Schedler 2002, 2006), even though I rather prefer 
the second to the rst classication. Both regimes are not democratic, 
although they locate their legitimacy on elections and popular support. 
erein, electoral events count not as mechanisms of popular decision or 
accountability, but as an elite mechanism to ratify from above its ruling 
position. In that sense, the regime is not open to real competitive elec-
tions; the electoral scene is inclined in favor of the elite in power and pre-
clude the chances for the opposition to take over the national government.
In both authoritarian regimes, however, the opposition´s possibility of 
acquiring power through elections is not completely closed. at might 
occur even though the electoral, legal and institutional framework pro-
vide the ruling elite an almost unsurmountable favoritism. e di	erence 
between the two, competitive and electoral authoritarianism, has to do 
with the legitimizing factor over which the regime reproduces its power. 
In the case of competitive authoritarian regimes, the critical point are the 
unequal electoral conditions over which the ruling elite wins elections 
(Levitsky y Way, 2010), whereas in electoral authoritarian regimes the 
fundamental aspect is its electoral and popular superiority over the rest 
of political actors. For the rst category, the emphasis is on unequal elec-
toral conditions; for the second, electoral legitimacy. Since it seems clear 
that correísmo has consolidated its electoral supremacy because it popular 
and electoral hegemony, winning all elections in the period 2006-2014, 
I claim that it can better be dened as an electoral authoritarian regime. 
at, of course, does not mean that the electoral system in Ecuador has 
been just and fair over the last 9 elections, won by AP since 2007. But that 
is not the central characteristic of the regime, as it is the electoral and 
popular supremacy of correísmo (Montúfar 2016, 96). 
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Since 2014 the international economic conditions that made co- 
rreísmo possible have vanished. Oil international prices dropped from 
US$ 97.5 in 2014 to US$ 40/barrel in 2015. In January 2016 the price of 
oil fell below US$ 20. is international event has produced several pro-
blems: the GDP growth declined from 8% in 2011 to 3.8% in 2014 (IMF 
2015, 4). According to the IMF, the prospect of the GDP growth rate will 
be -4.5% in 2016, and -4.3% in 2017. e April 2016 earthquake that 
destroyed part of the Coast was still not considered in that projection.7 
In addition to that, Ecuador´s external sector shows a wide balance of 
payments decit US$ -1098 in the period 2014-2015 (Andrade 2015, 12), 
depicting a very critical fact: more dollars exit than enter the economy, a 
very risky trend in a dollarized economy. Even more, the public budget 
decit reported for 2015 reached US$ 8.8 billion dollars, 10% of the GDP. 
is decit was covered in part by new public debt provided by Chinese 
banks, more taxes, and advanced oil sales. Moreover, the Central Bank 
reserves have been depleted, in a country in which, by decision of Correa 
himself, there are no emergency or reserve funds. Certainly, these gures 
show a paradoxical result of economic failure in the context of the decade 
of the biggest “bonanza” Ecuador ever lived.
Independent economists present pessimistic accounts on the economic 
legacy of the Citizen Revolution, and its prospects. For Eduardo Valen-
cia (Focus 2015b, 22), the essence of the current crisis is an economic 
model that privileges imports, subsidies and public debt. at makes it 
unsustainable. Margarita Andrade (2015, 2) points out that today´s eco-
nomic crisis precedes the decrease of international oil prices. Since 2006, 
the growth of public spending (347%) has largely surpassed GDP growth 
(115%). For that matter, Ecuador´s economy presents as a chronic s-
cal sector decit; a systematic current account decit; a sustained decline 
of the private sector and foreign direct investment; an inevitable rise of 
public debt, and a general weakening of dollarization (Andrade 2015, 11-
15). Marco Flores (2016) argues that aer a decade of Citizen Revolution, 
Ecuadorian economy is basically sustained by public debt and taxes. is 
7. An earthquake (7.8 Rittcher scale) destroyed part of the Ecuadorian coast in April 16, 2016 leaving 
a toll of more than 650 victims, thousands of injured, and material losses in public and private in-
frastructure calculated in more than 3000 million.
40 César Montúfar Mancheno
precludes any long term economic reactivation in a context in which oil 
prices will continue at low levels. 
In summary, in a decade the so called Citizen Revolution demolished 
the political regime emerging aer the 1979 democratic transition repla-
cing it with an authoritarian electoral regime. No substantive economic 
transformation has occurred. Moreover, Ecuador confronts structural 
economic problems that over the last 10 years have only aggravated. Even 
aer the past April earthquake, the government neglects the use of the term 
crisis to dene the current situation, and it has only announced narrow 
scal measures to tackle the problem. As a result, the current economic 
crisis would surely revert some of its social achievements. As it has oc-
curred since the 19th Century, periods of economic crisis resulting from 
the decline of primary exports have reversed the prosperity created in 
times of economic expansion.
The 2017 Presidential Election:      
Regime Consolidation or Regime Change
Ecuador is closing a political and an economic cycle. e end of the 
commodities boom changed the international political economic context 
in which correísmo as a political regime could ourish and consolidate. 
erefore, the political and economic model implemented since 2007 is 
no longer sustainable. High public spending cannot be maintained; the 
private sector is not in conditions of recuperating immediately; foreign 
direct investment will continue to be insignicant; imports would not de-
cline as it is required. Dollarization in a serious danger. e Ecuadorian 
economy might collapse if all previous conditions aggravate simultane-
ously, and so the political regime that has been constructed over the last 
decade.
In this critical economic context, Presidential and Legislative elections 
took place in February and April 2017. Rafael Correa, the hegemonic gu- 
re of the last decade, did not ran for reelection. Lenin Moreno, his former 
vice president, won the Presidential race, by a very short margin, against 
Guillermo Lasso, a center right businessman, who alleged fraud. Short 
aer Moreno took o
ce, the new President sharply distanced from his 
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mentor and antecessor, Rafael Correa. Moreno questioned Correa´s ad-
ministrations denouncing authoritarianism, corruption and ine
ciency. 
e President supported a judicial trail against Jorge Glas, Correa´s vice 
president reelected in Moreno´s ticket, who was accused of corruption. 
Finally, Glas lost his position, and, received a sentence of six years in jail. 
In the same line, Moreno launched and won a plebiscite aimed at, among 
other issues, reforming the Constitution in order to block a new reelec-
tion of Rafael Correa, change the institutions in which the former Presi-
dent consolidated his control, and reverse some of the most controversial 
laws of the Correa period. It was a referendum against Correa.
Aer a decade, Ecuador confronts a dilemma: Or correísmo consoli-
dates its electoral authoritarian regime or the country starts a road to-
wards democratization. is dilemma occurs in the midst of a deep eco-
nomic and scal crisis. It seems like political instability will be back, and 
that the dispute between Moreno and Correa will continue at the center 
of the political stage r the years to come.
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Ecuador, a small South American country, ranks 89th among the 188 
countries on the UN Human Development Index. Within Latin America, 
it is clearly a less developed country, with a per capita income below the 
regional average (UNDP, 2016).1 Ecuador’s level of economic diversica-
tion remains low, and according to ECLAC, in 2013 primary products 
still represented 93% of exports, mostly composed of crude oil, bananas, 
shrimp, co	ee, cacao, sh and owers (ECLAC, 2015a). Petroleum, the 
single most important product in the economy, accounted for 56% of to-
tal export revenue between 2010 and 2014, and oil revenues made up 
on average 32% of the government’s revenues between 2009 and 2013 
(Banco Central del Ecuador, 2018). 
Ecuador has one of the most diverse natural and cultural endowments 
in the word, with the highest number of vertebrates per square kilometre 
on earth (Josse, 2001). Additionally, Ecuador ranks among the rst ten 
most abundant countries in the absolute number of amphibians, birds, 
and butteries. More specically, Ecuador has the second highest num-
ber of orchid species in the planet, aer Indonesia.2 Ecuador also has a 
* An initial version of this paper was presented to the “Latin America and the Shiing Sands of Global 
Power” Conference on Extractivism in Latin America and Australia, Australia National University, 
Canberra, September 11 and 12, 2013, and will be published as a chapter in a book about Ecuador 
by Australia National University Press. And presented at the Conference “e Andean region today: 
Political, International and Economic Challenges”, Oxford University, May 5-6, 2016.
1. Ecuador’s per capita GDP was 10,718 PPP Dollars, compared with the Latin American average of 
14,041 dollars in 2015. PPP dollars are estimated at 2011 prices.
2. Ecuador has 4,015 species of orchids, while Indonesia has about 5,000. World identied species 
number 27,934; the third country is Colombia, with 3,516 species. (Hassler & Rheinheimer, 2013). 
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rich cultural diversity, with 14 indigenous nationalities and 13 spoken 
languages, although some of them may disappear soon.3
In 1967 large oil reserves were discovered in the Amazon region, and 
from 1972 onwards Ecuador has been an oil exporter. Five decades later, 
it can be concluded that oil contributed little to equitable and sustaina- 
ble development, in spite of some economic and social transformation. 
Economic growth remained evasive and unstable, with an average an-
nual growth rate of 2.8% in per capita income between 1972 and 2014 
(Chart 1). is growth rate was only slightly higher than that of the pre-
oil period (1950-1972), but the di	erence was not statically signicant. 
Despite important social achievements during the oil boom (1972-1982) 
and between 2006 and 2014, the social, ethnic, and regional disparities 
that have historically a	ected the country remained pervasive, as 30% of 
the population lived below the poverty line and underemployment af-
fected 40% of the labour force in 2017 (Charts 11 to 13, Larrea. 2017), 
and social inequality barely declined, as the Gini coe
cient remained at 
0.52 in 2015 (ECLAC, 2015; Vallejo, Falconi, Larrea, and Burbano, 2015, 
Larrea, 2017). 
Since oil extraction in Ecuador is located in a formerly undisturbed 
region in the Amazon basin, the environmental e	ects of oil activity 
have been severe, particularly regarding deforestation, loss of biodiver-
sity, pollution, and human health hazards (Herbert, 2010; Amazon De-
fense Coalition, 2012).
Future oil exports in Ecuador are constrained by limited reserves. Cur-
rently, proven reserve estimates vary between 3.65 (Ecuador’s Govern- 
ment estimate),4 8.8 (Energy Information Administration, 2015), and 8.2 
billion barrels (OPEC, 2013), which in any case will not permit more 
than 20 years of continued net exports, depending on future discoveries 
(Chart 2). Net oil exports have already declined by 16% since 2004 (Table 
1). erefore, a turn to alternative development strategies is required.
e objectives of this paper are, rst, to evaluate the economic, social 
and environmental e	ects of oil extraction in Ecuador during the last 45 
3. Some languages, such as the Zapara, are on the verge of extinction.
4. El Comercio, July 16, 2012. e o
cial source is the National Hydrocarbon Directorate.
45Oil, development and sustainability in Ecuador: 1972-2016
years, and second, to briey discuss the prospects of achieving a sustaina- 
ble and equitable development path in the future, in the context of de-
clining oil reserves. e current government is pursuing an extractivist 
policy, based on expanding oil extraction in formerly unexploited elds 
–including those inside the Yasuní National Park– and starting large-scale 
mining exploitation. Two future options will be evaluated, rst, an ex-
pansion of extractive activities, and, second, an alternative path based on 
conservation, with sustainable use of natural resources (e.g. ecotourism, 
agroforestry, bio-knowledge), without oil eld expansion and large scale 
mining. 
Theoretical Framework
Most oil exporter developing countries share di
culties in reaching 
sustained and equitable growth, and several studies have found that oil 
exports have had negative impacts on development. Already in the 1950s, 
Prebisch and Singer pointed out the disadvantages of primary export spe-
Chart 1. Per Capita Income in Ecuador. 1950-2014
Source: University of Pennsylvania, PENN World Table, Version 9.0 ‹www.ggdc.net/pwt›, Visited February 2018. 
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cialization, as international commodity prices face short term instability 
and a declining long term trend. A comparative World Bank investigation 
concluded that most oil-exporting countries failed to e
ciently channel 
oil revenues into development during the 1970s. In general, the economic 
results for national development were disappointing, as “Dutch Disease” 
and other shared problems reduced the possibilities of economic diversi-
cation and stability (Gelb et al, 1988).
e “Dutch Disease” theory refers to the negative e	ects of primary 
export booms on long term development prospects for industrialization 
and economic diversication. e term originated in Holland aer the 
discovery of North Sea gas (Gelb, 1988). Booming export activities gene- 
rate e	ects on the exchange rate and domestic demand that over-expand 
both the booming traded and shielded sectors, making other traded and 
import competing activities less competitive. Once the boom is over, the 
economy is a	ected by low diversication and deindustrialization. 
Je	rey Sachs, based on a sample of 97 developing countries between 
1971 and 1989, found a negative and signicant correlation bet ween natu- 
ral resource exports and economic growth (Sachs, 1995). Albert Berry, 
based on a comparative analysis of Indonesia, Venezuela, Chile, and Ni-
Chart 2. Oil Extraction by fields in Ecuador: 1972-2026
 Source: Ministerio de Energía y Minas, Ecuador, 2007.
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geria, found poor outcomes in job creation and income distribution in oil 
and mineral exporting countries (Berry, 2008). Terry Karl explains how 
oil exporting developing countries tend to rely excessively on oil reve- 
nues as scal resources, thereby weakening taxation systems and state 
institutions (Karl, 1997, 1999). Rosemary orp points out that mining 
and oil producer countries have generally serious long-term institutional 
development problems (orp et al, 2012) although, in some exceptional 
cases, such as Chile and Botswana, solid institutions prevented detrimen-
tal e	ects and permitted growth and diversication. Bebbington, based 
on a comparative study of Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, analyses the e	ects 
of extractive activities on local development in mining and oil extrac-
tion regions. Linkages of extractive industries with local economies are 
Exports









2000 146209 86197 15802 101999 5832 50042 96167
2001 148746 89907 14332 104239 8693 53200 95546
2002 143759 84263 13268 97531 6153 52381 91378
2003 153518 92442 11632 104074 15759 65203 88315
2004 192315 129409 13556 142965 17348 66698 125617
2005 194172 131595 12799 144394 22173 71951 122221
2006 195523 136634 13615 150249 25932 71206 124317
2007 186547 124098 15160 139258 29329 76618 109929
2008 184706 127395 15416 142812 27859 69753 114953
2009 177408 119558 12334 131892 32179 77696 99713
2010 177422 124464 10259 134723 41004 83702 93719
2011 182357 121732 11527 133259 37435 86533 95824
2012 184315 129516 10038 139554 40266 85028 99287
2013 192120 140245 7180 147425 46412 91108 101012
2014 203071 154660 2826 157486 55824 101408 101662
2015 198230 151765 5490 157255 53920 94895 103335
2016 200711 144559 12080 156639 43832 87904 112807
2017 193929 135494 15266 150761 44678 87847 106083
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador (January 2018 and previous issues). Información Estadística Mensual
 ‹www.be.fin.ec›.
Table 1. Oil extraction, exports and imports in Ecuador: 2000-2017    
 (thousand barrels)
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generally weak, as are the results of local development projects promoted 
by extractive corporations. Local redistribution of scal linkages may 
contribute to development but only in the infrequent context of e
cient 
institutions, both national and local. Oil and mining regions are also 
severely a	ected by environmental degradation. e case studies show, 
most oen, highly conictive social scenarios with disappointing redis-
tributive development results (Bebbington, 2013). In general, countries 
that are dependent on oil or mineral exports are vulnerable and fragile, 
and they share poor records in economic growth, diversication, institu-
tional development, job creation, and equity (Larrea and Warnars, 2009).
Hypotheses
1. e contribution of oil extraction to sustainable and equitable develop- 
ment in Ecuador during the last four decades has been weak. Eco-
nomic growth was slow and unstable, diversication remains mini-
mal, social development, albeit signicant in the 1970s and 2000s, is 
still insu
cient, and the environmental impact of oil and other eco-
nomic activities has been severe, threatening a sustainable future.
2. Nevertheless, state capacity to promote economic growth and social 
improvement varied substantially between 1972 and the present, with 
better results during the initial oil boom (1972-1982) and the post-
neoliberal (2004-2014) periods, and a disappointing performance 
during the neoliberal phase (1982-2004). e most important internal 
factors that contribute to positive linkages are state participation in 
oil revenues and the institutional capacity of the state for investing in 
economic and social development. A third explanatory variable is the 
real price of oil, and the fourth factor is the quantum of oil extraction.
3. e current strategy pursued by the government, to expand oil extrac-
tion to exploit the ITT and other elds, and starting large-scale open-
pit mining in the Amazon basin, will have a signicant environmental 
impact and barely contribute to sustainable development in the me-
dium and long term.
4. Current adverse international conditions, from 2014 onwards, with 
declines in oil and mineral prices may persist and lead to the exhaus-
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tion of the extractivist strategy in Ecuador. As diversication has been 
weak, the transition towards a new development model may be dif-
cult in the short term. 
5. An alternative development option, based not only in a coherent envi-
ronmental strategy to progressively eliminate deforestation, but also in 
promoting economic diversication, social distribution, and sustaina- 
ble uses of biodiversity (ecotourism, agroforestry, bio-knowledge) is 
feasible and will provide more favourable economic and social results 
for Ecuador with respect to equity and sustainability.
Ecuador’s biodiversity       
and cultural heritage
Ecuador is one of the 17 megadiverse countries in the world, and it 
has the highest number of vertebrates per square kilometre in the planet. 
In all, Ecuador has 17 di	erent ecosystems5 (Sierra, 1999; Ministerio 
del Ambiente, 2015), and about 51% of its land still remains covered by 
almost undisturbed ecosystems, mostly in the Amazon region (FAO, 
2015). Although protected areas cover about 20% of the national terri-
tory, Ecuador has a high deforestation rate, even in the South American 
context (0.6% per year according to FAO, 0.55% per year according to the 
government), mostly as a result of oil expansion in the Amazon.6
e Yasuní National Park is the most important biological reserve in 
the Amazon basin. According to recent research, it is one of the most bio-
logically diverse hotspots in the planet (Bass, Finer, Jenkins, et al., 2010). 
It was created in 1979 and declared a UNESCO World Biosphere Reserve 
in 1989. e Park is located in the upper Napo basin in the western Ama-
zon region, and it has an area of 928,000 ha. Its strategic position, close to 
the equator and the Andean mountains, provides unique climatic condi-
tions, with relatively high and uniform temperatures and rainfall levels.
5. e number of ecosystems in Ecuador depends on the classication criterion. Sierra identies 17 
ecosystems and 34 vegetal formations, but recent research identies 91 ecosystems (Ministerio del 
Ambiente, 2015).
6. Estimates of deforestation in Ecuador di	er according to the source and methodology. e o
cial esti-
mate of 0.55% per year during the 1990-2014 period seems accurate (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2015).
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Scientists agree on the park’s unique value due to its extraordinary 
biodiversity, state of conservation, and cultural heritage. e reserve 
has an estimated 2,274 tree and bush species, and 655 species have been 
counted in just one hectare; this is similar to the total number of native 
tree species in the United States and Canada combined. e park has 593 
recorded bird species, making it one of the world’s most diverse avian 
sites. ere are 80 bat, 150 amphibian, and 121 reptile species as well as 
4,000 vascular plant species per million hectares. e number of insect 
species is estimated to be 100,000 per hectare, the highest concentration 
on the planet. Furthermore, the species found in the park have a high 
level of endemism.
e park has the highest density of amphibian, mammal, bird, and 
plant species in the Amazon region. In addition to high biodiversity, 
the projected temperature rise in the park due to climate change will be 
comparatively moderate, which makes the region strategically important 
for the future conservation of species (Bass, Finer, Jenkins, et al., 2010; 
Hoorn, 2006).
e Yasuní Park is also home of the only two uncontacted indigenous 
peoples living in Ecuador, the Tagaeri and Taromenane, which belong to 
the Wuaorani people, who had been seriously a	ected by oil activity since 
the 1970s.
Oil and Development       
in Ecuador
e overall economic record of Ecuador during the oil extraction pe-
riod is poor, with an average growth in per capita income (2.8% per an-
num) not statistically di	erent from that of the pre-oil period,7 and mini-
mal economic diversication. Only two new primary products, shrimp 
and owers, were added with signicant shares to the export basket in 
four decades, and manufacturing did not increase its share in GDP.
7. Growth rates were estimated by kinked exponential regressions, adjusted for rst order autocorrela-
tion. e growth rate of the banana period di	ers slightly with the one presented in Table 2, due to 
di	erent model specications. 
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In addition, the oil period has been unstable and uneven, with two 
phases of signicant economic growth, at the beginning and end of the 
period, and a long crisis during the 1980s and 1990s (Table 2). 
Two explanatory factors for this uneven performance will be analysed. 
ey are, rst, national public participation in oil revenues, and second, 
the institutional capability of the state to e
ciently invest in economic 
and social development. Additionally, as contextual variables, the volu- 
mes of oil extraction and real oil prices will be taken into account.
ree main periods are di	erentiated. ey are the oil boom (1972-
1982), the neoliberal period (1983-2003) and the post-neoliberal recove- 
ry (2004-2014). Although a new period of crisis seems to be emerging 
aer 2014, the time span is still too short to allow for a detailed analysis. 
Table 3 summarizes comparative factors and results for the three periods 
analysed. 
e initial oil boom (1972-1982). Shortly aer the start of Amazon oil 
exports in Ecuador in 1972, an international scenario of rising oil prices, 
increasing OPEC inuence, and favourable negotiating conditions for oil 
producing countries emerged (Chart 3). Ecuador implemented a new na-
tionalistic policy that increased state participation in oil revenues to 80% 
and created a state-owned oil company (CEPE). e state pursued a de-
velopment strategy based on import substituting industrialization (ISI) 
and agricultural modernization, investing in infrastructure, and using 
Period Years Growth rate
Banana period 1950-1972 2.16
Oil Boom 1972-1982 5.69
Debt crisis 1982-1990 -3.21
Neoliberal adjustment 1990-2004 1.82
Recovery 2004-2014 6.37
Current crisis (*) 2014-2016 -2.25
Table 2. Average annual growth rates of per capita income in Ecuador   
 by periods
Source: Chart 1, Banco Central del Ecuador, 2018.
(*) Average growth rate taken from Ecuador´s Central Bank.
Note: Growth rates were estimated by kinked exponential 
regressions, adjusted for first order autocorrelation, except for the 
2014-2016 period, estimated from Ecuador´s Central Bank data. 
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subsidized credit, tari	 protection, tax incentives and favourable exchange 
rates to promote growth and diversication. e investment in education, 
health, housing and social infrastructure reached important levels.
Ecuador experienced rapid economic growth (Table 2), but the secto-
rial performance was uneven, with the fastest growth rates in manufac-
turing and construction, while agriculture barely kept pace with popula-
tion growth.
While social conditions improved sharply in education, health, and 
housing, employment performance was disappointing, as underemploy-
ment did not decrease. In other words, growth was fuelled by capital in-
tensive investment, with little job creation and limited trickle-down ef-
fects (Larrea, 1993).
At the same time, the environmental impacts of Texaco’s oil activity in 
the Amazon were devastating. According to New York Times columnist 
Bob Herbert:
Much of that area has been horribly polluted. e lives and culture of the local inhabi- 
tants, who shed in the intricate waterways and cultivated the land as their ancestors 
had done for generations, have been upended in ways that have led to widespread mis-
ery. 
Texaco came barreling into this delicate ancient landscape in the early 1960s with all 
the subtlety and grace of an invading army. And when it le in 1992, it le behind... 
widespread toxic contamination that devastated the livelihoods and traditions of the 
local people, and took a severe toll on their physical well-being. 
A brief led by the plainti	s said: “It deliberately dumped many billions of gallons of 
waste by product from oil drilling directly into the rivers and streams of the rainforest, 
covering an area the size of Rhode Island. It gouged more than 900 unlined waste pits 
out of the jungle oor –pits which to this day leach toxic waste into soils and ground-
water. It burned hundreds of millions of cubic feet of gas and waste oil into the atmos- 
phere, poisoning the air and creating ‘black rain’ which inundated the area during tropi-
cal thunderstorms.” 
e quest for oil is, by its nature, colossally destructive. And the giant oil companies, 
when le to their own devices, will treat even the most magnicent of nature’s wonders 
like a sewer. But the riches to be made are so vastly corrupting that governments refuse 
to impose the kinds of rigid oversight and safeguards that would mitigate the damage 
to the environment and its human and animal inhabitants.8
8. Herbert, Bob. “Disaster in the Amazon”. New York Times, June 4, 2010.
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e structural adjustment period (1983-2003). e rapid growth of 
the 1970s was partially nanced with foreign debt, which accumulated 
and become unsustainable under rising interest rates in the early 1980s. 
Aer the Mexican debt moratoria in 1982, International Financial Insti-
tutions imposed rigid conditions on Latin American countries, the ISI 
strategy collapsed, and structural adjustment and liberalization strategies 
were implemented. Policies included the drastic reduction of state inter-
vention in the economy, the pursuit of scal austerity, decreased social 
investment, liberalization of exchange rates and labour relations, as well 
as opening the economy to foreign competition and investment.
In Ecuador, as well as in most Latin American countries, structural ad-
justment and export promotion strategies failed to lead to recovery of eco-
nomic growth (Tables 2 and 3), per capita income stagnated or even de-
clined, and the country was a	ected by several nancial shocks in 1983 (El 
Niño oods), 1987 (plummeting oil prices and an earthquake) and 1999 
(collapsing oil prices, worst El Niño oods and a private sector nancial 
bankruptcy), which led to the dollarization of the economy in 2000.
As real oil prices dropped dramatically, mostly in 1986 and 1998, and 
foreign debt remained unmanageable, the state turned to expanding oil 
extraction by opening the oil frontier to the South and East of the Ama-
zon, increasing pipeline capacity, and attracting foreign oil investment 
with favourable conditions. As a consequence, new oil contracts had only 
a 20% state share in export revenues, and oil extraction expanded even 
into the Yasuní and Cuyabeno National Parks.
During the period of structural adjustment and export promotion 
policies, social inequality, exclusion, and poverty remained pervasive in 
Ecuador. In 1995, poverty a	ected up to 56 % of total population and 
reached 76 % in the countryside. ese percentages were higher than the 
Latin American average. Income concentration, estimated by the Gini 
Coe
cient (0.57) placed Ecuador in the third worst position in the re-
gion, only aer Brazil and Paraguay (IDB, 2000). In 1994, 57% of urban 
population had low productivity jobs (CEPAL, 2001), illiteracy a	ected 
10.5% of the population, and adult schooling averaged 7 years in 1995 
(PNUD, 2001). In 1998, 26% of children younger than ve su	ered from 
chronic malnutrition (Larrea, Freire y Lutter, 2001).
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In summary, the state capacity to turn oil exports into development 
during the neo-liberal period collapsed. In spite of increasing oil extrac-
tion (and environmental impacts), prices dived, and state participation in 
revenues dropped as well. Most of the reduced oil revenues were devoted 
by the state to debt payments. Additionally, under structural adjustment 
policies, public institutions were seriously weakened. Social expenditure, 
as a share of GDP, declined by about 50%, and the national planning 
board was almost eliminated.
e post-neoliberal recovery (2004-2014). Aer 2000, oil prices be-
gan to recover again, stimulated by increasing Chinese demand and a 
global supply peak. Oil extraction was boosted from 2004 onwards by 
a new pipeline (OCP), which doubled transport capacity. As a conse-
quence, from 2004 onwards, Ecuador experienced the largest expansion 
of oil exports in its history, as they grew rapidly by both quantum and 
price (Charts 3, 4 and 6). Quantum jumped in 2004 but began a slow 
decline aerwards; however, prices continued to soar.
From 2005 onwards, aer the nationalization of the Occidental oil 
elds (Block 15) and the approval of new legislation, the national share 
in oil revenues recovered again up to about 75%. From 2007 onwards, the 
government adopted a new development strategy, increasing state par-
ticipation in development and expanding public investment in renewable 
energy, infrastructure, and human capital.
In the context of increasing oil prices, higher oil extraction, recove- 
red state shares in oil revenues, and improved public institutions, both 
economic and social results became favourable. Economic growth was 
recovered, and social indicators improved, as poverty and inequality de-
clined, with substantial improvements in education, health, employment, 
and housing.
However, oil extraction has faced an irreversible declining trend since 
2004, as the Hubbert oil peak was reached and reserves are limited (Chart 
2). In spite of ostensible favourable public policies, results in economic 
diversication were poor, and private investment remained weak. In 2015 
the model appeared exhausted, facing plummeting oil prices and adverse 
international conditions.
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Future prospects: A new looming crisis? A decade-long period of 
economic expansion and social prosperity came to an end in late 2014, 
as oil and commodity prices collapsed, mostly as a result of a slowdown 
in the growth of the Chinese economy. Ecuador’s oil prices plummeted 
from 99 dollars per barrel in June 2014 to 31 dollars in November 2015 
(Chart 3). e change appears to be long lasting and generalized to most 
raw materials. e IMF commodity price index went down from 210 
in April 2011 to 90 in December 2015. e growth rate of the Chinese 
economy declined from 14.2% in 2007 to 6.9% in 2015, and the develop-
ment strategy of China changed, giving priority to domestic expansion 
and environmental controls.
Under declining terms of trade and lasting adverse changes in the in-
ternational context, Ecuador is further a	ected by the appreciation of the 
US dollar. e country dollarized its economy in 2000, and the real ef-
fective exchange rate for Ecuadorian exports increased by 20% between 
2007 and 2015, making non-oil exports less competitive. In 2017 the US 
dollar devaluated by about 9%, allowing certain recovery for Ecuador´s 
real exchange rate. Since the country no longer has a national currency, it 
lacks monetary tools for balancing the adverse e	ects of exchange rates. 
In 2015, a strong simultaneous contraction of both oil and non-oil ex-
ports took place (Chart 6). As a result, per capita income declined by 
1.4% in 2015 and by 3.1% in 2016 (Banco Central del Ecuador, 2018). Ac-
cording to a recent IMF forecast, per capita GDP may continue declining 
up to 2018 and will remain at at least up to 2022 (IMF, 2017).
e Ecuadorian economy must face the challenge of diversifying its 
structure and moving away from its extractive base, but the weakness 
of non-oil sectors, the excessive dependence on primary products, and 
reduced private investment, in the context of exhaustion in public in-
vestment, make the transition painful and di
cult. In the likely lasting 
scenario of low oil and mineral prices, the extractive model of develop-
ment in Ecuador may become exhausted, especially in light of reduced 
remaining oil reserves and the lack of competitive prospects for large 
scale mining. 
A regression model on the structural factors of social distribution 
of oil revenue. According to the main hypothesis of this article, institu-
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tional state capacity to e	ectively invest oil revenues in social develop-
ment changed over time in Ecuador, depending on one externally de-
termined factor, real oil prices, a contextual variable with both external 
and internal components, the quantum of oil exports, and two internal 
factors, state participation in oil revenues and the institutional capacity of 
the state to foster an inclusive development strategy.
In order to analyse the hypothesis, a regression model was built, in 
spite of the fact that empirical information for building adequate indica-
tors for the entire oil period proved to be scarce and a	ected by reliability 
and lack of comparability over time. 
As a dependent variable, public education expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP was selected. is was the only proxy indicator on social expen-
diture with partially reliable information for the entire 1972-2016 period.
e independent variables were selected as follows:
1. Real oil prices for Ecuadorian exports in 1984 US dollars, taking 
the US consumer price index as a deator.
2. Quantum of oil exports, including both crude oil and oil deriva-
tives (a small component of Ecuador’s oil exports), measured in 
barrels.
3. Public foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, taken as a proxy for the 
institutional capacity of the state to invest in development (expected 
sign is negative). is variable may have been underestimated dur-
ing the second Correa administration (2013-2017).
4. e state share in oil revenues, as a percentage. is variable has a 
low reliability and comparability across time, given the di
culty of 
getting accurate information about the state budget.
e regression model was performed with the Prais-Winsten and 
Cochrane-Orcutt method, including a rst order correction for autocor-
relation, using the “prais” command in Stata 13. e results are presented 
in Table 4.
Oil export quantum has a surprising negative regression coe
cient 
with statistical signicance. e result may be attributed to the trend to in-
crease oil extraction as a policy response applied during the crisis periods, 
as was the case in the late 1980s as well as aer 2014. e remaining in-
58 Carlos Larrea Maldonado
dependent variables have coe
cients with the expected signs (although 
only two are statistically signicant at the 5% level). Despite the above 
mentioned deciencies in the reliability of the empirical information, the 
model broadly supports the hypothesis under discussion.
Economic diversification       
during the oil period 
 is section analyses economic diversication from three perspec-
tives: industrialization, export composition and other forms of sectorial 
change. 
Industrialization. Although economic growth in the 1970s was sig-
nicant, diversication was limited and short lived. In spite of impres-
sive manufacturing growth (10.1% per year between 1972 and 1980), the 
sectorial performance was weak and, in the words of the World Bank, 
“disappointing” (World Bank, 1984, p. 63). In fact, during the bonanza, 
structural diversication of manufacturing was minimal. Finished con-
sumer goods remained dominant, with minimum development of in-
termediate and capital goods and of internal linkages. Moreover, output 
remained highly concentrated in the metropolises, while a capital and 
import intensive technology, with reduced employment generation, pre-
vailed. Additionally, an early monopolistic structure characterized most 
branches while ine
ciency and reduced utilization of installed capacity 
were widespread.
Table 4. Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression model on Ecuador’s 
 oil-to-development capacity
Dependent variable: Public education expenditure as % of GDP.
R2 = 0.2729 Rho = 0.4633 Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) = 1.81 n = 44
Note: Atypical years 1972 (incomplete first year) and 1987 (earth-
quake) were excluded from the model. 
Independent Variable B t P(o)
Real oil price 0.0359 2.57 0.014
Oil export quantum -8.49E-06 -2.1 0.042
% foreign debt/GDP -0.11276 -0.16 0.876
State share in oil revenue 0.4319 0.71 0.48
Constant 3.5064 4.81 ~ 0
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 Some diversication in the composition of manufacturing output by 
sub-sectors took place both before and aer the petroleum bonanza, but 
the structure remained almost unchanged between 1972 and 1982. A pure-
ly “horizontal” expansion prevailed, without the development of domes-
tic internal linkages. Rob Vos analyses the changes in internal structure 
in manufacturing, using Leontief ’s input-output matrices. He concludes 
that domestic linkages in manufacturing were low and changed little dur-
ing the oil bonanza (Vos, 1987, pp. 53-72). World Bank conclusions are 
similar (World Bank, 1984). According to the Bank, Ecuador’s “modern 
manufacturing developed almost as an enclave.” As a result of growth 
without diversication, the internal composition of manufacturing 
in Ecuador –concentrated mostly in traditional consumer goods– remai- 
ned at an early stage of development, compared with other developing 
countries, as Table 4 shows (Larrea, 1993).
Industrialization was mostly a short-lived e	ect of demand expansion 
in protected sectors of the economy between 1972 and 1982. Aer 1982, 
in the context of the debt crisis, the state progressively dismantled the ISI 
model, and since de 1990s opened the economy to foreign competition, 
drastically reducing manufacturing protection. As a result, the manufac-
turing share in GDP declined, eliminating the gains of the 1970s (Chart 
5). However, during the neo-liberal period, some diversication took 
place, as processed food and beverages, chemicals and metal machinery 
improved, while the textile industry performed poorly in the face of fo-
reign competition. Recent policies, aimed since 2007 to support “selec-
tive import substituting industrialization”, failed to diversify the internal 
structure of manufacturing, as no signicant change can be observed bet- 
ween 2005 and 2012 in Table 5. 
Agriculture. In spite of subsidized credit and other incentives, agri-
cultural modernization did not lead to sectorial growth during the oil 
boom. Per capita agricultural output for domestic consumption actually 
declined, and export agriculture expanded slowly. e overall perfor-
mance of the sector during the last half century has been disappointing, 
as per capita agricultural output barely grew, and the sector lagged behind 
the rest of the economy (Table 6 and Chart 10). Domestic agriculture, in 
particular, almost stagnated in spite of the generous availability of water 
and fertile soils in Ecuador.
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SUB-SECTOR 1965 1972 1977 1982 1988 2005 2009 2012
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 58.1 46.3 42.8 41.6 37.5 36.3 37.2 38.9
Textiles and Clothing 16.2 22.1 23.6 22.1 19.8 8.8 8.1 7.8
Wood and Wood Products 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 8.8
Paper and Printing 7.4 7.1 6.0 6.3 7.3 6.5 5.9 6.0
Chemical Products 4.8 5.7 6.5 6.1 6.5 14.4 13.4 9.5
Non-metallic minerals & basic metals 5.4 9.1 10.0 12.4 12.7 12.7 13.2 14.8
Metal Products and Machinery 2.0 3.6 5.3 3.1 4.7 10.6 11.3 7.5
















GDP 1.04 4.17 -0.49 0.38 2.72 1.48 1.53
Agriculture -1.18 -2.20 2.76 2.12 -0.71 0.54 1.00
Manufacturing 2.34 4.57 -0.18 0.16 2.67 1.56 1.24
Construction 3.38 -1.31 -5.37 0.14 6.86 0.21 0.32
Commerce -0.46 2.72 -0.71 -0.76 1.56 0.34 0.25
Hotels and restaurants 0.54 13.44 -5.15 -0.73 4.89 2.48 3.15
Finances 5.05 10.78 -2.83 -0.18 5.61 2.81 1.91
Public administration 
and social security -3.49 6.44 2.21 -2.92 4.09 1.06 1.44
Agricultural subsectors
Bananas, coffee and 
cacao -5.73 -3.72 0.91 5.24 -0.05 0.59 1.72
Domestic agriculture & 
flowers 0.09 -4.40 3.03 1.44 0.66 0.19 0.66
Cattle raising -0.94 0.74 0.69 0.54 1.50 0.62 0.75
Domestic agriculture, 
cattle raising & flowers -0.11 -3.48 2.56 1.27 0.81 0.25 0.66
Silviculture 3.35 7.23 -1.19 2.55 2.57 2.94 2.68
Fishing and aquaculture 5.33 5.65 12.24 0.84 3.32 4.78 4.50
Note: Growth rates were estimated by kinked exponential regressions, adjusted for first order autocorrelation.
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales Anuales Base 2007 ‹www.bce.fin.ec›, visited August 
2015.
Table 5. Structure of Manufacturing Output by Sub-Sectors: 1966-2012
 (Percentages)
Note: Percentages were calculated from data at 1975 prices up to 1998 and at 2007 princes since 2005.
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales 13 (1990), and Cuentas Nacionales Anuales Base 2007 
‹www.bce.fin.ec›, visited August 2015.
Table 6. Per capita output annual growth rates by sectors and periods
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Agricultural output presents a typical countercyclical prole, contracting 
in periods of growth and expanding during crises. As real exchange rates 
became overvalued in expansion periods, domestic agriculture turns less 
competitive than imported food. Conversely, during periods of crisis, 
foreign exchange is scarce and domestic agriculture becomes more com-
petitive. 
Traditional agricultural exports performed poorly and followed the 
same countercyclical pattern. e most dynamic subsectors in agricul-
ture, forestry, aquaculture, and shing, are at the same time the less sus-
tainable and have the highest environmental impacts. 
Other sectors, like construction, public spending and nances, present 
a typical cyclical prole, as predicted by Dutch Disease models. An un-
equal development pattern of sectorial growth prevailed during the oil 
period in Ecuador, with detrimental e	ects mostly on agriculture, a stra-
tegic sector in terms of food security and employment (Berry, 2014). 
Non-oil Export performance. Non-oil exports, mostly composed by 
bananas, co	ee and cacao, enjoyed favourable international prices in 
the 1970s and also received subsidized credit and other benets, but, as 
predicted by Dutch Disease models, they were a	ected by the overva- 
lued exchange rates that prevailed during the oil boom period (Larrea, 
1993). As a result, they experienced slow growth. Export diversication 
was moderate in the 1970s, with only one signicant achievement, the 
expansion of sh and farmed shrimp exports. Sea product exports ac-
counted for 3% of total exports in 1972, 9.2% in 1982, 20% in 1993 and 
12% in 2012. However, shrimp aquaculture has had a high environmental 
cost, as mangrove deforestation has been severe, destroying about 50% 
of the ecosystem area. Additionally, farmed shrimp proved vulnerable to 
plagues, which strongly reduced production in the late 1990s.
e only new signicant addition to Ecuador’s export basket since the 
1990s has been fresh owers. In spite of its dynamic expansion, its con-
tribution to total exports is still small (3.1% in 2014). During the 1990s, 
banana export expansion was also important, and a group of non-tradi-
tional exports maintained a steady growth from the early 1990s to 2014, 
accounting for 14% of total exports in the last year. 
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However, from a long-term perspective, export diversication has been 
low and insu
cient, as Chart 8 shows. ree groups of mostly primary 
goods –namely oil, bananas and sea products– have been accounting 
for about 80% of Ecuador’s exports during the last four decades, without 
a signicant diversication trend.
Although in the three cases an important quantum expansion took 
place, all products face serious constrains in the future, as oil extraction 
capacity will inevitably decline given limited reserves, sea products may 
face environmental constraints due to overshing and diseases in farmed 
shrimp, and banana markets are almost saturated. Although the future 
of the terms of trade in uncertain, it is unlikely that the ascending trend 
(2004-2014) will return in the medium term in the context of the inter-
national nancial crisis and the slowdown of China and other emerging 
economies.
Social development
Broadly speaking, social indicators followed the economy’s boom-
bust- recovery trend, improving slowly during crises and quickly in ex-
pansion cycles, as Chart 9 shows. Oil extraction has very low direct em-
ployment generation, and in Ecuador’s case, both backward and forward 
productive linkages are weak, so the sector is an enclave. e social e	ect 
is mostly the result of the scal linkage, in other words, state taxing or di-
rect production capacity, coupled with the state’s capability to e	ectively 
promote social development. 
Both in the 1970s and aer 2006, the state was able to both appropriate 
a signicant fraction of oil revenues and e	ectively promote social deve- 
lopment. As a result, education, health, and housing conditions improved, 
as Table 7 demonstrates.
Nevertheless, several critical social problems stand out. Ecuador in-
herited, from the colonial period, an extremely unequal social structure, 
with widespread poverty, severe ethic discrimination and massive struc-
tural underemployment. Employment indicators barely improved during 
the oil boom, as a result of the capital-intensive growth model, deteriora- 
ted during the neo-liberal phase, and recovered aer 2006, as real wages 
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increased and employment expanded with construction and investment 
in public infrastructure (Table 8). 
However, given the lack of economic diversication, employment 
gains may be short lived and dependent on contingent scal buoyancy. 
Additionally, as capital and land assets remained highly concentrated and 
no social redistribution took place, the structural roots of inequality did 
not change. 
Poverty, inequality and social policies. In 2017, aer 45 years of oil 
extraction, poverty still a	ected almost a third of the population (30%), 
being higher in rural areas (49%) and particularly among indigenous 
peoples (62%) (Larrea, 2016, Charts 13 and 14). Aer a sustained im-
provement from 2007 to 2014, the Gini coe
cient of per capita household 
income remained at at 0.45. Several studies show that the indigenous 
population barely beneted from social gains during the last decade, and 
Table 7. Selected Social Indicators in Ecuador: 1962-2010
Year 1962 1974 1982 1990 2001 2010
Average years of schooling 3.03 3.71 5.16 6.67 7.28 8.69
Illiteracy rate 32.8 26.1 16.5 11.7 9.1 6.7
% dwellings with piped water 13.0 20.0 31.9 38.3 47.9 55.3
Note: Indicators are defined as average years of schooling of persons older than 23, illiteracy rate among 
persons older than 14 years, and percentage of dwellings with piped water inside the house.
Sources: INEC, Censos de población, 1990, 2001, 2010, Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series-International: Version 4.0. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008. Based on: INEC. 
Censos de población 1962, 1974, 1982.
Table 8. Structure of Labour Force in Ecuador 
 (Percentages of total Economically Active Population (EAP))
Sources: INEC, Censos de población, 1990, 2001, 2010, Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series-International: Version 4.0. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008. Based on: INEC. 
Censos de población 1962, 1974, 1982. 
Year Wage earners/EAP Agriculture Manufacturing Wage earners / agricultural EAP
Wage earners/ 
manufacturing EAP
1962 46.2 59.0 14.2 38.8 38.3
1974 50.2 45.7 11.8 36.9 50.7
1982 51.6 36.7 13.3 29.8 58.4
1990 44.4 35.8 12.5 25.5 45.4
2001 44.0 31.1 11.2 26.2 49.7
2010 60.9 21.7 10.1 52.4 66.2
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the gap between them and the rest of the society actually widened (World 
Bank, 2015, Larrea, 2016, Chart 14). e wage discrimination against fe-
male and indigenous workers, albeit declining, is still high, and about a 
third of the labour force remain underemployed. 
Summarizing, in spite of important social achievements during the oil 
period –particularly in the 1970s and between 2004 and 2014– Ecuador 
still remains deeply a	ected by inequality, poverty and social exclusion, 
particularly against indigenous peoples. 
During the oil boom, social policies promoted education and health, 
from a perspective of universal social rights and a signicant state inter-
vention in the economy, but a capital-intensive model of industrialization 
and agricultural modernization prevented adequate employment genera-
tion, so employment indicators actually deteriorated, with an expansion 
of informal sector (Larrea, 1993).
Later, during the structural adjustment period (1982-2004), social ex-
penditure declined, and social policies became focused on poor house-
holds, as social progress was expected to be a consequence of private in-
vestment and market-based social distribution. As happened in most Latin 
American countries, economic growth was elusive and weak, poverty 
and social inequality actually increased, and structural underemploy-
ment deepened.
In 1999, a deep economic crisis, sparked by El Niño oods and the 
bankruptcy of most private banks, led to the dollarization of the economy 
and the worst social deterioration in Ecuador since the 1920s and 1930s. 
Poverty and unemployment soared, and about one million people mi-
grated abroad, mostly to Spain and the United States.
From 2004 to 2014, as mentioned, economic growth returned to Ecua- 
dor and Latin America, as a result of soaring oil and commodity prices 
sparked by a rapid expansion of Chinese economy. In 2006, as Rafael 
Correa was elected president, a new social policy began, promising the 
end of neoliberal structural adjustment. 
Under new social policies, a signicant role of the state in develop-
ment returned, with a strong expansion of education and health expen-
diture, an extended coverage of social security, increasing real wages and 
an important conditional cash transfer programs for poor households. 
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Employment expansion was fuelled not only by public investment in in-
frastructure and energy (roads, hydroelectric dams), but also by the ex-
pansion of public bureaucracy. Policies were nanced by high oil prices, a 
wider public participation in oil revenues and a generous ow of Chinese 
loans.
As a result, poverty declined from 46% in 2007 to 30% in 2014, under-
employment also dropped from 48% to 29%, and the Gini coe
cient of 
per capita household income was reduced from 0.54 to 0.47 in the same 
period (Larrea, 2016, Charts 11 to 14). 
In spite of these signicant achievements, social policies had several 
problems.
1. Although poverty in Ecuador a	ects mostly the countryside, and par-
ticularly indigenous peoples, the Correa government lacked a coherent 
rural development policy. Despite a very unequal land distribution, 
with a Gini coe
cient of 0.80, the government did not promote a 
wider access to land and irrigation for small peasants, and land re-
form was absent from social policies. Rural development programs, 
which usually include credit, technical assistance and training, were 
not implemented either. Rural economic policies strongly supported 
agribusiness and large plantations, with frequent detrimental e	ects 
on peasantry. e lack of an inclusive rural development policy ex-
plains part of the wider social gap with indigenous peoples.
2. e government did not promote an e	ective policy towards micro, 
small and medium enterprises. Although most of the employment in 
Ecuador is linked to micro and small enterprises, they lack access to 
credit, technical assistance, training and appropriate technology, and 
therefore are a	ected by low productivity. During the Correa govern-
ment, credit remained highly concentrated among large corporations, 
without signicant programs promoting microcredit and supporting 
small and medium entrepreneurs.
3. e most important result of education policies was an expansion in 
coverage of primary and secondary education, without signicant 
achievements in education quality. e educational system in Ecua- 
dor has strong problems of low quality and lack of pertinence of pro-
grams. Educational policies were applied in an authoritarian and cen-
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tralized way, without an e	ective contact with local circumstances and 
realities. e bureaucracy in charge of education policies lacked expe-
rience and adequate training.
4. In the case of health policies as well, the main result was an important 
expansion of coverage, but results were unsatisfactory in terms of re-
ducing child malnutrition and adolescent pregnancy. 
5. Despite a signicant investment in higher education, science and tech-
nology, results were hardly e	ective. While some improvements took 
place in the quality of higher education, the whole program failed by 
the lack of coherent goals, ine
cient management, and a poor vision 
of national requirements on science and technology. 
6. In general, social policies were highly dependent on buoyant scal 
expenditures (public works, investments in infrastructure, education 
and health, cash transfers to the poor), and will be hard to maintain 
once the economic bonanza is over. 
e main question is the state capacity to keep and consolidate the so-
cial gains obtained during the post-neoliberal bonanza. As the Ecuadorean 
experience with the 1999 crisis shows, the country social structure re-
mains highly vulnerable to external shocks and natural disasters. e 
current situation has several simultaneous vulnerabilities, such as low oil 
and commodity prices, the appreciation of the dollar harming non-oil 
exports, a harder access to international credit and the recent earthquake 
in the Coast, which was the worst since 1949. If external vulnerabilities 
prevail in the future, social vulnerability in Ecuador may be high.
Going beyond the predicable short-term impacts of the crisis, the 
main problem is the capacity of an extractive-based economy to provide 
conditions for an improvement in living conditions of the population and 
enhancing human capabilities in a sustainable way, which is the ultimate 
goal of development. 
It seems that Ecuador, with limited oil reserves and facing an uncer-
tain future about oil prices, may require exploring alternative develop-
ment strategies, seeking ways to overcoming the oil dependence and pro-
moting economic diversication toward activities able to improve living 
conditions and generate productive employment, within the limits of 
ecosystems and in harmony with nature. is problem will be discussed 
in detail in the next section.
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Chart 3. Real Oil prices in Ecuador. 1972-2015
 (2005 US $)
Sources: Banco Central del Ecuador, Información Estadística Mensual ‹www.bce.fin.ec›, U.S. 
Department Of Labour ‹http://www.bls.gov/cpi/›. Visited January 2016.
Chart 4. Total Oil Export Quantum in Ecuador. 1972-2011
Note: Total oil exports include crude oil and derivatives.
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador. Boletín Anuario (2012 and previous issues). 
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Chart 5. Ecuador: Manufacturing Share in GDP. 1965-2013
Note: Percentages were calculated from data at 1975 prices up to 1998 and at 2007 
prices since 2005. Data from national accounts at 2007 follows a similar trend, with more 
dispersion.
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales 13 (1990), and Cuentas Naciona-
les Anuales Base 2007 ‹www.bce.fin.ec›, visited August 2013.
Sources: Author’s estimates based on: INEC, Censos de población, 1962, 1974, 1982,1990, 
2001, 2010; Banco Central del Ecuador, Información Estadística Mensual ‹www.bce.fin.
ec›, World Bank, Development Prospects Group; ‹http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX-
TERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:20587651~pagePK:64165401~pi-
PK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html›. Visited January 2016.
Chart 6. Per Capita Export Purchasing Power by Products. 1972-2015
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Sources: Author’s estimates based on: INEC, Censos de población, 1962, 1974, 1982,1990, 
2001, 2010; Banco Central del Ecuador, Información Estadística Mensual ‹www.bce.fin.ec›, 
U.S. Department Of Labor ‹http://www.bls.gov/cpi/›. Visited August 2013.
Chart 7. Export Quantum by Main Products. 1970-2011
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Información Estadística Mensual (www.bce.fin.ec). Visited 
January 2016.
Chart 8. Ecuador’s Export Composition by Main Products. 1970-2015
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Sources: INEC, Censos de población, 1990, 2001, 2010, Minnesota Population Center. In-
tegrated Public Use Microdata Series-International: Version 4.0. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 2008. Based on: INEC. Censos de población 1962, 1974, 1982. 
Chart 9. Ecuador: Average Years of Schooling. 1962-2010
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales Anuales Base 2007 ‹www.bce.fin.ec›, 
visited August 2015.
Chart 10. Per Capita Output indices of Agriculture and GDP in Ecuador.   
 1965-2012. (1965=100)
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Source: Author’s estimates from INEC, Encuesta ENEMDU data base 2007-2017.
Chart 11. Urban underemployment end Uneployment. 2007-2017
Source: Author’s estimates from INEC, Encuesta ENEMDU data base 2007-2017. 
Chart 12. Underemployment end Uneployment in Quito. 2007-2017
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Chart 13. Poverty and Indigence by Area of residence. 2007-2017
Source: Author’s estimates from INEC, Encuesta ENEMDU data base 2007-2017.
Chart 14. Poverty and Extreme Poverty by Ethnticity. 2007-2017
Source: Author’s estimates from INEC, Encuesta ENEMDU data base 2007-2017.
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Alternative development paths      
for Ecuador
Although Ecuador experienced an important process of economic 
growth and social improvement between 2004 and 2014, this process is 
unlikely to continue and, in the medium term, can be exhausted or even 
reversed. e following reasons explain this argument.
1. e recent economic expansion was nanced by a particular conver-
gence of three favourable factors: a) A sharp increase in real oil prices, 
as they doubled between 2004 and 2012, b) A 50% jump in oil export 
volumes from 2004 onwards, as a result of the construction of the new 
heavy oil pipeline (OCP), and, c) An important expansion of foreign 
debt, particularly to China, which lent about 17.4 billion dollars to Ecua- 
dor, partially in the form of “anticipated oil purchases” (Hoy, 2013, 
Interamerican Dialogue, 2018). ose factors have been weakened or 
were even reversed in 2015: oil prices plummeted, net export volumes 
declined, and foreign credit sources are seriously reduced.
 Real oil prices may remain low in the future, as global economic 
growth is a	ected by the lasting e	ects of the 2008 nancial crisis. 
China has already reduced its growth rates by about 40%, while other 
emerging economies, such as Brazil, are even in recession. Oil de-
mand has dropped by 10% since 2005 in developed countries, as the 
e	ect of rapid technological change to new energy sources, and even 
in China the rate of growth of oil demand declined to 3.1% between 
2012 and 2015 (e Economist, 2013, IEA, 2016, EIA, 2016). On the 
supply side, the expansion of U.S. oil and gas extraction by fracking 
led to the dumping policies of Saudi Arabia to protect its market share, 
further exacerbated by the possible expansion of Iranian exports aer 
the liing of international sanctions. e recent join OPEC and Rus-
sia policy of restricting supply had a limited e	ect on boosting prices, 
but so far has been insu
cient to return prices to the 2014 levels. Both 
the World Bank and IMF forecast moderated oil prices in the coming 
years, and other forecasts that include the expansion of electric cars 
and renewable energy sources are more pessimistic (Helm, 2017). 
Nevertheless, sudden changes in the oil market may occur as a result 
74 Carlos Larrea Maldonado
of the volatile political situation prevailing in the Middle East and 
Russia.
 Future volume expansion in Ecuador’s oil exports is unlikely, as net 
export quantum has already fallen by 16% since 2004 as most oil elds 
are in a declining phase, and domestic consumption is growing (Table 
2). As mentioned, reserves are limited and net oil exports will hardly 
last more than 20 years. e declining trend in oil volumes may be 
postponed for several years with improved extraction in mature elds 
and the exploitation of the ITT reserves if prices recover, but net ex-
ports will continue to fall aer that.
 Between 2014 and 2017 the state has managed to avoid a severe crisis 
by increasing foreign debt, but the strategy seems coming to its limits. 
As the Ecuadorian experience in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates, 
foreign debt may become more expensive and di
cult, severely redu-
cing growth prospects in the future. 
2. Sustained future growth requires diversication. As already explained, 
the Ecuadorian economy failed to diversify during the last four de-
cades, a	ected by multiple problems associated with extractivism. 
Moreover, most of the investment, both public and foreign, has been 
concentrated in infrastructure (hydroelectricity and roads), and in oil 
and mining, while private investment and, generally, investment in 
economic diversication, remained reduced. In fact, while both in-
vestment and savings were low, sumptuary consumption soared until 
2014. As a consequence, the trade balance has been consistently nega-
tive from 2009 onwards.
Two alternative models can be envisaged for future development in 
Ecuador.
“Deepening extrativism       
to overcome it”
e current government strategy promoted the expansion of the oil 
extraction frontier to formerly undisturbed regions in the Amazon, in-
cluding the Yasuní National Park, and the start of large-scale and open 
pit mining (copper and gold) in several environmentally sensitive spots 
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in the Amazon and Highland regions. e state have planned to use these 
short-term resources to further invest in biotechnology and other biodi-
versity-based services.
e feasibility of this strategy was questionable, even with the high 
commodity prices prevailing up to 2014, given the lack of success of all 
the policies aimed toward economic diversication in the last four deca- 
des. Additionally, the environmental impact of expanded oil extraction 
and mining in highly sensitive areas may be too great and irreversible, 
limiting the feasibility of a turning point towards a sustainable develop-
ment path. Severe climate change e	ects will be added to destructive 
impacts of extractive industries in the medium term. With current oil 
and mineral prices, the strategy may turn out to be unfeasible. Since oil 
extraction costs may be similar of higher than export prices, and this 
situation may be lasting, perspectives for the expansion of the extractive 
frontier are uncertain.
Is a road towards sustainability       
still feasible in Ecuador?
An alternative path may be based on stopping oil frontier expansion, 
banning large-scale mining in environmentally sensitive areas, and ap-
plying a coherent policy aimed at remaining ecosystem conservation, hu-
man development, and the promotion of sustainable uses of biodiversity, 
based initially on ecotourism, tourism, agroforestry, and international 
cooperation towards rainforest conservation, biodiversity protection, and 
climate change mitigation. Some selective industrialization may comple-
ment the strategy, expanding domestic linkages of agricultural products 
and promoting certain protable branches. A social equity policy may 
complement the strategy, promoting land distribution, democratization 
of credit, technical assistance and training, and e	ective support for small 
and medium enterprises, cooperatives and communal organizations. In 
the medium term, investment in education, health, science and technolo- 
gy may lead to a sustainable use of biodiversity and the development of 
appropriate technologies. 
e strategy aims to preserve the exceptional natural endowment and 
cultural diversity of Ecuador, improving at the same time the quality of 
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life in a participatory way. e goals are expanding the resilience to cli-
mate change and other forms of environmental degradation and simul-
taneously promoting economic diversication towards labour intensive 
activities and improving land productivity conserving soils. e ultimate 
objective is promoting human development within the regenerative ca-
pacity of ecosystems.
A similar experience in Latin America is that of Costa Rica, a small 
Central American country, which had the same export base as Ecuador 
in the 1950s (bananas, co	ee and cacao). Costa Rica pursued a long-term 
development strategy investing in human capital, biodiversity protection 
and social equity. Currently, Costa Rica’s social achievements are among 
the best in Latin America, per capita income is about twice that of Ecua- 
dor and tourism share in both employment and GDP is at least three 
times higher than the corresponding gures in Ecuador. 
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Ecuador: myths of “progressive” 
extractivism and technocracy
(The flaws of redistributive health governance)
Jaime Breilh Paz y Miño
Introduction 
e discourse of a good extractivism, which pays for the social ex-
penditures, appears as a common characteristic of auto proclaimed “pro-
gressive” technocratic Latin American governments during the past two 
decades. e political leaders of these regimes exacerbated their progres-
siveness dening their administrations as “revolutionary” in contrast 
with what was repeatedly demonized as the dark era of neoliberalism. 
is contradictory economic and political model can be characteri- 
zed as a redistributive neo-productivism. A form of governance, which 
built its legitimacy by taking distance with the wave of open privatization 
and private investment centered neoliberal policies of the previous years 
and opening a two track governance strategy. In the rst place, switching 
market-centered policies with a public investment State model, focused 
in aggressive public infrastructural development and administrative 
modernization policies; mainly in elds of social interest like education, 
health and transportation. And secondly, by retaining the social com-
pensation systems of focalized bonus deliveries for the extremely poor, 
applied in previous populist and neoliberal regimes. 
e nancial cornerstone of this State centered rule was the fast 
growth of public income, mainly through negotiation of concessions and 
taxes with transnational corporations and big companies, mainly around 
the extraction of oil and mining natural resources, which in their turn 
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provided funds for the development of big public infrastructure projects 
and equipping in areas like public transportation, educational facilities 
and health services.
 e bulk source of fresh public funds has been oil and metal mining, 
activities that imply very serious social and environmental consequen- 
ces, under the dominant international cannons that are applied in all the 
more lucrative negotiations. So it was under this excessively pragmatic 
mode of public policy nancing and the urgent political need of funds for 
social investment, that the ghost of extractivism showed it darkest face. 
e progressiveness of governments that had initially taken sides with 
environmental justice and ecosystems protection, was diluted through 
the face saving rhetoric of a supposedly “good extractivism”. e intent to 
justify it by a discourse of minimal negative impacts became the sad face 
of claudication. 
en, not only did governments go over the constitutional norms 
that many of them had previously help build in response to neoliberal 
carelessness, but their executive and legislative arms participated in the 
regressive move of developing technically biased mechanisms of environ-
mental certication and permission, that concealed the magnitude and 
nature of the imminent hazards of the proposed extraction projects. A 
discourse was consciously or subconsciously developed by the technical 
cadres for minimizing the image of destructive and socially regressive 
conditions of big scale mining and agribusiness and disguising the social 
and health hazards that these those developments entail.
From an epidemiological perspective Social wellbeing standards and 
the health state of the population constitute important evidences when 
evaluating the overall impact and e	ectiveness of public policy and govern- 
mental strategies. they are true thermometers of the degree of healthi-
ness and wellbeing obtained by successful social policies. Conventional 
reports based on mere irresponsible socio economic development pro- 
jects concentrate on macro economical average indicators of economic 
growth and bulk data on social investment, but they can easily oversee 
the very negative and regressive implications of the sort of contradictory 
investment that we have described, so it is important to take a careful in 
depth look at health
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A critical scrutiny and understanding of heath conditions in any period 
of a society being evaluated, is not only important so show if straight-
forward positive health e	ects are being attained –in this case the e	ects 
and goodness of socially oriented public revenues derived from extracti- 
vist practices-, but also to understand the degree of public health progres-
siveness that the model make possible, beyond the rhetorical recognition 
of mother natures´ and peoples´ health rights.
So in order to contribute to the evaluation of the wellbeing and health 
conditions generated during the extractivist period in Latin America, and 
to examine some of the aws of redistributive governance, we have chosen 
to examine the health accomplishments of Ecuador´s “citizens revolution” 
government from 2006 to 2015. Not only that by doing so t in the the-
matic of the present compilation, but because the Ecuadorian case pro-
vides the combination of fast growing extractivism and at the same time 
important expansion of public investment in health and public services. 
It is however important to highlight that one important limitation of 
this exploratory assay is the limiting structure and depth of the available 
health information. Conventional health state reports, as is the case of 
Ecuador, limit themselves to the fragmented, decontextualized and up-
rooted description of broad average morbidity and mortality rates, nutri-
tional indexes, and indicators of health services provision and access, as if 
those empirical facts would have a self explanatory nature. While o	ering 
a disintegrated presentation of certain variables and their empirical in-
dicators on national, regional or local basis, they do not provide an in-
tegrated description of the social conditions to which they are inextrica-
bly connected, and therefore it is very di
cult to explain their presence, 
magnitude and severity in the determining conditioning of preponderant 
contextual processes.
To overcome that limitation and critically analyze the relation of health 
conditions to the neo productivist governance, we recur to by restating 
the epidemiological conditions and and demonstrate the we begin have 
tried to Our empirical evidences should be built so that we are able to 
rightly interpret the socio political roots of our present health conditions 
and problems, and must guide us in understanding the economic, politi-
cal and cultural processes that shape the social determination of health. 
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One important conclusion of our reections is that the contemporary 
case of the past Ecuadorian government, especially during the oil prices 
boom (2006-2014), depicts the deleterious logic of extractivism, and 
demonstrates the limited e	ectiveness of a type of public health invest-
ment, which is mainly circumscribed to individual curative actions and 
provision of conventional individual health care services through hospi-
tals and other health units. 
 Under the premise that health levels are a sound indicator of the suc-
cess of social policies, health coverage indexes and morbidity/mortality 
rates reduction are considered the gold standard for weighing the e	ect 
of such governance. erefore, national state of health evaluations oen 
limit themselves to the analysis of programs and services provision indi-
cators and classical epidemiological tracers. 
While conventional reports of that sort provide information on na-
tional, regional or local trends of empirical health phenomena, they do 
not allow us to explain the socio epidemiological determination of the 
state of health. Our empirical evidences should be built so that we are 
able to rightly interpret the socio political roots of our present health con-
ditions and problems, and must guide us in understanding the economic, 
political and cultural processes that shape the social determination of 
health. 
In order to evaluate the expected e	ects on the health of the popula-
tion, our analysis went beyond the empirical reductionist methodology 
of conventional epidemiology, which operates through description of iso-
lated evidences, merely describing them and their external connections. 
To overcome the empirical evaluation of health conditions we have to 
insert and interpret health data of related to the a	ections and psychobio-
logical characteristics in their social context, link connect data built about 
important variables which restricts description to health phenomena 
or expression that constitute the peak of the iceberg peal of the ice do not 
allow us to apprehend the real, integral, collective health condition, we 
have analyzed data in their historical context, deciphering the social 
In order to fulll this commitment 
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The contradictions       
of “progressive” extractivism
e concept and practice of extractivism appear in countries with 
abundance of valuable natural resources. It applies to a form of gover-
nance that subsumes the logic of the State, which is negotiated and -
nanced by powerful international corporations. It entails aggressive in-
vestment in extraction of exportable, non renewable, goods. rough oil 
and mining concessions or similar mechanisms it a preferred form of 
capital accumulation acceleration that operates and accelerated appro-
priation / concentration of life goods (land, water, genome and in general 
of the biota).
Countries get trapped in a perverse logic which converts their abun-
dance in a paradoxical impoverishment. 
e main argument of a “good extractivism” that supports the cons- 
truction of equity through social investment and a redistributive process 
–without undermining the principles of progressive development–, has 
been subject to profound national and international scrutiny and ques-
tioning. ere is a wide range of criticisms. Some focus in the di	erent 
pathways for the expropriation of resources, the loss of autonomy and 
destructiveness (Acosta 2011).1 Other highlight the operation of loans 
which intertwine a a gain-loss scheme: from the side of the receptor 
heavy public debt building and from the side of the donor an aggres-
sive blow to win diplomatic allies, invest its funds, promote its currency 
and secure much-needed natural resources (Krauss and Bradsher 2015).2 
Others map the oil concessions in sensitive territories and foresee a major 
ecologic disaster (Foucart, Holzinger, Malécot & Patricolo 2015).3 Some 
researchers have demonstrated through rigorous eld research the slow, 
unstable and now critical nature of oil industry, with its recurrent cri-
1. Acosta, A. (2017). Maldiciones, herejías y otros milagros de la economía extractivista (2011) (1a. ed., 
pp. 341-78). Quito: Abya Yala.
2. Krauss, C., & Bradsher, K. (2015, julio). China’s Global Ambitions, With Loans and Strings At-
tached. e New York Times.
3. Foucart, S., Holzinger, F., Malécot, V., & Patricolo, C. (2015). Dilemme pétrolier en Equateur. Le 
Monde, Samedi Juillet 4, p. 7.
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ses - especially since 2013, when there was an abrupt 60% drop in value. 
ey explain the vulnerability of an economy with limited diversication, 
whose benets are concentrated and do not solve the poverty and social 
inequity indexes. ey describe the forest devastation, the a	ected com-
munities and the minimum institutional development that the model im-
plies. ey question the anthropocentric vision of a blind economic sys-
tem in the face of social and environmental rights and demands (Larrea 
et al. 2017).4 Later studies have penetrated in the periodization mega-
mining projects in Ecuador and the shiing strategies used by junior cor-
porations from 2001 to 2007 basically dedicated to exploration, whose 
prot depends mainly on nancial speculation in the stock exchange 
market, around territories of low concentration of precious metals, opera- 
ting through asset valorization of projects of massive, highly destructive 
material intensive extraction (Sacher 2018).
 Nevertheless during the blossoming years of oil extraction and 
rising mining investment, the planning voice of government repeatedly 
argued in a triumphal tone the consistent success of productivism and 
dened those years as a “gained decade” (SENPLADES 2017).5
e advent of a new government last year (August 24th, 2017) raised 
a wave of cautious hope in the country but at the same time intensied 
the interpretative dispute. One recent analysis proles this period´s com-
plexity, stating the potentialities of the new political moment, but at the 
same time cautioning about the vulnerable scenario that faces any rea-
sonable, well informed and consistently democratic option to be built 
(Acosta Cajas-Guijarro 2018). Qualifying optimist positions in this new 
political cycle of economy the analysts demonstrate that in the declining 
productivist years from 2014 to 2017, there was a clear contraction of 
production, investment, employment, labor time an its value. At the 
same time the disturbing growth of scal decit as percentage of GIP, of 
an important fall of the international reserve and a four fold increment 
4. Larrea, Carlos. ¿Está agotado el periodo petrolero en Ecuador? Alternativas hacia una sociedad más 
sustentable y equitativa: un estudio multi-criterio. Quito: Universidad Adina Simón Bolívar; Edicio-
nes La Tierra;  UASB-E, 2017.
5. SENPLADES. Informe a la Nación 2007-2017. Quito: Publicaciones de la Secretaría Nacional de 
Planicación y Desarrollo, 2017.
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of public debt. is preoccupying mortgage forced upon the country´s 
economical future, not only rea
rms the abounding criticisms we are 
portraying but also becomes hurtful when the data conrm that not even 
basic social equity gains were obtained. Indicators as the Gini income 
concentration index and the percentage of poverty appear stagnated. 
And even some crucial social equity indicators like the land concentra-
tion index was incremented during the years considered in the analysis.6
So these are the social historical circumstances that demanded us to 
look at what happened to the population´s health in the period an urged 
us to explore the readings of the epidemiological thermometer of real hu-
man development during the neo-productivist years.
Collective health: indispensable conceptual   
precisions and hypothesis 
In the academic and institutional eld of public health there is cur-
rently a dissent among those who approach health from a functional em-
pirical paradigm, which assumes a reductionist and linear logic that con-
siders it as a fundamentally individual problem caused by the so-called 
“risk factors”, and, on the other side, those who sustain an integral critical 
paradigm that explains the generation and distribution of health pro- 
blems through the theory of social determination of health.7
e application of the empirical-analytical logic to the “diagnoses of 
the health situation” emphasizes the systematization –even rigorous– of 
epidemiological and environmental evidences, but fragmenting them in 
a factor system, converting health into an array of fragmented variables, 
that the researcher associated by a formal mathematical model. A vision 
that works on the “peak of the iceberg”, attening reality to the phenome- 
nal, with evidences only formally connected, but lacking a structural ex-
planation. is model of Cartesian foundation, reies collective health 
6. Acosta, A., & Cajas-Guijarro, J. (2018, enero 12). El proyecto económico del gobierno de Lenín 
Moreno (De una política sin rumbo a una propuesta alternativa).
7. e social determination of health theory, propossed and amply discussed by Latin American au-
thors (explicada por autores de la salud colectiva o medicina social latinoamericana).
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understanding as the statistical summation of individual events and as-
sociated factors. 
If one is dealing, as is the case of this assay, with the assessment of col-
lective health in the productivist era, the Cartesian model would reduce it 
to the statistical systematization of indicators and, at best, the correlation 
of those fragmented pieces with some isolated “risk factors.”
In contrast, to evaluate the health situation from the paradigm of com-
plex thinking and social determination, we assume it as a multidimen-
sional process where what happens with human health in the individual 
domain and the social (collective) are not related only externally. Instead 
of looking at social “factors” as external to the human and environmen-
tal biological impacts, their intimate connection is established, mediated 
by a process that is not just external contact but the subsumption of the 
biological in the social, that is, the concatenation narrow social life with 
what happens in our bodies, in the physiological processes of the pheno-
type and the genotype reaction norms. In this way, it is understood that 
Figure 1. Integrating Health model ( Complex critical reasoning)
 Social Deetermination social DS (multidimensional)
 G: general / P: particular / I: individual
Breilh, J. (2015). Epidemiología crítica latinoamericana en Tras las huellas de la determinación salud (pp. 
19-75). Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
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phenomena such as morbidity and mortality in the case of human beings 
and the condition of the ecosystems of the a	ected nature must be ex-
plained within the framework of collective ways of life, and these in turn 
they must be analyzed within the broader framework of the social move-
ment that is established in the general domains of society and particular 
of the economic, cultural groups of said society.
Critical epidemiology inserts the understanding of the impacts on hu-
man and environmental health in the movement in the social reproduc-
tion of each society that takes place under typical forms of relationship 
with nature, in the form of a metabolism. Said movement of social re-
production is concomitantly a conscious process of creation of culture, 
forms of organization, and power relations, as well as the construction 
of relationships with nature itself, of which human beings are part. e 
conceptual map of gure 3 summarizes the spaces, dimensions and rela-
tionships that participate in social determination that redene the scope 
and essence of health (Breilh 2003, 2017).
If we are going to analyze and evaluate the health of the Ecuadorian 
society of the productivist period, for example, we must not disconnect 
the phenomena that are expressed in individuals –such as morbidity and 
mortality– or from local territories, from the processes of the dimension 
Social. When in a social space the logic of the general processes (G; macro), 
the particular processes of the typical groups’ living modes (meso) and 
the individual processes of the lifestyle in the individual order (micro) 
fulll the conditions that we have called the 4 “S´s” of life (i.e sustain-
able, sovereign, solidarity and biosecure) then are healthy spaces and 
processes, otherwise they are unhealthy spaces and processes, which are 
evidenced in epidemiological indicators (Breilh 2015 ). See Figure 1.
From this perspective, the “hypothesis” of this work emerges:
Even though conventional curative public health installations and professional resources 
were expanded and modernized since 2006, the potential favorable impact of this pol-
icy was masked and counteracted by the proliferation of unhealthy processes under 
conditions imposed by productivism, this is why their was no consistent improvement 
of health indicators in the period. e resulting unhealthy modes of living counteract 
the favorable e	ect of expanded health services. Since health impacts data cannot be 
statistically linked to social determination data it is practically impossible to discrimi-
nate the net e	ect of health care services. 
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Raising health investment      
and stagnation in the Productivist Era
e nancial administrative strengthening policies of the public health 
sector in Ecuador for the period 2006-2012 are evidenced in the invest-
ment budget items (accrued expenditure and advances). us according 
to the Ministry of Finance´s gures, public investment was on the raise: 
in the health eld it grew from 0.64 to 332 million US dollars; in educa-
tion from 88.86 to 537.0 million. Likewise, investments in energy went 
from 3.8 to 912 million and road investments from 279 to 986 million.8
e political decision to consolidate public health as a priority is evi-
dent in the year-over-year growth of the budgets accrued in the sector 
that went from 775 million in 2006 to 2,829 million in 2012 and more 
than 3,294 million in 2013.9 With the turn of the century, spending on 
health in Ecuador as a percentage of GDP increased notably from 2000 
to 2012 and remained above 6% with discrete uctuations.
As well as a rising tax collection, which doubled in the period, social 
investment per capita grew from 147 to 446 USD according to National 
Planning O
ce gures reported by the Ministry of Public Health.10 At 
the same time, social indicators such as the basic salary showed a discreet 
growth to reach 329 USD. e redistributive trend was also manifested 
in the consolidation of housing bonuses which grew in 2010 from 263 to 
14567 solutions.
When comparing the trend of per capita public health expenditure 
in several countries of Latin America during the current century (2000-
2012) according to World Bank data, Ecuador reports the highest per-
centage growth (584.33%) although in absolute terms the per capita as-
signed in 2012 is barely 361,17 USD; much higher than in previous years, 
but much lower than Uruguay (1313.44 USD) or Chile (1103.36 USD), 
Argentina (995.18 USD) or even Colombia (529.82 USD). If we com-
8. Secretaría de Planicación y Desarrollo–Informe Ministerio de Finanzas al 21 de Diciembre de 
2011. 
9. Presupuestos institucionales devengados y Resol.CD.441(2000-2013), MCPE (PIB 2013 estimado), 
INEC (Proyecciones Población) MSP–CGDE-DES.
10. MSP. El Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir, determinación social de la salud y la gestión pública. Quito: 
Informe de la Ministra, 20 de noviembre del 2013. 
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pare the gures between two political sub-periods 2000-2005 and 2006-
2012, we nd that although an absolute increase in both phases persisted 
year aer year, the rhythm was greater in the rst (260.38%) than in the 
2006-2012 phase (66.99%) (Figure 2).11 Tendency similar to that which 
occurred in the national public social security system. In general, despite 
the imperfections and shortcomings in accessibility, or compliance with 
the free medicines policy, it is evident that a signicant expansion of con-







y = 29,963x - 59874
R² = 0,9556






1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Percápita health expenditure USD Ecuador 2000-2005
"Percápita health expenditure' 
USD Ecuador 2000-2005"
Linear ("Percápita health 
expenditure' USD Ecuador 
2000-2005")
Figure 2.  Gasto percápita en salud. USD actuales
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11. MSP, CGDES-DES.. Cuadro elaborado sobre cifras del Banco Mundial 2000-2012.
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e recovery of public services quality provoked a remarkable in-
crease in patient demand. e umber of attended patients rose from 16.2 
million in 2006 to 40.3 million in 2012. Similarly hospital discharges 
rouse 26.30% from 1999 to 2005 and 33.97% from 2006 to 2012. In 2012, 
72.98% of treated cases were public (843205) and 27.07% (313032) were 
private.12 e rate of expenditures was higher in provinces with stronger 
entrepreneurial development.
Availability of medical doctors per thousand inhabitants, also expe-
rienced a signicant increase of 10.62% in the 2007-2012 period. e 
most recent report registers 1.71 doctors x 1000. Although these gures 
indicate an important raise in public medical employment, the country 
has not achieved levels of coverage such as that of Uruguay (3.7 x 1000) 
(Figure 3).
e political will to improve the basic living standards of the poor was 
framed in a set of social investment policies based on public social spend-
ing and a subsidy-based program to palliate inequality. Initially from 
2007 to about 2013 some discrete redistribution was evidenced in a mod-
est reduction of national income concentration, the % of population em-
pirically dened as poor, and the land tenure concentration, but even the 
trend of those basic indicators was reversed from 2014 to the present.13 
Table 1.
Basic wellness indicator
Period: years 2007 - 2017
Initial year Middle year End of period


















Source: A. Acosta and J. Cajas-Guijarro, 2017 (Based on: BCE; INEC; Supercias).
Table 1.  Stagnation of basic living standard indicators for the poor 
 (Ecuador)
12. INEC. Egresos hospitalarios, 2012.
13. SENPLADES. Estudio citado en  MSP. El Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir, determinación social de la 
salud y la gestión pública. Quito: Informe de la Ministra, 20 de noviembre del 2013.  
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On the other hand to ponder how much this public policy model has 
contributed to improving health, and given the limited space in this pa-
per, we summarize some important ndings, on health disorders that 
tend to become widespread in contexts of an accelerated economy with 
increasing levels of wealth concentration and social exclusion which yield 
ever growing cases that end up in hospitals. e increase of morbidity 
prevalence rates, of an increasingly complex and expensive to treat pa-
thologies, exerted increasing pressure on public health care services. Lets 
illustrate these phenomena.
Stagnation of infant       
and maternal mortality
ese epidemiological rates are adequate tracers for evaluating the 
state of health because they are sensitive –although non-specic– indica-
tors of basic social and service infrastructure development.
We analyzed the time series of infant and maternal mortality from 
1990 to 2012, subdividing them in: a) a neoliberal modernization period 
(1990-2001); b) a crisis of neoliberal hegemony and transition period 
(2002-2006); and c) the neo-productivist period with redistributive gov-
ernance, that we are evaluating (2007-2012). When comparing the linear 
regression slopes of infant IM of the threes sub-periods, we observe a 
non signicant (p= 0.15) di	erence in the decline of mortality between 
the neoliberal and the neo-productivist subperiods. at is to say, the 
very modest improvement of these socially sensitive mortality rates, does 
not withstand the argument of a profound “health revolution” that the 
o
cial discourse disseminates. Our infant mortality rates are still much 
higher than those of countries in the region with consistent development 
of basic living conditions and health infrastructure Conversely, one can 
speculate that the public health system has been clearly ine
cient, or that 
the ever growing accumulation and persistence of destructive unhealthy 
social processes counteract the potential e	ects of expanded infrastruc-
ture and professional resources made available (Figure 3).
e maternal mortality curve for the same periods yields similar ndings. 
But in this case there is a very pronounced increase in the third sub-pe-
riod, probably implying a higher percentage of detected cases, that in the 
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Figure 3.  Contraste tendencias de mortalidad infantil Ecuador
 1990-2001 / 2007-2011. Diferencia de pendientes. P= 0.15
* Cambio sistema de registro.
 Fuente: INEC, Nciminetos y defunciones, 2012.
 Elaboración: J. Breilh
previous moments fell into underreporting, but which the health system 
could not solve.
When you break down the mortality rate contrasts to the provincial 
level and you compare those provinces characterized by higher entre-
preneurial development, which include the bigger cities and accumulate 
slum informal population, in respect to those of less developed socio eco-
nomic capitalist development, you nd rate di	erences of 30 to 40%.14
14.  Estraticación basada en el análisis censal por el sistema INSOC del autor.
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 Growing malnutrition       
and the agrarian inequality model 
e nutritional condition of any society depends much more on the 
productive, commercial and cultural processes of food systems, rather 
than on health care programs. Agricultural activity is a vital and dening 
process of planetary life and human health. It strongly determines both 
in rural productive areas as well as in urban consumer areas the real nu-
tritional capacity of a society and the healthiness of its metabolism with 
nature. e quality of life and health depend deeply on agriculture. Agri- 
cultural practices dene if land is fertilized in a sustainable way or not; 
it conditions how seeds are transformed and distributed. Agrarian trade 
determines the equitability and sovereignty of food distribution. Food 
biosecurity, which is the main indicator of the safeness and ethical funda-
ment of agricultural practices is systematically deteriorated in dominant 
conventional agriculture. And nally, the type of agrarian model is also 
expressed in the degree of contamination, waste or generation of waste. 
Agricultural extractivism has expanded its territorial presence in the 
historical period we are analyzing. Vast zones of conventional for export 
agribusiness are growing exponentially, through land concentration, wa-
ter monopolization, intensive pesticide use and climate warming agri-
culture. Small and medium farm producers that feed the country are in 
retreat. Agroecological producers ght to survive under unfair market 
and policy conditions. 
During a decade of agrarian productivism, nutritional health indi-
cators have worsened. Obesity, is on the raise (ENSANUT 2012)15 and 
under nourishment is stagnated; there are worrisome signals of growing 
15. Freire, WB., Ramírez-Luzuriaga, MJ., Belmont, P., Mendieta, MJ., Silva-Jaramillo, MK., Romero, 
N., Sáenz, K., Piñeiros, P., Gómez, LF., Monge, R. (2014). Tomo I: Encuesta Nacional de Salud y 
Nutrición de la población ecuatoriana de cero a 59 años. ENSANUT-ECU 2012. Ministerio de Salud 
Pública/Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. Quito-Ecuador.
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multiple food contamination (Curillo 2015)16 that even a	ects breast 
milk (Breilh J & Felicita O 2017).17 
Progressive extractivism is a clear demonstration of the aws of re-
distributive health governance. It has not only drained our valuable pro-
ductive resources but also the faith of our people in the discourse of the 
deviant le.
16. Curillo, Sofía. 2015. Dávila Análisis de residuos de plaguicidas químicos en alimentos de consumo 
humano con la metodología de laboratorio ELISA. Quito: Colegio de Ciencias e Ingenierías, Uni-
versidad San Francisco de Quito.
17. Breilh, J., Felicita, O. 2017. Contaminación de la leche materna en madres de zona agrícola de la 
Sierra Norte de Ecuador. Avances del Proyecto de Soberanía y Bioseguridad Alimentaria. Quito: 
Programa AndinaEcoSaludable–TEG3 de la UASB-E.
Authoritarian Caudillismo




Social movements have had a special impact on Latin America in the 
past. ey were the driving force behind the shi away from neo-libera- 
lism. And they were also a key factor in the elections won by progressive 
governments of “so-core socialism” or “twenty-rst century socialism.”2 
It is important to stress that these victories were secured more because of 
the grassroots protests spilling into the streets for many years and the so-
cial conditions this resistance had created than because of the personal 
charisma of the leaders who won these elections.
ese governments implemented policies for the redistribution of 
wealth and broadened public participation and the State’s role, while kee- 
ping certain neo-liberal features. At the start, social movements (work-
ers, indigenous peoples, students, environmentalists, women, etc.) sup-
ported these regimes, albeit in some cases with a certain amount of wari-
ness. Over time, however, they began to spearhead protests against these 
governments. In certain cases, this led to an outright declaration of war 
between social movements and the government. Although not widely 
known, Ecuador is without a doubt the clearest illustration of this clash. 
1. is paper was presented at the Conference “e Andean Region Today: Political, International 
and Economic Challenges”, Latin American Centre, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, 
Oxford, UK, 5 to -6 May 2016, updated October 2017.
2. is appellation has been used widely, especially in the media, and it is oen used in political and 
academic discussions.
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at is why the present paper will focus on examining the conditions 
underlying the clash between Rafael Correa’s administration, which came 
into o
ce in January 2007, and the organizations of workers, informal 
workers, indigenous peoples, professionals, students, and defenders of 
the environment, human and women’s rights, and sexual minorities. 
It was said that in Ecuador, as in other countries whose governments 
were viewed as “radical”, a “revolutionary” process was under way. But it 
is increasingly evident that the radicalness of Correa’s administration lay 
more in his words than in his actions. He started out by advocating timid 
reforms but he did not tackle deep underlying problems, and he was in-
creasingly more concerned about holding onto power than moving for-
ward toward socialism. He led a strongman regime (caudillismo), where 
more and more cases of corruption are now being uncovered. It has been 
viewed as a “bogus revolution”.3
e so-called Latin American “progressive” governments were able to 
win at the ballot box because of support from a variety of social organiza-
tions. In Ecuador, when these organizations turned to criticism, the govern- 
ment tried to coopt them and establish parallel organizations. It carried 
out actions aimed at fragmenting the organizations and brought back the 
old clientelismo (cronyism, pork barrel politics) and caudillismo (autho-
ritarianism, strongman politics).4 It even criminalized social protest. And 
that is why there was such a powerful reaction from trade unions and so-
cial organizations, which saw the danger in being manipulated and di-
vided.
e purpose of the present paper is to point out several features and 
characteristics of the clash between Ecuador’s social movements and 
President Correa’s regime. To this end, I shall rst set forth a few brief 
historical considerations and then review the regime that came into o
ce 
in 2007. Finally, I shall focus on the mobilizations of the past few years.
3. Cf. Eduardo Ruilova Quezada, Falsa revolución (Quito: Editorial Gallo Rojo, 2012).
4. Carlos de la Torre Espinosa, De Velasco a Correa: Insurrecciones, populismos y elecciones en Ecua-
dor, 1944-2013 (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Corporación Editora Nacional, 2015), 
146. 
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A Strong Track Record
Organized workers have held substantial social power throughout 
Ecuador’s history. Crasmen’s guilds were leading players in colonial socie- 
ty and continued to be highly inuential in the society of the Republic 
in the nineteenth century.5 In the early twentieth century, crasmen’s or-
ganizations were re-activated and modern trade unions for workers and 
labourers emerged and fought to have their grievances addressed, such 
as the right to strike, the eight-hour workday, social security coverage, 
among others.
In response to the cacao production and export crisis in the nine-
teen twenties, workers organizations became stronger and called for their 
rights to be respected. ey were aware that they had to take a stand re-
garding the national situation, because they were the main victims of the 
lengthy recession. e movement became increasingly involved in anti-
establishment politics. In November 1922, in the city of Guayaquil, the 
power of organized grassroots movements became evident for the rst 
time. But the government reacted violently. In this “baptism in blood”, 
hundreds of persons peacefully participating in a protest march were 
massacred in Guayaquil.6
In the following years, labour organizations grew, driven by le-wing 
forces. In 1944, when democracy was being more widely promoted, the 
Ecuadorian Workers Confederation (Confederación de Trabajadores del 
Ecuador, CTE) was established, spearheaded by socialists and commu-
nists.7 At the same time, the right-wing sector started promoting confes-
sional-based organizations, which in 1938 came under the umbrella of 
the Ecuadorian Catholic Workers Confederation (Confederación Ecua- 
toriana de Obreros Católicos, CEDOC), and in the early sixties the Ecua- 
5. Cf. Jaime Durán Barba, “Orígenes del movimiento obrero artesanal”. In Enrique Ayala Mora (ed.), 
Nueva Historia del Ecuador, vol. 9, Época Republicana III: “Cacao, capitalismo y Revolución Libe- 
ral” (Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional/Grijalbo, 1988), 187.
6. Cf. Elías Muñoz Vicuña, El 15 de Noviembre de 1992 (Guayaquil: Facultad de Economía de la 
Universidad de Guayaquil, 1983); INFOC, El 15 de Noviembre de 1922 (Quito: Corporación Edi-
tora Nacional,1983); Patricio Martínez Jaime, Guayaquil Noviembre de 1992: política oligárquica e 
insurrección popular (Quito: CEDIS, 1988).
7. Patricio Ycaza, Historia del movimiento obrero ecuatoriano, II (Quito: CEDIME-Ciudad, 1991), 
127-134.
100 Enrique Ayala Mora
dorian Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (Confedera- 
ción Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres, CEOSL) was es-
tablished. ese confederations grew but marched separately because of 
their ideological orientations.
In the sixties, trade union organizations became increasingly aware 
of the need to come together to ght for their rights and overcome their 
faith-based di	erences to establish the United Workers Front (Frente 
Unitario de los Trabajadores–FUT), which became the hub for calling 
for the redress of grievances from not only workers but also the people as 
a whole. It was able to bring together sectors of peasants, urban “pobla-
dores”, and self-employed workers. It opposed the military dictatorship, 
which in 1977 ordered the massacre of dozens of workers who were on 
strike at the Aztra Sugar Mill. e “protest platforms” of the FUT not only 
included specic grievances, but also challenged State policies, which as 
of the eighties were dictated by neo-liberalism.8
In the nineties, the impact of FUT and labour organizations declined as 
a result of economic adjustment policies and the dismantling of the State. 
Organized indigenous movements, however, took the lead in the social 
protests and resistance against neo-liberalism. In the eighties, organiza-
tions such as the National Federation of Peasant Workers Organizations/
National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous, and Black Organizations 
(Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas/Confederación 
Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras, FENOC/
FENOCIN), the Confederation of the Peoples of the Kichwa Nation of 
Ecuador (Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecua- 
dor–ECUARUNARI), and the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of 
Ecuador’s Amazon Region (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indíge-
nas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana, CONFENIAE) had been consolidated. 
In 1986, the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (Confede- 
ración de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador, CONAIE) was esta- 
blished, and it became the hub for the social coalition and resistance to 
voice rst-nation grievances and make proposals enshrining the needs of 
the country’s majority.
8. Cf. Jorge Dávila Loor, El FUT: trayectoria y perspectivas (Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional/
CDS, 1995). 
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In 1999, the country’s economy collapsed and eventually hit rock bot- 
tom when the banking system that had been growing years earlier fell 
apart.9 Because of this situation, all social movements had to buckle un-
der the adjustment measures taken by the government. And although 
they protested, the U.S. dollar was adopted as the economy’s currency in 
2000. FUT and workers organizations, along with CONAIE and indige-
nous organizations, spearheaded a series of resistance actions to counter 
government policies implemented at the turn of the twenty-rst century.
Ecuador’s social movement has become more diverse and complex in 
recent times. In the midst of major changes in society, as of the sixties, a 
national platform for greater diversity has gained traction in Ecuador.10 
In that context, since the last decades of the twentieth century, various 
movements have developed and have exerted a signicant impact. Orga-
nizations that are calling for the broader participation of women and de-
fending their rights have made progress in having their specic grievan- 
ces addressed and have contributed new outlooks. Organizations for Afro 
-descendants and the montubios of the coastal region have been establi- 
shed. e growing concern for nature (the Pacha Mama of the Indian peo-
ples, that is, Mother Earth) and for the fate of the planet have led many, 
especially young people, to promote various ecological organizations that 
have played a very active role in public life in recent years.11 Promoters of 
the rights of sexual diversity have also made major advances. 
Twenty-First Century Socialism
Ecuador came to the 2006 elections aer having repeatedly experien- 
ced frustration in drawing up platforms to break away from the past and 
“recast the country” using a di	erent mould. ere was widespread re-
jection of the political forces of the State that had prevailed in preceding 
decades and most people were determined to look for another economic 
9. “e Banking Crisis that nearly destroyed Ecuador’s Economy”, telesurtv.net, March 8, 2016.
10. Enrique Ayala Mora, Historia del Ecuador, Época Republicana II, (Quito: Universidad Andina 
Simón Bolívar Sede Ecuador/Corporación Editora Nacional), 167. 
11. Ibid., 55
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model, di	erent from the one prevailing at the time. Víctor Granda ex-
plains this very accurately:
e electoral victory at the end of 2006 which brought Rafael Correa to power in Janua- 
ry 2007 took place in circumstances that were very special for the country’s histo-
ry: burnout of traditional political forces; ideological and organizational fragmenta-
tion of social forces and alternative policies; a growing crisis and dissatisfaction with 
the speculative and rentier economic model imposed over the past few years by in-
ternational nancial bodies in association with national economic interest groups, 
along with the poverty, unemployment, and migration emerging in its wake; a subs- 
tantial rise in revenues in the country as a result of the steep increase in internatio- 
nal oil prices and a growing anti-imperialist consciousness among the population, 
as highlighted by the overwhelming rejection of the United States’ attempt to mains- 
tream both Ecuador and the other countries of the region into its economy for the 
benet of its inte-rests on the basis of Free Trade Agreements, and on top of all that, 
its military strategy in Colombia’s conict, aimed mainly at protecting its borders 
and the sources for its supply of natural resources.12 
In the midst of this uncertainty for the future, Rafael Correa emerged 
as a candidate of the political movement and party Alianza PAIS. He had 
started out in politics as the Minister of Economy of President Alfredo 
Palacio’s administration, aer having been a university lecturer for seve- 
ral years. With a platform that challenged partidocracia (democracy 
ruled by political parties) and neo-liberalism, he managed to secure the 
support of various dissatised middle-class sectors and le-wing mili-
tants who had abandoned their political parties. He also secured the ear-
ly support of the Socialist Party and various related grassroots organiza-
tions. His radical proposal against the prevailing political system brought 
him the overwhelming backing of the grassroots and he won the election.
Correa was not a simple “outsider.” His victory was neither hapha-
zard nor coincidental. He beneted from the conditions that were already 
there to impact the voters and he found that the time was right. He also 
gained much from the historical build-up of the struggles of le-wing 
sectors and social organizations, especially over the preceding three de-
cades, against neo-liberal regimes. Although he did not acknowledge it, 
for his victory it was essential for him to ensure continuity with le-wing 
12. Víctor Granda Aguilar, Operación Explosión, La muerte de Guadalupe Larriva [Operation Explo-
sion: e Death of Guadalupe Larriva] (Quito: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 2008), 43.
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anti-capitalistic and anti-imperialist stances and to be supported by the 
socialists. His campaign platform, whose slogan was “citizen revolution,” 
pledged to dismantle the power of political parties by dissolving parlia-
ment and convening a Constitutional Convention that would dra a new 
Constitution to radically change the country. Giving priority to “nationa- 
lism” and “patriotism” was crucial.
Once at the helm of government, President Correa and some of his 
followers proposed the establishment of “twenty-rst century socialism.” 
is proposal, according to Correa himself, had not yet been clearly 
drawn up: “we believe that, in the government, there is still much work 
to be done to streamline this notion, that of Twenty-First Century Socia-
lism; it still needs to be packaged, to be given conceptual and theoretical 
cogency...”13 It intended to create something di	erent and which could be 
di	erentia-ted. But the proposal for “pensamiento propio” was not origi- 
nal. For years, Ecuadorian socialism had propounded its own thinking, 
both Ecuadorian and Latin American. Since its rst manifesto, this key 
guideline had been set, and it was a dening element in its initial consti-
tution.14 e national and original nature of the Socialist Party had been 
repeatedly expounded for more than eighty years.15 
Correa stated that his twenty-rst century socialism was new, with 
some elements common to, as well as various di	erences from, “classical 
socialism.” When he attempted to dene the nature of his socialist pro-
posals, Correa emphasized that there were “many socialisms.”16 One ele-
ment that matched “classical socialism” was a “key feature and the huge 
di	erence from capitalism and, with the tragedy that Latin America has 
experienced over the past twenty years with neo-liberalism, it is the su-
13. Rafael Correa, President of the Republic of Ecuador, El socialismo del siglo XXI [Twenty-rst Cen-
tury Socialism], Educación Política, N. 1. s/f, 1.
14. Germán Rodas Chávez, El Partido Socialista casa adentro, Aproximación a sus dos primeras déca-
das, (Quito: Ediciones La Tierra, 2006), 29-35.
15. e 1987 Congress of the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE), for example, stated the following: 
“Our party is building a socialism rooted in the country. It is an autonomous, Latin American, 
and anti-imperialist party. It is revolutionary, it is for a new society and a new State, where the 
work and participation of the people will be the foundations for power and the well-being of all 
Ecuadorians, changing structures and eliminating inequality and injustice.” Ecuadorian Socialist 
Party, Declaración de principios, Forty-rst Congress of the PSE, Ibarra, 1987.
16. Correa, El socialismo del siglo XXI, 4-5.
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premacy of human labour over capital. (...) What we have experienced is 
the total, absolute subservience of human labour to the needs of capital 
accumulation, albeit under a variety of labels...”17 Another matching ele-
ment is “collective action for development.” e importance of the mar-
ket is incontrovertible, “but that does not exclude the importance of col-
lective action. e importance of reaching an agreement to dominate that 
market.”18
With very little precision, Correa spoke of instating a “new econo-
my that o	sets the creation of use values and exclusively the creation of 
exchange values, that is, things that have a price attached to them.” He 
stressed that “another key aspect of twentieth-rst century socialism that 
matches classical socialism is the emphasis on social justice.”19 But apart 
from underscoring that Latin America is the “most inequitable region in 
the world,” the concept remained unclear and no specic proposal was 
drawn up.
Furthermore, the President highlighted many di	erences with “clas-
sical socialism.” He said: “Dialectical materialism, one of the pillars un-
derpinning this ideology, has been superseded, that is, the class struggle 
and violent change are unsustainable in the twenty-rst century.”20 On 
various occasions, he indicated: “We cannot eliminate private proper-
ty and instead of that, we place our bets on democratizing the means of 
production, without discounting the possibility that the State can be the 
owner of key sectors, as well as alternative forms of ownership.”21 Correa 
contended that the socialist tradition was unable to go beyond its single-
minded notion of development. One of his proposals was: “Twentieth- 
rst century socialism, radically participating in democracy, has the big 
challenge of providing a new notion of development, aimed at living 
well, not living better, for which purpose matters such as gender, region-




20. Taken from the web page ‹www.presidencia.gov.ec› by Víctor Granda in his book Manuel Agustín 
Aguirre y el socialismo de hoy (Quito: Ediciones La Tierra, 2008), 21.
21. Correa, El socialismo del siglo XXI [Twenty-rst Century Socialism], 23.
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corporated.”22 It involves implementing the buen vivir, or sumak kawsay 
in Kichwa.
Correa proposed restoring his country’s own roots as one of his dri-
ving ideas. One of his theses was to restore Ecuador’s dignity and natio-
nal sovereignty. “To get our country back,” an old banner of Ecuador’s so-
cialist tradition, was one of his slogans when he was campaigning. He also 
stressed the need to promote South American and Latin American inte-
gration that was “di	erent” from what neo-liberalism had tried to impose. 
The Correa Administration
e beginnings of Correa’s administration coincided with an unprece- 
dented hike in international oil prices. is provided huge revenues to 
the State, leading to an economic boom that Ecuador had never before 
experienced. In this administration, the State’s share in oil revenues rose 
considerably. Large infrastructure projects were built. But there was no 
major social change. e “revolution” did not go beyond verbal attacks 
against the oligarchy. e country’s most powerful economic groups were 
pillars of the Correa government. It was said, for instance, that he would 
restrict bank earnings, but with Correa never before had banks made so 
much money. 
Over ten years of government, Correa’s rhetoric and practices 
changed. Aer his second re-election in 2013, the “citizen revolution” no 
longer mentioned “twenty-rst century socialism.” ere were no struc-
tural transformations.23 e proposal for the buen vivir, or sumak kaw-
say, was drained of all of its contents and transformed into a bureaucratic 
requirement. e idea of patria (homeland) was increasingly identied 
with the person of Correa himself and his associates. He continued to 
speak of “revolution” but in the administration there were increasingly 
fewer progressive people and larger numbers of associates from previous 
right-wing governments or dissidents of populism.
22. Ibid., 21.
23. Alberto Acosta, “El correísmo, un nuevo modelo de dominación burguesa”. In various authors, El 
correísmo al desnudo (Quito: Arcoiris Producción Gráca, 2013), 9.
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e changes made by the Alianza PAIS government were conned to 
the realm of the State, and there was no proposal to carry out any so-
cial transformation that might stir up powerful resistance from econo-
mic interest groups and that would require the very active endorsement 
of social movements and other organized sectors. ere was “economic 
growth without any signicant structural change”.24 e government’s 
agrarian policy did not attempt even the slightest reform. No urban re-
form that would tackle the accumulation of property and the privatized 
use of public services was proposed. Policies on natural resource develop-
ment had an extractivet approach and promoted the presence of preda- 
tory international capital, while endangering the indigenous peoples of 
the Amazon region.25
Contrary to its rhetoric, Correa’s administration opted for moderni- 
zing capitalism. To this end, of course, tangible projects were required. 
But just building bridges and highways does not mean development. It 
is equivalent to mere growth when it is decoupled from e	ective social 
change. As observed by Mario Unda: “Resorting to progressive, even ‘revo- 
lutionary’ language is basically conned to times of stress and election 
campaigns.”
On the contrary, he was only able to materialize his claim by scurrying back to the 
right-wing sector and relying on the most conservative and retrograde elements of 
social awareness: scorn for independent social organizations, rejecting mobilization 
and protests, denying the decision-making component of participation, yielding to 
right-wing discourses about insecurity and violence, and celebrating the use of es-
pionage and repression to both deal with crime and keep labour and social protest 
in check... In short, it’s been quite some time now that Correa and his followers have 
only been able to come up with conservative statements.26
If an attempt is made to dene the government’s ruling feature, then it 
is clear: its purpose was to ensure modernization in order to prop up the 
system. And to do that it built public works. e government of “twenty-
24. Francisco Muñoz Jaramillo (ed.), Balance crítico del gobierno de Rafael Correa, (Quito: Universi-
dad Central del Ecuador, 2014.), 426.
25. Esperanza Martínez, “Las políticas minero/petroleras de la revolución ciudadana: incumplimien-
to, desvío, avocamiento y coación”. In various authors, El correísmo al desnudo, 173.
26. Mario Unda, “Modernización del capitalismo y reforma del Estado”, Ibid., 37.
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rst century socialism” focused on adapting the country for twenty-rst 
century capitalism.
Reform, Co-Option        
and Criminalization
e Correa government backtracked on its proposals for reform and 
used the “citizen revolution” merely as an advertising jingle, while focu-
sing on the task of modernizing capitalism. is was bad for social move-
ments and the majority of the people. Some features of the regime that 
appeared from the very beginning became even more marked over the 
past few years: power concentrated in the hands of the executive branch 
of government, restrictions on civil liberties, attacks against organiza-
tions, criminalization of social protest, aggression against the environ-
ment, and overproduction of natural resources; in general, an attempt to 
impose state control over society along with unbridled corruption and 
impunity. To this must be added the inadequate management of the eco-
nomic crisis, whose existence the government did not accept, and the ins-
talment of a system of institutionalised corruption at the highest levels of 
government.27 
A structural feature of Correa’s government was the tendency to curb 
civil liberties, against the grain of many of the country’s democratic tra-
ditions and even against the mandates of the Constitution. is tenden-
cy was evident above all in the State’s interference with the media and its 
breach of the right to freedom of expression.28 It did not involve the go-
vernment’s clash with mainstream media, which are ghting for their in-
terests, but rather something far more serious: a general and constant 
situation that must be viewed as a national issue. In addition to the sus-
tained attempt to control big media, there was pressure exerted by govern- 
ment institutions on journalists, small newspapers and radio stations, the 
27. Jorge Rodriguez Torres “Dinero, poder y corrupción en la década ganada”, Comisión Nacional 
Anticorrupción, Corrupción en la Década Encubierta (Quito: Imprenta Don Bosco, 2017), 180. 
28. César Montufar, Las reglas del silencio, Análisis de la Ley Orgánica de Comunicación del Ecuador, 
Quito, 13 ediciones, 2013, 63.
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massive intervention of government-paid trolls on social networks, the 
repression of grassroots marches and protests by ordinary people.
To secure the State’s control role, the government carried out reforms 
ranging from constitutional statutes and trade union reforms aimed at 
limiting the right to organize to the establishment of bureaucratic mecha- 
nisms for co-option. Trade unions, especially in the public sector, were 
restricted; the scope of action of trade unions and workers organizations 
was reduced and placed under governmental control; fragmentation of 
trade union federations was promoted, to such an extent that ten years 
ago there were ve federations and now there are eight.29
Similar situations occurred in the indigenous movement. One on- 
going practice was the government’s way of co-opting indigenous orga-
nizations. Another was using State institutions and legal proceedings to 
promote or widen fragmentation. But the most dangerous of actions was 
the persistent trend to dissolve the community grassroots of the organi-
zations using direct action by the State. e purpose was to undermine to 
the utmost the “community” as a collective body in order to insert their 
members as individual “citizens” into the crony network of Correa’s ad-
ministration. 
e government interfered in civil society organizations, such as 
NGOs, centres, clubs, and associations, which were targeted by a presi- 
dential decree instructing that all aspects of their internal functioning 
should be subject to government monitoring. ere were special instruc-
tions against human rights NGOs, whose activities were obstructed and 
monitored to the utmost, leading even to the disappearance of several 
legally established entities. Several activities of professional associations 
were removed. In certain cases, associations, such as the national associa- 
tion of physicians, adopted a very rm stance against the government.
To promote “civic participation”, a kind of cronyism typical of old 
right-wing strongman (caudillo) regimes was installed, even if it actual-
ly fostered fragmentation and undermined social organizations. But the 
29. e most frequent mechanism to do this was the government’s recognition of dissident groups 
emerging from internal conicts. Legal status was granted to these factions as long as they sup-
ported government policies and the actions taken by the government’s ruling political party 
Alianza PAIS.
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government’s worst action was the criminalization of social protest. e 
2011 human rights report stated: “Criminal justice continues to be used as 
mechanism to criminalize social protest and public opinion: 204 leaders 
defending human rights and the rights of nature, most of them indige- 
nous persons, were tried for sabotage and terrorism; there were 10 cases 
of persecution and criminalization against 48 trade union leaders; and 20 
proceedings were brought against journalists.”30 e government denied 
this, but it was ascertained that the gures were even higher than those 
reported above.31
Using the judiciary to harass social leaders was a permanent practice 
which led to the criminalization of protest. Activists who were against oil 
exploitation in Yasuní were persecuted, although these extractive activi- 
ties are fostering irreversible damage to the environment and a	ecting 
Amazon indigenous peoples.32 In Saraguro and Zamora, indigenous and 
mestizo people were victims of violence, harassment, and illegal entries 
and searches of their homes. A teacher accused of having urged her pu-
pils to go out and demonstrate in the streets was sentenced to eight years 
prison. Students who protested against the situation of schools were ex-
pelled and transferred to other schools. Many other examples could be 
provided.
All of this was possible because the government absorbed all the State 
“powers”, eliminating the autonomy of the branches of government. at 
was the so-called presidencialismo.33 e majority in the National As-
sembly passed all the bills sent by the President of the Republic. Judges 
were under pressure from the government. e judiciary had no autono-
my. And amendments to the Criminal Code worsened the situation. e 
Constitutional Court was an unwavering linchpin of the regime. It passed 
30. Andean Human Rights Program [Programa Andino de Derechos Humanos–PADH], Informe so-
bre derechos humanos, Ecuador 2011 [Human Rights Report, Ecuador 2011] (Quito: Universidad 
Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador, 2012). 
31. In the midst of a very intense public controversy, the government attacked the university, especial-
ly the PADH, but it was possible to ascertain that the report’s contents were accurate. 
32. Esperanza Martínez et al., Yasuní, el crudo despertar de un sueño, Informe especial de la situación 
ambiental y social del Yasuní/ITT, Amazonía por la vida [Yasuní, Rude Awakening from a Dream: 
Special Report on the Environmental and Social Situation of Yasuní/ITT], Amazonía por la vida, 
Quito, 2012. 
33. Enrique Ayala Mora, ¿Por qué la Asamblea Constituyente? Derrotar al autoritarismo con un gran 
Acuerdo Nacional (Quito: Ediciones La Tierra, third ed., 2015), 25.
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judgments that criminalized dissidence and dismissed appeals made by 
those complaining about government actions. 
e excessive growth of the State’s bureaucracy became a problem. 
“In a situation where there was an unprecedented rise in oil prices, the 
treasury received huge amounts of public revenues. e government 
used them to make public investments, to increase allowances and sub-
sidies, to create new bureaucratic bodies.”34 Aer neo-liberal cutbacks 
and privatization, enlarging the public sector was a positive step, but the 
growth was excessive.
is disproportionate growth jeopardized the stability of career civil 
servants who were induced to resign from their jobs to consolidate a bu-
reaucracy aligned with Correa. ere were repeated complaints by or-
ganizations which refused to be co-opted by the Correa administration. 
e situations triggered by the uncontrolled rise in public bidding, fos-
tered widespread corruption, which was reported but not investigated, 
even in those cases where the President of the Republic and his relatives 
were implicated.35 e same occurred with other high-ranking o
cials. 
Aer a report about his involvement in activities reported in the Pana-
ma Papers, the Attorney General dismissed the investigation in a matter 
of hours. Vice-President Jorge Glas, some of his associates and relatives 
are involved in the corruption activities of Odebrecht, the huge Brazilian 
conglomerate. 
Social Movements        
and Authoritarian Caudillismo
In the 2006 election, Correa’s candidacy was endorsed by the majori-
ty of social organizations. But, aer the government came into o
ce, the 
rst moments of tension with their leaders emerged because the presi-
dent was unwilling to establish ties with the organizations on the basis of 
their own structures. His intention was to mainstream them into the po-
34. Enrique Ayala Mora, “Ecuador en el socialismo del siglo XXI” [Ecuador in Twenty-First Century 
Socialism] (working text for the United Workers Front), 2015, 7-8.
35. Juan Carlos Calderón and Christian Zurita, El gran hermano: historia de una simulación [Big 
Brother: History of a Simulation] (Quito: Ediciones Paradiso, 2010).
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litical cronyism or caudillismo of Alianza PAIS and its electoral apparatus, 
without respecting their organizations. As in all strongman regimes (cau-
dillismo), a direct rapport with the masses was established. To do this, 
Correa implemented a policy aimed at co-opting and fragmenting the or-
ganizations, as we have already indicated.
e new Constitution (2008) undermined workers organizations, es-
pecially in the public sector, and restricted some of the achievements 
made by indigenous groups. In the following years, labour reforms were 
undertaken, as well as various changes to core aspects of the agrarian sec-
tor. e universities were deprived of their autonomy.36 In all cases, the 
basic trend was to centralize decision-making in the State, very concretely 
in the O
ce of the President of the Republic, and to get rid of the inuen- 
ce of labour, indigenous, teacher, and student organizations. 
e government announced that it would submit a new Labour Code 
to the National Assembly and mentioned the reforms it was proposing. 
e trade unions warned that the government intended not to “moder-
nize” social relations but to reverse the achievements that had been up-
held for decades and to undermine the rights of workers.37 Several of the 
reforms involved positive innovations but the government’s basic inten-
tion to “modernize” labour-management relations set the conditions for 
consolidating capitalism rather than moving toward socialism.
Since then, the trade unions have indicated that, in many aspects, the 
proposed legislation is aimed at getting rid of workers organizations. In 
addition, they have stated that, in the planned overhaul of the country’s 
output structure (cambio de la matriz productiva) it was discovered that, 
instead of breaking away from big business and implementing major pro-
gressive transformations, it involved an e	ort to modernize the social 
and economic structure so as to adapt the country to the realities of capi-
talism in this new century.
36. Arturo Villavicencio, ¿Hacia dónde va el proyecto universitario de la Revolución Ciudadana? (Qui-
to: 13 Ediciones, 2013), 47.
37. “Maniesto de las centrales sindicales sobre el nuevo Código del Trabajo” [Statement by trade 
union federations regarding the Labour Code], Frente Unitario de los Trabajadores, FUT, July 
2013.
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e United Workers Front (FUT) submitted an alternative dra for 
the Labour Code, but it was shelved by parliament without any discus-
sion. e government’s dra was also discarded as a result of social pres-
sure, and the regime opted to introduce its labour reforms in laws that 
were passed subsequently. It did not discard its tendency to fragment or-
ganizations and established a “Central Unitaria de Trabajadores”, CUT on 
the basis of some pro-government organizations.38 e CUT had been a 
project dreamed of in the social movements for many years, but this or-
ganizations was a government´s act of division. e CUT set up by the 
government had no drawing power. Not even the workers organizations 
that supported Correa’s administration participated in it. It was under-
mined by lack of support and inghting. 
FUT’s actions, however, gathered momentum.39 Since 2014, it has 
been at the leading edge of social protests and grassroots opposition, 
largely because it has also enshrined the grievances of other social sec-
tors and aspirations of the citizenry as a whole. e rallies organized by 
FUT and other organizations bring together not only their own militants 
but also many other persons opposed to Correa’s administration, which 
had to undertake major bureaucratic e	orts to keep up its presence in 
the streets. Workers have gained traction as leading gures for social and 
public opposition. eir chances of being elected to o
ce are limited, but 
they have a great deal of social drawing power.
Aer the boom of the nineties, the indigenous movement su	ered 
a setback, because of its participation in the Gutiérrez administration, 
among other reasons. But, despite the government’s actions to fragment 
and co-opt them, the indigenous organizations were highly active in op-
posing the laws that increased the government’s control over water and 
land.40 Despite resistance, the laws were enacted by the National Assem-
bly’s majority controlled by the Correa administration and ratied by 
38. Interview: Marcela Arellano, leading member of CEOSL, Quito, February 2016. 
39. It should be highlighted here that the General Workers Union of Ecuador (Unión General de Tra-
bajadores del Ecuador–UGTE), which coordinates its activities with the Grassroots Front (Frente 
Popular) and other organizations such as the National Teachers Union (Unión Nacional de Edu-
cadores–UNE), must be added to the three trade union federations mentioned above.
40. Carlos Pástor Pazmiño, Ley de tierras, el debate y las organizaciones campesinas, Quito, Ediciones 
La Tierra, 2014, 90.
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the executive branch of government, but they managed to bring together 
again the majority of indigenous organizations. In addition, in view of 
the absence of reforms in the rural sector, the government and President 
Correa were forced to personally recognize that they have a debt pending 
with the agrarian sector.41
e main indigenous organizations, CONAIE and ECUARUNARI, 
carried out joint actions with FUT and other social organizations. ey 
convened national rallies and demonstrations that had considerable im-
pact on public opinion. It has been proven that, although they garner few 
votes in elections, their capacity for mobilization and even to bring large 
sectors of the country to a standstill is substantial. 
Other social sectors such as teachers, students, professional associa-
tions, retirees, and citizens not belonging to any organization came to-
gether to join the protest. is convergence was further strengthened as a 
result of various actions taken by the government to severely undermine 
the social security system. e government breached the autonomy of the 
Social Security Administration of Ecuador (IESS) and used its resources 
to bridge gaps in the budget. It stopped disbursing its share as required by 
the Constitution and law to pay for the pensions of retirees. To this must 
be added middle-class resistance to changes in tax and inheritance laws.
Grassroots opposition clustered around the National United Workers, 
Indigenous and Social Organizations Collective (Colectivo Unitario Na-
cional de Trabajadores, Indígenas y Organizaciones Sociales), headed by 
FUT and CONAIE. When it called for the “March of the People” on May 
1, 2015, it said:
Workers, peasants, crasmen, employees, workers in general, indigenous people, Afro 
-Ecuadorians, montubios of the coastal region, young people, retirees, unemployed 
persons, housewives, small retailers, self-employed workers and professionals, tea- 
chers and students, workers and social organizations, retiree organizations, women’s 
collectives, defenders of the environment and human rights, small and medium-
sized farmers, entrepreneurs, consumers, and former soldiers, we are united on In-
ternational Workers’ Day.42
41. Ibid, 51.
42. “1 de Mayo, marcha nacional del pueblo”, Manifesto for International Workers’ Day, Quito, May 1, 
2015.
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is demonstration turned out to be one of the largest over the past 
forty years. In all the capitals of the provinces and other cities, the res- 
ponse was massive. In Quito, it was bigger by far than the rally organized 
separately by the government, which preferred to focus its forces in the 
capital and for which buses from everywhere in the country converged, 
bringing civil servants and job seekers. It was a “forced counter-demons-
tration” chaired by the top leaders of Correa’s political cronyism, without 
any broad representation of civil society.
e mobilization of grassroots organizations and the protest of mid-
dle-class sectors shook the government, which accused its opponents of 
preparing a “so coup” to overthrow it and promote a “conservative res-
toration.” A few weeks later, the Pope’s visit quelled the unrest and demo-
bilized the protest. In the midst of national euphoria, workers’ leaders ex-
tended their welcome to the Pope for being the rst Latin American to 
have reached such a high o
ce and for his open attitude. ey thanked 
him for visiting Ecuador, where “Catholicism has played a historical role 
of the utmost importance. Here there have been pastors and lay people 
who have devoted their lives to serving the people and to the cause of 
their liberation, denouncing and condemning colonialism, exploitation, 
and injustice which were put into place on behalf of the Christian reli-
gion.” ey then added: 
We have reason to hope that your presence shall be a motivating factor to bring the 
abuses committed by the powers-that-be to an end, to halt the criminalization of so-
cial protest, to stop the persecution of leaders and members of social organizations 
that are calling for their rights, to promote respect for the freedom of conscience, to 
stop authoritarianism, corruption, and impunity, to secure respect for the princi-
ples of justice, and to prevent the country from being handed over to the clutches of 
foreign capital and the most powerful economic groups.43
ey voiced their fear that his visit could be used by the regime to capi- 
talize on increasingly adverse public opinion, in order to justify abuses 
and to try to uphold an international image “completely contrary to the in-
ternal reality of arbitrariness and denial of the most basic rights. e dou-
ble standard that has been kept up for years with a multi-million dollar 
43. Letter from the United Workers Front to Pope Francis, on the occasion of his visit to Ecuador, 
Quito, July, 2015, p. 1.
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advertising campaign cannot be bolstered or endorsed by the presence of 
Your Holiness.” But in fact, the ebbing of mobilization, which until then 
had been on the rise, gave some respite to the regime. Since then the pos-
sibility of replacing it by further protesting has no longer been an alter-
native.
Crisis and Grassroots Protest
When the economic crisis was felt, the above-mentioned “Colectivo 
Nacional Unitario”, National United Collective called for a national pro-
test mobilization for September 17. Government media attempted to dis-
credit it but the mobilization was massive. According to workers, gover-
ment reforms “are giving continuity to the policy of ensuring greater 
labour market exibility as developed in the neo-liberal period, further 
entrenching the reversal of the rights of Ecuadorian workers. (...) e legal 
reforms restricting rights come with a powerful campaign that is discredi- 
ting social organizations and achievements, identifying the interests de-
fending grassroots sectors as trade union interests contrary to the general 
interests of the population and the State. Another priority of the govern- 
ment has been to control social organizations; to this end, from the 
spheres of state power, a political strategy has been drawn up to divide, 
manipulate, co-opt, and criminalize social struggles.”44
e mobilization’s platform proposed defending the labour rights 
that were being breached by new laws, putting an end to the criminaliza-
tion of social protest and calling for respect for human rights, amending 
laws such as those on water and communication, abiding by internatio- 
nal conventions, opposing the Law on Land (Ley de Tierras), and adop- 
ting an agrarian policy that would be for the benet of peasants. A core ele- 
ment was defending social security, which at the time was one of the key 
hubs for resistance to the government. 
From September 2015 to May 2016, various nationwide mobilization 
actions were carried out. In December 2015, the government managed, 
albeit underhandedly, to introduce amendments to the Constitution that 
44. Interview with Marcela Arellano, leader of CEOSL, May, 2016. 
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abolished presidential term limits so that Correa could be re-elected in-
denitely and also placed constraints on the rights of workers. e ensuing 
protest was overwhelming. Nevertheless, on April 16, the country’s situa-
tion changed drastically when an earthquake devastated various localities 
of the province of Manabí and other places in the coastal region, which 
le more than 600 dead, thousands of injured persons, and towns razed 
to the ground. Under these di
cult circumstances, the government’s ef-
fort to control civil society, which was the rst to react to the disaster and 
proved to be hugely dynamic, became evident. e regime took advan-
tage of the occasion to adopt economic measures that had already been 
announced to tackle the crisis. Furthermore, everything was managed 
centrally, without the participation of the social grassroots. 
By the end of Correa’s government, the allegations of corruption had 
grown, along with social pressure for investigating them. e National 
Anti-Corruption Commission set up by FUT (United Workers’ Front) 
and social organizations, presented a number of very clear cases of cost 
overruns and corrupt management. However, they were never investi-
gated by the State Prosecutor or the Comptroller General who were both 
hooked on to Correa. Commission members, who are highly respected 
gures in society, were prosecuted and harassed. Nevertheless, social re-
jection of corruption increased. 
Conclusion
Correa’s government policies on social organizations were aimed at 
controlling society, removing its representativeness, and even mains- 
treaming them into the State. In Ecuador, the State has traditionally re-
spected the organizations created by society to express itself, acknow- 
ledging that they are broadly representative. It has even incorporated civ-
il society delegates into the State’s executive functions. But the Constitu-
tion has trampled that tradition and eliminated representativeness from 
society’s organizations.45 Although hard to believe, this was done as if it 
45. Constitución de la República del Ecuador (Ciudad Alfaro: Gaceta Constituyente, 2008). 
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were a “revolutionary” achievement. Along that same line, Correa en-
gaged in “disciplining Ecuador’s population”.46 He did from the vantage 
point of an increasingly more powerful State unhampered by democratic 
checks and balances.
e Constitution installed a new branch of government to ensure 
“transparency and social monitoring.” Its principal body is the Public Par-
ticipation Council (Consejo de Participación Ciudadana) which is not an 
elected body. is Council appoints most senior o
cials of the State on 
the basis of “competitive bidding processes.” is undermines represen-
tation of and by the citizens and distorts the nature of public power; it 
confuses broadening public participation with state control over socie- 
ty and prevents organizations from representing society.47 And the gov-
ernment has taken this trend even further with its various reforms and 
amendments to the Constitution. It has also issued decrees aimed at con-
trolling the inner workings of institutions such as trade unions, unions, 
professional associations, NGOs, and social and sports clubs.
e Constitution, especially aer recent amendments, enshrines the 
O
ce of the President as a heightened, all-encompassing, and vertical 
branch of government, one that eliminates the separation of powers and 
the autonomy of each branch of government. With a Head of State who 
commands everything and takes all decisions, monitoring disappears al-
together, there is no auditing of the misuse of public funds, and corrup-
tion becomes widespread.
In view of this reality, the country’s social movements have taken up 
not only the defence of their own interests, but also the call for the autono- 
my of society as a whole. In response to the government, organizations 
have promoted social unity. 
Quito/Oxford, April 2016 
46. Pablo Ospina, “La revolución ciudadana en Ecuador: conicto social, régimen disciplinario y 
proyecto de Estado”. In various authors, El correísmo al desnudo, 29.
47. Enrique Ayala Mora, ¿Por qué la Asamblea Constituyente?, 52.
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Post Scriptum
Rafael Correa upheld his policies of criminalizing social protest and 
grassroots organizations up until the end of his term of o
ce. In the 2017 
presidential election, social movements backed the candidate of Acuer-
do por el Cambio, Paco Moncayo Gallegos, whose share of the ballots 
cast, however, was negligible. Rafael Correa and his movement Alianza 
PAIS presented the candidates Lenin Moreno-Jorge Glas for the presi-
dency and vice-presidency. ey won in a questioned and conict-ridden 
electoral process over the right-wing candidate, Guillermo Lasso. Alianza 
PAIS secured a majority in the National Assembly.
As soon as Lenin Moreno was sworn into o
ce as President of the Re-
public, he announced he would change the style of his predecessor and 
open a dialogue with various political and social forces. He also proposed 
to combat corruption. Reports on bribery and other dubious practices by 
the Brazilian corporation Odebrecht involved high-level state o
cials, 
among them the Vice-President of the Republic, Jorge Glas. e deep ri 
between the President and the Vice-President became apparent. More-
no also called Rafael Correa into question and this break became all the 
more evident in Alianza PAIS. A few months aer the change in leader-
ship, the conict goes on.
Oxford, November 2017
Fernando Balseca
Arts and Literature Versus Political 
Authoritarianism, or George Orwell  
in Ecuador
Fernando Balseca
I would like to begin with a commentary drawn from the recent book 
by the critic William Deresiewicz –his A Jane Austen Education: How 
Six Novels Taught Me About Love, Friendship, and the ings that Really 
Matter.1 He describes how the prose of this nineteenth-century author 
not only leads us to an understanding of the people in that past century 
but also provides a means to more fully understand ourselves. Austen’s 
writing makes us confront ourselves and question ourselves –what is our 
place in the world? and what is it that is happening in the world around 
us? ese texts are not mere prose artifacts to entertain us. Artistic lite- 
rary writing enables us to perceive the circumstances of our existence. We 
read literature, we attend the theater, and venture out to look at exhibi-
tions of art because words in literature and images in the arts reveal ano- 
ther version of reality, in contrast to the o
cial truths that the govern- 
mental apparatus tries to impose on us as a community.
For those who support Rafael Correa and form part of his political 
party Alianza PAIS, Correa’s term of o
ce could be designated as a “de-
cade of substance” especially when one considers the vast undertakings 
in the sector of governmental construction: mostly highways, but also 
growth in such infrastructural projects as schools, and hospitals. For his 
critics, on the other hand, this presidency might be termed the “lost de-
cade” because many of these built structures were not accompanied by 
1. William Deresiewicz. A Jane Austen Education: How Six Novels Taught Me About Love, Friendship, 
and the ings that Really Matter. New York: Penguin, 2011.
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a service sector of a similar high quality of o	erings to the public. e 
debate –whether Ecuador lost or won out with Correa’s presidency– will 
go on for many years, and there is no way I can give a satisfactory answer 
to this quandary in this article.
Right now though that it is certain that before Correa, the country of 
Ecuador was indeed caught in an unstable institutional spiral characterized 
by a wide-spread crisis from 1996 to 2006, a time marked by eight di	e- 
rent presidents holding o
ce. But it is also very clear that Correa ushered 
in an “Orwellian” era characterized by a domineering voice of authority 
and of unprecedented control never before seen in its e	ect on media and 
mass media outlets. e media was subjected to mechanisms of govern-
ment propaganda; there was a movement to erase all “enemy” opinion, 
topped o	 with a Communications Law that sought to criminalize cer-
tain opinions. Correa encouraged an atmosphere of vigilance, a keeping 
watch, and an encouragement of suspicion among Ecuadorian citizens 
in a style that promoted confrontations and also divided the populace 
into those who supported him and those who did not. I will now make a 
lengthy quote from an in-country critic, Rodolfo Krone Chambers: 
Lauding the Bolivarian project –a twenty-rst century socialism–, appropriating the 
image of the former president Eloy Alfaro, and alluding to the to the transformative 
measures of the Liberal Revolution of 1895, the [Correa] government chipped away 
at the foundational underpinnings of the national image, unleashing an unpreceden- 
ted propaganda machine never seen before. To accomplish this, the government seized 
various private media outlets and implemented new laws for this particular group. 
ey –this group of entities– lived constantly on edge because of governmental sanc-
tions and high prole trials against them, that ended with these same entities imposing 
conditions of self-censure on their employees. As the head of state, Rafael Correa wield-
ed a discourse of violence, ready to eliminate all resistance –or even insinuations of 
criticism– from a “corrupt” mass media, targeting press agencies and international or-
ganizations, all types of activist programs, industrial associations, and organizations 
of wide-ranging ideological orientation, against the old elite class, and against the eco-
nomically powerful social class he mocked by calling them the pelucones [the long hairs, 
as if they were wearing wigs]. All were identied as enemies of the fatherland. Within 
Correa’s term of o
ce there was no room for dissent or questioning. Social protest was 
a criminal act and was corrected with obvious retaliation for those opposing the regime. 
It was even more far reaching. ose who got out of line, those who at rst supported 
these governmental postulates proposed by Correa’s government, were constantly de-
monized, pursued with an intensity, or labeled as traitors. is overt aggression toward 
dissenters, dressed up with gestures of authoritarian arrogance, was carried out in a 
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setting called the Weekly Community Town Hall (Enlaces Ciudadanos, also called sa-
batinas), which television and radio stations were required to air, and there were 524 
of them held. What was this meeting? Well, in these events, the public o
cials of this 
government were subjected to public expressions of grievance, and these same indivi- 
duals (the public o
cials) were made to shoulder the burden and blame for all sorts of 
unfounded blunders. In uncountable numbers of ‘spots’ lled with propaganda and in 
the creation of an army of trolls contracted to permanently patrol social networks and 
open spaces on the internet, the government reacted with a harshness to any gesture 
that was seen as opposition.2
In 2015 Jorge Velarde painted a 
hand giving the middle nger, accom-
panied with an inscription that also 
served as the title of the work: e 
Hand of the Artist Must be Read [Mano 
de artista para ser leída]. is painting 
was included along with a series of 
self-portraits, a series that provoked 
a great deal of commentary –both of 
fervent controversy and also actions 
of solidarity– caused by Correa’s 
aggressive stance against the singer 
Jaime Guevara in August of that same 
year (2013). Guevara’s action is well 
remembered for the yucazo (the pha- 
llic gesture) that he aimed at a convoy 
of cars transporting the President. In this particular cavalcade, each time 
that Correa received gestures of rebuke, he stopped his car –along with the 
rest of the convoy– and entered into a shouting match with the citizens. 
Many times Correa gave an order to carry the citizen who insulted him 
right away to prison, with no presidential juridical authority at all. So, of 
course, through this painting Velarde capitalizes on the citizens’ right to 
protest against the government, even if that protest is an obscene insult.
To justify his authoritarian stance, Correa claimed what he called his 
“rightful majesty of power”, an stance which made him almost untoucha- 
2. Rodolfo Krone Chambers. Limpio, lúcido y ardiente: artes visuales y correato (Ecuador, 2007-
2017). Guayaquil: Paralaje, 2017.
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ble. is stance also revealed one of his main contradictions: he, an advo- 
cate of twenty-rst century socialism, plays up the value system of the 
Ancien Régime. e author and poet Mario Campaña in his recent book 
–A Society of Lords [Una sociedad de señores]3– suggests that this “sector” 
–the noblemen, the feudal signore from times past, the boss man, the 
hacienda owner– forms part of our daily fare because truly he has never 
le us. It has been a mistake, according to Campaña, to assume that the 
18th and 19th century revolutions –swelled by the newly formed bour-
geoise taking advantage of the power of the masses– were able to com-
pletely eliminate these upper class personages. Better yet, the bourgeoise 
preserved these ideals 
that divied up persons 
to those who gave or-
ders from those who 
had to obey them. While 
these days notions of 
“equality” are formally 
proclaimed, an inherent 
aspect of the revolutions 
that supposedly Ecua-
dor lived through, in 
reality the “democrati- 
zers” have transformed themselves into 
new “dominators” who hark back to old 
time precepts like fame, glory and the lar-
gesse of power. Doesn’t that remind us of 
something like “But some animals are more 
equal than others”?4
Yes, Correa did create the Ministry of 
Culture and National Heritage; yet this ins- 
titution is seen as ine
cient and lacking a 
3. Mario Campaña. Una sociedad de señores: dominación 
moral y democracia. México: Jus, 2017.
4. George Orwell, Animal Farm [1945], New York: Signet 
Classic, 1988.
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clear mandate regarding 
the politics of culture. Let’s 
point out right now that 
there is no real National 
Archive, no National Li-
brary, no National Plan to 
Promote Literacy, nor a 
policy regarding museolo-
gy [fomenting the creation 
of museums] in Ecuador. 
Instead, what Correa has 
le us with is a Museum 
of the Presidency, a site to 
display the objects Correa 
 received during his interna-
tional trips, with an expli- 
cit populist statement of pur 
pose –that gis given to 
the President really are gis given to the People. is purported mu-
seum that is housed in the Palace of Government in the heart of Quito 
displays the objects –like a souk– including a special section all decked 
out with awards, diplomas, and shiny medals of honorary doctora- 
tes honoris causa that he received. e Ecuadorian poet Iván Carvajal had 
something to say about this:
It is outrageous [...] that the museum that is the end product of 10 years of the Correa 
decade consists of a boastful display of a caudillo [a strong man]. It is a collection of 
trivial gis received on an o
cial trip by Correa or his subordinates, Rolexes handed 
over by oil producing sheiks or a book never read... in this display one sees the populist 
small town mentality of the caudillo and his followers. I am not saying that these o
cial 
gis should not be collected up somewhere, nor that they should not be displayed. e 
small town mentality is evident in the fact that the only museum built or even proposed 
in this decade, even with the quantities of money available in the rst seven years [of the 
presidency], was this one, a museum that glories in the vanities of a “supreme” leader. 
Literary narratives serve to question human and political action that at-
tempts to frame everything from a starting point of zero, as if nothing trans- 
cendent had ever occurred before this. Let’s listen to a historical narra-
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tive and reect on a recent theatrical presentation in Ecuador. So, a Mr. 
Torres, benetting from an extensive virtual network of the Web, calls for 
a meeting of people interested in participating in the creation of the ‘Al-
ternate Republic’. A group of people arrive at the host’s house: those who 
are interested in worthy propositions of living in a “just” society, an indis-
pensable ingredient for the ‘Alternate Republic’. Based on their reasoning, 
they decide that the country will be reborn by means of a founding act, 
like a revolution. But when they begin discussing details, contradictions 
sprout forth: one person is addicted to violent methods, another never 
says anything at all, one is a dreamer, another is interested in how the 
new Cabinet will be formed and distributed among them, another is a 
super intellectual with no sense for practical matters. e debate is frac-
tious; interrupted by digressions that fade in and out, their interventions 
overlap, no one understands the other one’s point of view. Some threaten 
to drop out of the movement and they pound on the desks. It is a bloody 
scene. Some cry out for order, but spirits are riled up and there is more 
dissention. ese are the founding fathers.
However, respectful of the institution of the state, they forged on and 
sought out signs and symbols to identify themselves as a republic: a ag, a 
national anthem, a directorate of advisors to guide them. Because in Qui-
to, the “First Shout of Independence” [Primer Grito de la Independencia] 
occurred in 1809, they had to invent something similar and they called it 
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the “First Whoop” of the Alternate Republic, a deafening shriek that says 
nothing and everything in an e	ort to create a democracy where there is 
no fear. With a written text, with direction, and staging all put together 
by Arístides Vargas, a member of the theater group Malayerba [e Bad 
Weed], the Alternate Republic is a play from 2011 that provides portraits 
–with no holding back– of those who attempt to spin out fantasies with 
no regard for the historical and political consequences of their acts. With 
humor and poignancy, this play questions previous revolutions as well as 
contemporary revolutions that do not modify our relationship to power. 
For instance, in the play, one person a
rms that revolutions can have 
their ten days or ten hours of glory but that later the exercise of power will 
then pervert a utopia. is theater piece demysties revolution, the In-
dependence period, and the bicentennial celebration. It uncovers the ri-
diculousness of intellectual discourse and harangues it. In this theater we 
are shown the small scale of humanity, of those who show us their good 
intentions, but oen linked up with enormous corporations. It warns us 
of the raving madness that can befall the bids for absolute and total trans-
formations. ere is no doubt that the backdrop for this play is Correa’s 
so-called Citizen’s Revolution. 
Xavier Bonilla (he call  himself Bonil), an artist, drew and published  ca- 
ricatures that dealt with the unjust and violent manner that agents of the 
law implemented with Fenando Villavicencio (in an event of the 28 of De-
cember in 2013). Villa- 
vicencio was accused 
hacking into the emails 
of the President, the Vice 
President, and President’s 
Legal Secretary. e cap-
tion for this graphic 
cartoon was “Police 
and Public Prosecutors 
Search the Home of Fer-
nando Villavicencio and 
Carry Out Documents 
Regarding Allegations 
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of Corruption”. e drawing alludes to the violence with which they 
stripped the political reporter of all the documentation he used to de-
nounce government corruption. Because of this graphic comic strip, the 
Ecuadorian justice system brought the artist and the newspaper to trial. 
Need I mention that the courts are directly controlled by Correa, who 
named himself in 2009 as head of all state entities including the judicial 
branch? National and international pressure ensured that the sentence 
imposed by the Superintendent of Information (the judge who was part 
of the proceedings) was relatively minor; in the end it was plainly ludi-
crous. It was this: Bonil should alter the caricature “because the content 
depicted there does not correspond to the reality of the situation and it 
stigmatizes the actions both of the state’s public prosecutors and the judi-
ciary police”. Who in their right mind thinks one can “rectify” –that is to 
correct, to amend– an artistic rendering?
To carry out his sentence Bonil made his correction by means of ano- 
ther caricature on the h of February 2014. is was the caption: “e 
Police and the Prosecutors Search Villavicencio’s House and Conscate 
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His Electronic Tablet Pads, His Computer, and His Cell Phones”. In the 
drawing are depicted some very friendly o
cials who carefully execute 
the judicial warrant. We also see Villavicencio greeting them good hear- 
tedly, and calmly, as if they were friends. So, instead of amending the 
rst graphic image, the new one expansively rea
rms the message of the 
rst one and subjects Correa’s system of censorship to ridicule. A further 
irony: the authorities who were supposedly o	ended by the rst graphic 
were content with the “rectication”.
Now we move to consider the year 2227 A.D., to the capital city of the 
Fortunate Revolutionary Republic of New Ecuador. A certain man called 
Segon González Lobo, a Deacon and a devoted member of the Univer-
sal Church of the Absolute Chávez –whose acronym is IUCA– which in 
Spanish is pronounced YUCA, and which we learned previously is the 
symbol designating giving the middle nger or ipping the bird. Well, 
González Lobo arrives in the capital to study the accomplishments of 
Co-rrea’s “Static Revolution” that has been in place governing conti- 
nuously for 220 years. In order to carry out a utopian plan of social trans-
formation, the head of state is a cyborg of President Correa. And what a 
cyborg!, a robot formed from Correa’s DNA and from electronic digital 
images. Why did Santiago Páez publish this novel, with the title Ecua-
tox® New Ecuador,5 at the close of 2013, a novel that takes place in 2227 
A.D.? Why does he turn to the resources of imagination and creativity to 
allude to the reality that we Ecuadorians are currently living in? Hasn’t 
science ction already speculated about what situations we humans are 
going to confront in the future? One answer to these questions is this: 
that imaginative creativity is a form of knowledge. Our novels and our 
literary works are not the product of unbridled delusions set loose by an 
author. Instead these literary works are tangible proof that –with creativi- 
ty– we can understand worlds of possibility, in which we participate as 
individuals and as collective members.
e irony here is well recognized, especially because Correa declared 
that the Ecuadorian Constitution (the one he wrote in 2008) would last 
300 years due to the perfection of its conceptualization. For ten years it 
5. Santiago Páez. Ecuatox® Novo Ecuador, 2227 d.C. Quito: Paradiso, 2013.
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was said –every day– that we were living in a time of amazing and mi-
raculous transformations, yet here in this novel the revolution is static 
 –that is stopped in its tracks– identical to the previous one. But to prove 
that indeed times have radically changed, lunch is not called lunch in the 
New Ecuador but instead “e Time of Ingestion of Wholesome and Hot 
Foodstu	s, of Superior Quality Provided by the Ample Goodness of our 
Splendid Leader and All-Knowing Guide Correa anks to His Insight-
ful Vision of Nutritional Necessities”. is mockery has us remember that 
the political process involves disputes over vocabulary, because of course, 
language is the basis for our structural fabric.
Literary prose allows us to better perceive our footsteps, to perceive 
the direction we are heading. In Santiago Páez’s novel Ecuatox is a new 
mineral water, extracted from plants that have been sloshed with metals 
extracted from the mining sites in the country. e treatment minerals 
include cyanide, mercury, sulphuric acid, and other dissolvable chemi-
cal components, which, thanks to the ad industry and the propaganda 
machine, are bottled up in containers and sold with the prominent logo 
of the national brand. But Ecuatox is also a metaphor for the future that 
should not happen, a metaphor for a country –the Ecuador of today– in-
toxicated with various movements that we have been discussing here. In 
revealing the absurd to us readers, literary works provide a vaccination 
against all forms of institutional intolerance based on political, economic, 
or social platforms. And literature teaches us to hold dear those matters 
that are truly important in life.
From 2007 to 2017 Ecuador was subjected to Correa’s authoritarian rule. 
In this paper, I have tried to present how artistic manifestoes –in the visual 
arts, in the theater, and in literature– can contest an ambience marked by 
social fears, the imposition of silence, and the self-censorship of newspa-
per reporters, intellectuals, writers, and those of the performing arts. Art 
is very much about resistance to excessive force, resistance to excesses of 
power because those in power undermine every hierarchical system of va- 
lues. Indeed, literature and the arts serve to have us doubt the very promi- 
ses of the powerful.
The “Universities Project”
Radiography of a Failed State Scheme
Esteban Nicholls
As the “le-turn” in Latin America is fading, crucial questions remain 
about the role that the state played during this period? I this paper I tac- 
kle this question by looking into the role of the sate in higher education 
system form. Specically, I look into Rafael Correa’s government’s deci-
sion (an implementation) to undertake the unprecedented step of buil- 
ding a parallel public university “system,” what I will henceforth refer to 
as the Universities Project. rough the use of James’s Scott’s conceptual 
framework developed in his book “Seeing like a State,” I analyze how the 
state-led Universities Project scheme failed. is is not, however, a paper 
about decision-making per se. Instead of debating specic policy choices 
and justications, my aim is more ‘sociological,’ as it were, in that I see 
educational reform as part of a larger process of statecra. I posit that 
the Universities Project cannot be fully understood outside the purview 
of state-theory and that the specic road that the Universities Project 
took cannot be explained without a theoretical framework of state ac-
tion. Consequently, in this paper I argue that: a. the Universities Project 
ts, rather neatly in James Scott’s (1998) four criteria of a failed, state-led, 
scheme and b. that Scott’s concepts can be usefully complemented by Jes-
sop’s strategic relational approach as it reveals aspects of state power that 
Scott’s book does not. e theoretical contribution of this paper lies par- 
tly in weaving an interpretative ‘framework’ of both approaches through 
an analysis of the Universities Project. 
is paper is organized as follow. e rst section lay out a basic con-
textual analysis of the elements of how and when the Universities Project 
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was developed, in which setting and actors. e second and third sec-
tions explain the Universities project through James Scott’s two central 
concepts the reordering of nature and society and the presence of high 
modernism. Finally, I move beyond Scott’s arguments in order to em-
phasize the linkages between Scott’s arguments and the concept of state 
power. I end with some short concluding remarks.
Describing the Universities Project
e Universities Project is composed of four of the largest, most aca-
demically ambitious, technologically advanced and expensive public 
universities in the history of the country: Yachay Tech, Ikiam, the Na-
tional Education University (UNAE) and the University for the Arts 
(UNIARTES). A decade ago President Correa’s government justied the 
development of these universities in terms of what I would call a “grand 
developmental narrative” about education. His government’s discourse 
portrayed the Universities Project as a central component of a larger 
strategy for Ecuador’s “development” (SENCSCYT, 2009). us, an im-
portant portion of the state’s apparatus devoted its resources, economic 
and human, to promoting the Project. e Universities Project involved 
the ministries of Education, culture and nance, multiple government 
agencies, like SENPLADES, and, importantly, SENESCYT (Secretariat 
of Higher Education Innovation and Technology), who was in charge 
of the project itself. Moreover, the project required the enactment of a 
new regulatory/legal framework which mean reforming the entire legal 
education code through the LOES (organic law for superior education). 
In order words, the Universities Project is no just another government 
promise: it was a scheme with plans actual implementations. Between 
2008 and 2016 over 2 billion have been devoted to the project; lands were 
expropriated (with compensation), buildings were built, students recrui- 
ted Faculty hired and so on. All four universities are now, albeit now as 
the state had envisioned, operational (i.e. classes are being taught, though 
no degrees have been awarded). 
As mentioned earlier, the Universities Project entailed the actual cons- 
truction of four universities. Here is a brief description of each: e 
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UNAE is located in Azogues in the Province of Cañar [about 450 kilo-
meters from the capital, Quito], its main purpose is to train teachers (ele- 
mentary and high school teachers). Ikiam, is located in Tena in the Napo 
Province, about 190 kilometers away from Quito. Its purpose, according 
to the Ministry of Culture is to “generate knowledge, research and infor-
mation to develop technological alternatives for a rationalized use of the 
[Amazon Region’s] resources (Ministry of Culture, 2013: ‹https://www.
culturaypatrimonio.gob.ec/creacion-de-yachay-ikiam-unae-y-uniartes-
ya-esta-en-la-asamblea-nacional/›). e UNIARTES, located near Guaya- 
quil, aims to form artists and “culture professionals, whose objective is 
to develop a more critical and creative citizenry ...in accordance with the 
National Development Plan (Ibid. –emphasis mine). And, nally, there 
is Yachay, perhaps the most ambitious and emblematic (and expensive) 
of the four. Located in Urcuquí, in the Province of Imbabura, about 50 
kilometers away from Quito, Yachay was originally conceived as a univer-
sity for technological innovation. Unlike Ikiam, however, its focus is on 
nanotechnologies, and what Yachay’s mentors call “bio-knowledge” (see 
Andrade and Nicholls, 2017).
It should also be mentioned that unlike many large-scale projects that 
were proposed and never implemented (like the Manta-Manaos “multi-
modal, transportation axis”; or the Pacic Renery) during President 
Correa’s presidency, the Universities Project was implemented and can 
be evaluated as more than just a plan or a governmental promise. is is 
why, I would argue, it is a methodologically useful piece of evidence to 
understand a state-led scheme. 
An important contextual issue that must be pointed to is that between 
2008 and 2014 Ecuador’s Central Government enjoyed an unparalleled 
favourable environment to govern: commodity and petroleum prices 
were high; Correa and his party Alianza PAIS swept the electoral land-
scape; opposition parties, following the Constituent Assembly of 2008 
were largely dismantled; Correa had a solid majority in Congress and 
large portions of the region, particularly oil-rich Venezuela, coalesced be-
hind so-called 21st Century Socialism. In other words, conditions for the 
state to expand its presence in society were, if not ideal, very favourable. 
Hence, the government took advantage of the unprecedented favourable 
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conditions to undertake large, ambitious projects, most of which inclu-
ded changing major legal changes. 
In the eld higher education the main legal changes was to reform, 
basically, the entire regulatory system for higher education through the 
LOES and one of the main changes in the LOES was to place the state at the 
centre of the educational system. rough this legal reform new govern- 
mental bodies and agencies to oversee the higher education system were 
created; one of the most important of these governmental agencies was 
SENESCYT. SENESCYT became a key government agency during Co-
rrea’s presidency. rough its leadership (and President Correa’s backing) 
the Universities Project, especially the development of Yachay, became a 
centrepiece of the government’s schemes to reform higher education. 
Yachay, and the whole Universities Project, was a grandiose statement 
about a modernist vision of the future. e original plan for Yachay, as 
well as for the other three universities, envisioned a series of “know-
ledge networks” where knowledge production would be concentrated 
and spread trough the rest of society. In the specic case of Yachay, it 
meant the construction of an entire city. Yachay’s original plan involved 
developing 4.500 hectares of land over what were, in 2008, mainly unused 
agricultural lands, wetlands and the remains of an old hacienda, near the 
town of Urcuquí in the northern Province of Imbabura. In other words, 
building an entire city from scratch. e original investment was calcu-
lated to be around 5.7 billion dollars over 33 years (El Comercio, 2018: 
‹https://especiales.elcomercio.com/2017/10/yachay/#›). Similarly, Ikiam, 
UNAE and UNIARTES were to be erected in “distant” areas (from main 
urban centres) over unused lands that lacked the basic infrastructure 
for the development of a university towns, let alone “knowledge cities” 
equipped with labs, amphitheatres, studios and specialized venues, dor-
mitories and so on. During all of this it should be noted, the Universi-
ties Project remained (as it did throughout the period under analysis) 
a strictly a state-managed project. SENESCYT along with SENPLADES 
were in charge of coordinating the design implementation of the pro-
ject. ere was no real, systematic involvement of organized civil society, 
particularly from other public universities and educational sectors. e 
Universities Projects was truly a top-down a	air c.f. Cabrera et. Al, 2018; 
Villavicencio, 2013). 
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By 2016, all four universities had, in varying degrees, been built. In 
2014, Yachay and UNAE had begun recruiting students, had brought in 
and/or hired academics from top-tier technological universities from the 
Global North and were promoting its services internationally. By the end 
of 2015, however, when the ow of petrodollars had begun to dry-up, on-
going problems began to surface: none of the universities had been able 
adhere to the building schedule, the recruiting expectations and the aca- 
demic plans that had been part of the original design had fallen short 
of expectations. Corruption cases in the uinversities, particularly Yachay 
became public scandals (see El Universo: ‹https://www.eluniverso.com/
noticias/2018/02/14/nota/6622477/irregularidades-yachay-dos-exa 
menes-contraloria›). In the case of Yachay, planned physical dimensions, 
technological output and expected demographic density have had to be 
scaled down and/or entirely discarded. For instance, the original plan of 
developing 4500 hectares has now been scaled down to 382 hectares; its 
original (planned) population of 22000 is now set to be at around 2000 
–about 10% of what was expected! Finally, in 2018 Yachay has no high-
tech laboratories and much of its infrastructural development has been 
stopped as structural defects were detected in some of its buildings and 
even to the fact that streets were paved before a sewer system was built (El 
Comercio, 2018: ‹https://especiales.elcomercio.com/2017/10/yachay/#›). 
Before attempting to understand how the Universities Project crum-
bled, it is worth mentioning a few additional contextual that will be ana-
lytically useful. It should be mentioned that the country has a number of 
art, education and science public universities both at the graduate an un-
dergraduate levels. Moreover, the country’s largest universities are public, 
including the oldest universities in the country: e Central University 
of Ecuador and the National Polytechnic School. Similarly, in the elds 
of Education and Social Science, Ecuador has two postgraduate public-
international schools, which according the Central Government’s own 
ranking system, are ranked in the “A” level (highest); these are: Univer-
sidad Andina Simón Bolívar and FLACSO. It is important to mention 
these issues for at least two reasons. First, they point to the fact that Ecua- 
dor, notwithstanding a series of problems and shortcomings, counts with 
a number of well-established, public universities in the elds of arts and 
134 Esteban Nicholls
sciences, as well as in the social sciences and humanities; second, there 
is a vast pool of social, infrastructural and scientic capital already built 
around the country’s public higher education system. Both factors suggest 
a puzzling question: why build a parallel pu-blic system? Why underuti-
lize the experiential capital that Ecuador’s public system has developed? 
As mentioned earlier, I posit that the answer to this question must lie 
beyond an analysis of public policy about education or education reform. 
As I argue below, the explanation for the development of such a scheme 
and its failure lies in the realm of statecra and state theory. 
Radiography of a Failed Scheme:     
The example of Yachay 
Yachay was set to be, as President Correa stated in 2009, the rst 
planned city in the history of Ecuador. As many planned cities (like Bra-
zilia), Yachay required a reorganization of space and a certain “narrowing 
vision” (Scott, 1998: 11) that demanded simplication and abstraction. It 
also demanded an “ideological” or discursive component and it deman-
ded a strong sense of authority and coordination for its implementation. 
Not only in Yachay but also in the Universities Project as a whole, all of 
these elements, processes and tasks were organized and led by the state, 
mainly through SENESCYT. According to James C. Scott (1998), there 
are four criteria for a failed, state-led scheme: rst, is the administrative 
reordering of nature and society – what I would call an articial implan-
tation of the state in a natural and/or social systems; the second is a high 
modernist ideology; third a measure of authoritarianism and fourth, a 
limited civil society capable of opposing the state. e universities Project 
exhibits, in varying measures, all of these elements, especially the rst 
two, on which I will focus. 
All of the four universities in the Universities Project entailed an ad-
ministrative reorganization of nature and society. While Scott’s study 
selectively looks at projects where natural environments are re-ordered 
according to administrative planning systems in the state, the Universi-
ties Project is not exactly characterized by the reordering of nature like a 
planted forest (as opposed to a natural one –Scott, 1998: 11-12), but it is 
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very much an example of the reordering of space and society. Insofar as 
all four universities are located in specic sites whose geographic positio- 
ning is not related to already-existing social capital, productive chains, art 
networks, connectivity or social demands, their positioning responds to a 
scheme concocted at the level of specialized state agencies. Education en-
tails the movement of people; students and teachers must spend much of 
their lives at their universities. All of these universities require that large 
numbers of students, faculty, employees, sta	 and their families relocate 
to the universities themselves or nearby towns or cities. e aim accor- 
ding to state planners at the time was to decentralize knowledge produc-
tion (SENESCYT, 2009)– decentralization means, in this case, moving 
resources away from the centres of knowledge production in Ecuador, 
mainly its three largest cities, Guayaquil, Quito, and Cuenca. And this 
has been in fact the case: the majority of students and faculty members 
at all of these universities of the Universities Project are from Ecuador’s 
major cities and have had to relocate to their new work/study sites; mean-
while, by implication, students from the areas where these universities 
were inserted are not, proportionally speaking, attending these schools 
in signicant numbers (see El Comercio, 2017) 
e reordering of nature and society by means of planning can have 
positive e	ects, of course. As Scott himself states, his argument is not 
(and neither is this paper’s argument) that planning is pernicious per se. 
Instead, the point is that a central component of a failed, state-led scheme 
is the illegibility of common knowledge by state, top-down planning. is 
means “a hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role 
of local knowledge and know-how” (Scott, 1998: 6); this does not entail, 
Scott continues, “that practical knowledge is the product of some mythi-
cal, egalitarian state of nature... [the] point is that formal schemes of or-
der are untenable without some elements of the practical knowledge that 
they tend to dismiss” (Ibid: 7). In this respect, it would be useful to cite 
Arturo Villavicencio (2018: 141), one of Ecuador’s foremost analysts of 
higher education reforms. In an analysis of international university ran- 
kings, he states the following about Latin American public universities: 
International university rankings do not take into account a wide spectrum of the role 
and functions of Latin American universities, which goes beyond teaching and research 
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... [Latin American] public universities, in particular, have played a key role in the cons- 
truction of state institutions, in solving pressing [social] problems in their countries 
and, in general, in the provision of a wide range of communitarian goods and in the 
creation and recreation of national cultures. 
Villavicencio’s point is revealing in a number of ways. First, it evokes 
the notion of local knowledge in the sense that there are a series of par-
ticularities about Latin American public universities that international 
rankings miss. Likewise he Universities Project is rooted on a notion of 
academic performance that, as Villavicencio shows, may be useful a uni-
versity system distinct from Latin America’s, and specically Ecuador’s 
public system. Second, the production of knowledge cannot be disassocia- 
ted with its location. Many Latin American universities (including Ecua-
dorian ones) are also sites of public protest, political-parties formation 
and political resistance, or what I would call the provision of “political 
goods.” e provision of a political good escapes the logic of planning. It 
does not conform to the logic of a CalTech or an M.I.T. (which are cited 
by Yachay’s planners as templates –see Andrade and Nicholls, 2017–) not 
that there is anything wrong with these very successful and socially useful 
institutions. e point I want to make here is that the scheme laid out by 
the state in the Universities Project suggests the presence of, to repeat, a 
hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role of local 
knowledge (Scott, 1998: 6). I should note that –and this is perhaps an 
important di	erence between Scott’s argument and my own–. I am not 
arguing that the provision of a political good is necessarily a positive at-
tribute of Latin American public universities. Local knowledges are not 
always useful or even desirable, as Villavicencio and Scott seem to imply. 
ere are pernicious local knowledges, surely, but that is beside the point. 
e locus of my contention is that a tip-down planning system that is ar-
ticially implanted, that requires social relocation and dislocation, as the 
Universities Project does, is likely to fail. 
As mentioned before, the second criteria specied for a failed state-
led scheme in Scott’s book is the presence of high-modernism. Out of 
the four criteria specied by Scott, this is perhaps the most evident in 
the Ecuadorian case. Before I dene high-modernism, I should stop for 
a moment to make an important methodological point. I employ Scott’s 
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arguments heuristically. His arguments give analytical order to a complex 
problematic and show historical precedents for believing that the criteria 
he establishes for failed, state-led schemes are not only “real” but also 
interpretatively useful. But that is as far as I would like to go with that. I 
am not applying Scott’s arguments formulaically. As I argue later, there 
are limits to Scott’s argument that need to be addressed and complemen-
ted with other theoretical sources. Similarly, the historical examples that 
Scott presents are not always comparable to Ecuador’s specicities. I will 
point that out as I move along in my own argument. 
High modernism is related to the notion of the articial implantation 
I mentioned before. It is the administrative ordering of society and nature 
(i.e. the articial implantation of a state scheme) but “at a more ambitious 
and comprehensive level”(Scott, 1998: 94) Specically, high modernism 
refers to a
strong... version of the beliefs in scientic and technical progress that were associated 
with industrialization in Western Europe and in North America from roughly 1830 un-
til World War I. At its centre a supreme self-condence about continued linear progress. 
e development of scientic and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, 
the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not 
least, an increasing control over nature... High modernism is this a particular sweeping 
vision of how the benets of technical and scientic progress might be applied –usually 
through the state– in every eld of human activity (Scott, 1998: 89-90).
 One importance di	erence between high modernism and “articial 
implantation” is that, 
[T]he simplied, utilitarian descriptions of state o
cials had a tendency, through the exer- 
cise of state power, to bring facts into line with their representations, then one might 
say that the high-modern state began with extensive prescriptions of a new society and it 
intended in impose them (Ibid: 90; emphasis in the original) (Scott, 1998: 89). 
Finally, authoritarian high modernism, encompasses the notions that 
a. the state is willing to impose its “will” or that of its ruling elite (not 
necessarily according to class interest) and second as Scott puts it, that 
there is a “prostrate” civil society incapable of e	ectively opposing state 
interventions 
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Ecuadorian 21st Century       
High Modernism 
Scott divides, in broad terms, high modernism in two strands XIX 
century high modernism and XX Century Modernism. In other words, 
high modernism does change, while conserving a certain “essence,” as it 
were. In this section I would like to give the reader an idea of Ecuador-
ian high modernism in its specicities. First, Ecuadorian high moder- 
nism, like most examples in Scott’s book, could be described as ‘grandi-
ose.’ e Universities Project was, indeed, large and intended to be great. 
e objectives and aspirations linked to the construction of a parallel, 
public university system contrasts with anything Ecuador had seen in its 
past To begin with, the overall objective of higher education reform was 
the creation of an integrated socio-economic system based on the genera-
tion of knowledge through a new public system. Yolanda Alfaro (2018: 
95) describes the integrated system as follows: 
e policies aimed at the development of [the aforementioned] system, as a new tech-
nical-scientic and institutional tissue, seek to strengthen four grand pillars: 1. e 
formation and strengthening of scientic and technological cadres; 2. e establish-
ment of emblematic universities ... oriented along the strategic purposes of changing 
the [country’s] productive matrix; 3. e creation of scientic cities like Yachay that 
cluster university research centres, some public research institutes, a technological and 
industrial park, and 4. e creation of a new law the Organic Code of knowledge, In-
novation Economy (COESCi), to regulate the actions and interactions of all the actors 
related to the SIN [National Innovation System].
In similar fashion, each of the universities of the Universities Project 
has loy, grandiose objectives. UNAE’s institutional objectives number 
10 and 12 are, for instance, “[t]o innovate educational, pedagogical, di-
dactic and cognitive bridges [sic] between local and universal cultures in 
the search of an interculturality of respect, peace and the construction of 
the Good Living [buen vivir]. Objective 12 is “to audaciously (de forma 
audaz), ethically and innovatively, in close proximity with the state, and 
through education, achieve a more just, non-patriarchal, intercultural, 
equitable society and rooted in solidarity. (UNAE, 2018: ‹http://www.
unae.edu.ec/acerca-de-la-unae-m28ev›).
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Likewise, in 2009 during one of President Correa’s a weekly televised 
appearances, it was stated that Yachay’s objective was to transform Ecua- 
dor into an “exporter of knowledge”; Yachay, it was said, would be the 
most ambitious project of the last one –hundred years and would trans-
form Ecuador’s productive structures so that knowledge, not primary 
raw materials, would be the main axis of its economy. Yachay will be, 
according to government, the most important university of its kind in 
the region, and will lead to development in the rural community where 
it was implanted, Urcuquí, by enabling it to become the “owner of agro-
industrial, high-technology communal rms, in harmony with nature, 
seeking to improve their living standards and abandoning a history of ex-
ploitation and exclusion” (SENESCYT, 2009: ‹https://www.youtube.com/
channel/UCcra7p6wRrdz0QPdqFROM5g›). 
ese are but a few examples of a pattern that repeats throughout the 
Universities Project. 
To further state the ‘grandiose’ nature of these plans it would be use-
ful to contextualize them against the backdrop of Ecuadorian socio-eco-
nomic realities. e ‘grandiosity’ rests not only in the language or the 
self-condence of these plans and objectives, but in that fact that they are 
enunciated from Ecuador. Ecuador is a country where 60% of its popu-
lation works in the informal sector; a country whose main exports are 
petroleum, bananas and roses, not nanotechnology. In short, a country 
that is far from being a global technological innovator and one that re-
mains deeply rooted in a relation of dependency with exporters of know- 
ledge and technology like the United States, China and South Korea. It is 
also important, as I mentioned earlier, that Ecuador already counts with 
a relatively well-developed public university system (with a myriad of 
problems, of course), a fact that makes the Universities Project an even 
more grandiose, almost extravagant, scheme than these statements on 
their own reveal. 
To nalize this point, and this section, it would be worth quoting Villa- 
vicencio (2018: 138-139; my translation) at length: 
All the preoccupation... of public policies to emulate elite universities comes from a na-
ïve conception of the role of science and technology and, thus, of the universidad de ex-
celencia, as engine of a new promise of development. In this respect one should remem-
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ber that one of the serious problems facing education in many developing countries is 
the scale of the demand for professionals... it is oen forgotten that technological deve- 
lopment and innovation are, in general, limited not by the oversupply of professionals 
but by the lack of demand from the productive sector. Hence, it is not the absence of 
scientists and engineers, or the lack of research laboratories and world-class universi-
ties what restricts the innovations needed to restructure the economies of developing 
countries. In the case of Ecuador, for example, it is not the absence of biotechnology or 
nanotechnology engineers what causes the lack of industrial development around these 
new technologies. e reason must be found in the weakness of an innovation system 
[that does not focus] on productive dynamism [and] economic diversication... 
Anti-Political High Modernism
In this section I argue that the building of a parallel educational sys-
tem was rooted in an anti-political stance linked to a combination of high 
modernism and the strategic positioning of the state vis-à-vis existing 
social forces. According to Scott, high-modernism tends to devalue or 
banish politics. [P]olitical interests,” he writes, “can only frustrate the so-
cial solutions devised by specialists with scientic tools adequate to their 
analysis” (Ibid.). Other scholars have also found that the advance of cer-
tain power arrangements, within or beyond the state imply anti-political 
attitudes and e	ects (see Ferguson, 1994; Murray-Li, 2005; Nicholls, 2014 
N/P; Andrade and Nicholls, 2017). 
ere are various anti-political dimensions to the Universities Project 
that do not imply the clamping down of opposition –although in some 
instances it did. e rst and perhaps most obvious anti-political atti-
tude is implied in the denition of high modernism: “political interests” 
are obstacle to “social solutions devised by specialists.” e Universities 
Project is a project devised by specialists, no doubt, and it is also a project 
lled with intricacies, complex schemes, spatial recongurations, with 
little room for error or “outside” interference. 
e Universities Project, as mentioned before, is a parallel system of 
education. It was created as such by major legal reform through the crea- 
tion of the LOES. e Project began as an isolated scheme, even though, 
paradoxically, it was organized and led by the state. Once the LOES was 
enacted, and funding secured, SENESCYT organized a series of meetings 
141e “Universities Project”. Radiography of a Failed State Scheme
and forums to discuss the project, the only problem is that these forums 
did not equate to an institutionalized channel for the involvement of the 
pu-blic university “establishment.” is was particularly evident in the 
case of Yachay. In 2013, for instance, SENESCYT along with other state 
agencies organized the seminar entitled (in English) “ink Tank Yachay, 
2013.” ink Tank Yachay is described as follows: 
ink Tank YACHAY gathers specialists from Latin America, North America and Eu-
rope. ey will gather in the city of Ibarra for three days, during which they will get to 
know the implementation zone, and along with the YACHAY planning team, will de-
velop an action plan that will guide the design and implementation of neighbourhoods, 
buildings, landscapes and the infrastructure of YACHAY City (Yachay, 2013: ‹http://
www.yachay.gob.ec/think-tank-yachay-ciudad-del-conocimiento-yachay/›). 
e Universities Project in e	ect sought to bypass the di
cult conver-
sations that the government would have had to reform the higher educa-
tional system. It would also have had to hear notable criticisms about its 
futuristic visions. For instance, in 2013 the same year that the ink Tank 
YACHAY took place Villavicencio as well as others was already raising 
serious concerns about Yachay, Ikiam, UNAE and UNIARTES. Accor-
ding to Villavicencio the parallel system would eventually lead to a crisis 
of hegemony, a legitimacy crisis and a crisis in the institutionalization of 
the existing university system. More generally, Villavicencio, following 
Aboites (2012), argued that: 
e plan [Universities Project] leads to the further isolation of its schools and facul-
ties given that it places them in watertight spaces, without a realistic organic-insti-
tutional connection. Aboites (2012: 761) warns that ‘the di	erentiation that is being 
proposed can only be justied through the logic of the simplest of common senses, 
which believes that it is more e
cient to specialize and separate in order to become 
adequate to the demands of the market’ (Villavicencio, 2013: 5). 
In 2013 Villavicencio warned against a possible disintegration of the 
existing public system as result of developing parallel system. With the 
benet of hindsight, one could conclude, however, that Villavicencio was, 
in a way, wrong: the partial disintegration of the system happened to the 
parallel public system, not the long-standing, socially embedded public 
university system in Ecuador. e attempt to depoliticize higher educa-
tional was shielded behind a high modernist language (and practices) 
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that appealed to scientic rigour and systems of specialized knowledge 
that escaped Ecuadorian reality. e high modernist attempt to reform 
higher education in isolation from organized social forces and from the 
politics agonisms and the dissensus (Mou	e, 2000; Ranciere, 2001) that 
that e	ort would have entailed demanded, indeed, a parallel system. As 
I have argued, however, the Universities Project as it was conceived and 
implemented was bound to fail or, at least, fall short if its expectations – 
just as Scott’s “theory” would have predicted.
Moving Beyond Scott’s Arguments:     
Knowledge-Power and the State
In the nal sections of the paper I want to further stress the impor-
tance of the anti-political ethos of high modernism but in conjunction to 
an analysis of state power. One of Scott’s argument’s shortcomings is that 
the concept of power and state power, in particular, is underspecied. It 
is not surprising that those wielding power over others may seek to dimi- 
nish opposition to their schemes (i.e. to become anti-political, in Scott’s 
terms). As we saw above, the Universities Project was a neatly planned 
scheme that allowed little room for error and/or interference; the end 
result was a failed, anti-political “system” that could not contain the pres-
sures created by its own elevated standards and isolation. 
is, by implication, means that certain domains of knowledge are 
linked to certain domains of power. At this point it would be useful to 
specify that knowledge and power are related in more ways than it is 
implied in the truism “knowledge is power.” Knowledge and power are 
linked simply because those in power possess a more privileged access 
to the means of spreading knowledge; also, and by consequence, not all 
forms of knowledge are spread equally, evenly and/or fairly. Moreover, 
the linkage ‘power-knowledge’ lies in the fact that knowledge is produced 
in specic institutionalized sites, like universities and/or government 
agencies (like SENESCYT). Under this light, I would argue that a fur-
ther dimension in the analysis of the Universities Project is revealed: the 
Universities Pro-ject can be understood not only as a failed scheme from 
the educational standpoint, or simply as failed public policy, but also as a 
failed attempt to strengthen a particular form of state power. 
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In this respect I would point to two important aspects of state power: 
rst, state power “extends beyond coercion, imperative coordination, 
and positive law to include the mobilization and allocation of money and 
credit and the strategic use of intelligence, statistics, and other kinds of 
knowledge.” And second, it “includes e	orts by state agents to strategi-
cally rebalance modes of government and governance in order to improve 
the e	ectiveness of indirect as well as direct state intervention, includ-
ing the exercise of power at a distance from the state (Jessop, 2008: 53). 
With these annotations I want to suggest that the Universities Project is a 
govermental project designed to assert the state’s authority over the higher 
education sector, not by weakening it, as has been the focus of a number of 
critics, (see Villavicencio, 2013; Cabrera, et al. 2018) but by improving it. 
is idea may appear counterintuitive at rst and a few clarifying re-
marks are in order. e system of which I speak, the object of govern- 
mental improvement, is not the already-existing Ecuadorian higher edu-
cation system, with its universities and institutions and so on; it is an ab-
straction that state o
cials form in order to improve it; it is, furthermore, 
a reason for the state to intervene in the education system in ways and 
degrees it had not done in the past (c.f. Murrai-Li, 2005; Walters, 2012; 
Nicholls, 2014N/P). e objective of the state was to create a governable 
space (i.e. the Universities Project) in which the messiness and unpre-
dictability of politics would be avoided. 
In this sense, it is clear that the type of knowledge, whether it is the 
eld of arts or the hard sciences, is linked to a type of power, in this case, 
“developmental” (Johnson, 1982; Woo-Cummings, 1999) state-led po- 
wer. In this respect this excerpt from an interview with René Ramirez 
may be revealing: 
Ecuador is not a country that researches –[Ecuadorian] universities do not conduct 
research. It is worth noting that that the law [LOES] does not tell either private or public 
universities that they must align themselves with the [government’s] plan. What it states 
is that articulations must exist, and that the state has the right to say: “these investiga-
tions are priorities for the new development strategy we wish to pursue...” (Mazzano, 
2009: ‹http://revistas.usfq.edu.ec/index.php/polemika/article/view/325/443›).
Elsewhere I have argued that state power, particularly developmental 
state power, can be understood genealogically, that is, by looking at the 
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history of how government creates domains of intervention (see Nicholls, 
2014 N/P; forthcoming, 2018; Andrade and Nicholls, 2017). e Univer-
sities Project is particularly useful in illustrating how the state created a 
governable space aer deeming the actual system ungovernable. Another 
of Ramirez’s statements illustrates this point: 
In U.S. universities one can nd a liberal, a republican, a socialist, or someone from 
the le; that can be guaranteed through democratic processes. e co-government of 
universities [i.e. by universities and the state] is a principle that seeks to form …certain 
values that, in many cases, have been lost in [local] universities. We must avoid what has 
happened to public universities –a politicization that has led …to the dilution of what 
ought to be the most important thing– debating ideas (Mazzano, 2009: ‹http://revistas.
usfq.edu.ec/index.php/polemika/article/view/325/443›). 
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the Universities Project must be unders- 
tood as an expression of state power. It is not just a failed educational-re-
form scheme; it was a failure to strengthen a form of state power-develop- 
mental state power. In seeking to understand why such a grand scheme 
failed I sough to analyse the Universities Project beyond its policy failu- 
res, which are many. In the process I noticed the remarkable coincidences 
between the Universities Project and its specic failures and Scott’s con-
ceptual framework for understanding how states fail to impose their au-
thority. I have also analyzed the Project by looking at it from the logic of 
the constitution of a governmental space for intervention and how the 
state constructed a space for it to exercise the tutelage over the produc-
tion of knowledge. is attempt was also a relative failure, but it is not a 
failure of an education scheme, it was a failure to construct the state –a 
failure of statecra. 
For reasons of space I have not detailed the specicities of how the state 
constructed the scheme: the use of maps, statistic, reinventions of space and 
so on. And this is something that could be undertaken in a future project. 
I have also come short of discussing the nancial details of the project. It 
is, aer all, important to remember that the project and the failed develop- 
mental state occurred during a large inow of petrodollars. It is aer all 
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not possible to fully understand the project without acknowledging that 
the grandiosity of the Universities Project was fuelled by economic af- 
uence. Nonetheless, by linking two approaches to understanding the 
state and state interventions I have, hopefully, disclosed a new dimen-
sion of the universities Project, one which does goes beyond the notion 
of policy failure, state authority as pure negative imposition and/or the 
concept of “ine
ciency” to understand failed, state-led shcemes. 
References
Alfaro, Yolanda (2018) “La selección del ENES como determinante en la falla de la 
política de acceso a la educación superior en Ecuador”. In Santiago Cabrera, 
Cristina Cielo, Kintia Moreno and Pablo Ospina (Eds.) La reforma universi-
taria en Ecuador (2008-2016): Extravíos, ilusiones y realidades. Quito: Corpo-
ración Editora Nacional 
Andrade, Pablo. & Esteban Nicholls (2017). La relación entre capacidad y autoridad 
en el Estado: La construcción de un Estado ‘Excepcionalista’ en Ecuador. ER-
LACS, ( 103 ), 1–24 . DOI: ‹http://doi.org/10.18352/erlacs.10154›.
Cabrera, Santiago, Cielo Cristina, Moreno Kintia and Pablo Ospina (Eds.) (2018) La re-
forma universitaria en Ecuador (2008-2016): Extravíos, ilusiones y realidades. 
Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional 
El Comercio (2017) Yachay: Los planes fallidos de un megaproyecto. DOI: ‹https://
especiales.elcomercio.com/2017/10/yachay/#›.
Foucault, M. (1994a). Power: e Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Vol 3, J.D. 
Faubion (Ed.), Rabinow, P. (series ed). New York: e New Press.  
Jessop, Bob (1990) State eory. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press. 
–––––,  (2008), State Power. Cambridge Polity Press. 
–––––, (2007) “From Micro-Powers to Governmentality: Foucault’s Work on State-
hood, State Formation, Statecra and State Power,” Political Geography, 26. 
Johnson, Chalmers (1982). MITI and the Japanese miracle: e growth of industrial 
policy (1925- 1975). Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
–––––, (1999). e developmental state: Odyssey of a concept. En M. Woo-Cum-
mings (Ed.) 
Mazzano, Giussepe (2009) “Universidad, libertad y bien común”. Entrevista a René 
Ramirez. Poemika 2(10). DOI:‹ http://revistas.usfq.edu.ec/index.php/polemi-
ka/article/view/325/443›.
Ministry of Culture, (2013) “Creación de Yachay, Ikiam, Unae y Uniartes ya está en la 
Asamblea Nacional”. DOI ‹https://www.culturaypatrimonio.gob.ec/creacion-
de-yachay-ikiam-unae-y-uniartes-ya-esta-en-la-asamblea-nacional/›.
146 Esteban Nicholls
Mou	e, Chantale (2009) En torno a lo político. Buenos Aires: Fondo de cultura 
económica.
Nicholls, Esteban (2014), “Towards a eoretical Understating of How to Study the 
State: Governmentality, Power and Governmental Regimes.” Universidad An-
dina Simón Boíivar, Repositorio Digital. 
Ranciére, Jacques (2001) Ten esis on Politics. eory and Event, 5(3), 1-33. e devel-
opmental state. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Scott, James C. (1999) Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human 
condition have failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Villavivencio, Arturo (2013a) “La universidad Virtuosa”. University Paper, Quito: 
UASB. 
Villavicencio, Arturo (2013b). ¿Hacia dónde va el proyecto universitario de la Revolu-
ción Ciudadana?. En J. Cuvi, D. Machado, & A. Oviedo (Eds.). El correísmo al 
desnudo. Quito: Montecristi Vive. 
Walters, William (2012) Governmentality. London: Routledge
Woo-Cummings, Meredith (Ed.) (1999). e developmental state. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press. 
Yachay (2013) “Primer encuentro internacional ink Tank YACHAY Ciudad del 
Conocimiento”. DOI: ‹http://www.yachay.gob.ec/think-tank-yachay-ciudad- 
del-conocimiento-yachay/›.

La Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar es una institución 
académica de nuevo tipo, creada para afrontar los desafíos 
del siglo XXI. Como centro de excelencia, se dedica a la in-
vestigación, la enseñanza y la prestación de servicios para la transmisión de conocimientos cien-
tícos y tecnológicos.
La Universidad es un centro académico abierto a la cooperación internacional, tiene como eje 
fundamental de trabajo la reexión sobre América Andina, su historia, su cultura, su desarrollo 
cientíco y tecnológico, su proceso de integración, y el papel de la Subregión en América Latina y 
el mundo.
La Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar fue creada en 1985 por el Parlamento Andino. Es un 
organismo del Sistema Andino de Integración. La Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar se esta-
bleció en el Ecuador en 1992. Es la primera universidad del Ecuador en recibir un certicado 
internacional de calidad y excelencia. 
La Sede Ecuador realiza actividades, con alcance nacional e internacional, dirigidas a la Co-
munidad Andina, América Latina y otros ámbitos del mundo, en el marco de áreas y programas 
de Letras, Estudios Culturales, Comunicación, Derecho, Relaciones Internacionales, Integración 
y Comercio, Estudios Latinoamericanos, Historia, Estudios sobre Democracia, Educación, Ado-
lescencia, Salud y Medicinas Tradicionales, Medio Ambiente, Derechos Humanos, Migraciones, 
Gestión Pública, Dirección de Empresas, Economía y Finanzas, Estudios Agrarios, Estudios In-
terculturales, Indígenas y Afroecuatorianos.
El Colegio de América Sede Latinoamericana es un centro dedica-
do a promover la actividad académica, el intercambio y el desarrollo 
de iniciativas entre Europa y América Latina. Su objetivo básico es in-
tensicar la cooperación entre instituciones universitarias, programas y proyectos, con el n de 
consolidar espacios de diálogo y trabajo común. Realiza actividades culturales y cientícas, con 
énfasis en la participación de varios países.
El Colegio de América Sede Latinoamericana fue establecido en Quito y funciona con sede 
en la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, mediante un convenio de colaboración. Funciona en 
estrecha coordinación con El Colegio de América de la Universidad Pablo de Olavide. Para ello 
se suscribió un convenio especíco en la ciudad de Sevilla.
El Colegio de América promueve eventos académicos, proyectos de investigación cientíca y 
cultural, iniciativas de intercambio y actividades de integración. Apoya programas de docencia 










Ecuador is a country that arouses interest in its current 
situation. Aer an economic boom, it is now going through 
a severe crisis. At the end of a decade of an authoritarian 
government identifying itself with “21st century socialism”, 
human rights and freedom of expression abuses are being 
exposed. As the facts are being laid bare, an entire system of 
abuse of power and corruption from the government is 
emerging.
e present work brings together various papers focusing 
on these realities. ey tackle several aspects of the coun-
try’s context today and in the immediate past: poverty, 
economic changes, political power and its relationship to 
social movements, extractivism and its impacts, art and 
literature.
Despite interest in this subject, the literature on Ecuador’s 
realities is quite scant. at is why we hope the present publi-
cation will contribute meaningfully to further knowledge 
about the country.
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